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Tinni Sen, VSSJ Co-Editor; sensb@vmi.edu

Mary Stegmaier, VSSJ Co-Editor; stegmaier@virginia.edu

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MULTIPLE-SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS AND THE ENGAGEMENT OF CITIZENS IN SOCIAL MARKETING CAMPAIGNS: THE CASE OF LYNNHAVEN RIVER NOW

Madeleine W. McNamara
William M. Leavitt
John C. Morris
Old Dominion University

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ABSTRACT

This paper reports on research that examines the collaborative efforts of multiple-sector partners to engage citizens and stakeholder groups through the use of social marketing campaigns. Multiple-sector partnerships involving collaborative efforts between public, non-profit, and private organizations present many unique challenges. We examine the collaborative structure developed to address water quality issues in the Lynnhaven River in Virginia Beach, Virginia. We find that collaborative structures are enhanced by the movement of people between collaborative partners, and that specialization among partners tends to make social marketing a largely independent activity.

INTRODUCTION

There are a variety of tools that today's public managers can use to induce social and behavioral change. One of these tools is known as social marketing and involves selling a social cause by targeting specific changes in citizen behavior (Fox & Kotler, 1980; Kotler & Zaltman, 1971; Weiss, 2002). The fundamental objective of social marketing is to voluntarily influence behavior and generate social benefit (Andreasen, 2002; Andreasen, 1994; Bloom & Novelli, 1981).

Social change programs can be used to address a wide range of issues varying in complexity. Although social marketing was initially applied to public health (Andreasen, 2002), its application has widened considerably. Today, social marketing may be used to address issues such as conservation, illiteracy, medical research,

educational opportunities, violence prevention, safe driving, carpooling, environmental protection, health promotion, anti-smoking, or AIDS prevention (Andreasen, 1994; 2002; Fox & Kotler, 1980; Kotler & Roberto, 1989; Kotler & Zaltman, 1971; Mazis, 1997). While this does not represent an exhaustive list, the variety of these issues illustrates considerable opportunities for the practical application of social marketing tools.

Organizations within the private, government, and nonprofit sectors are often involved in the design, implementation, and monitoring of programs involved in social change (Andreasen, 2002). As these programs attempt to generate compliance from many people, a single sector may be less effective at inducing behavior changes to achieve the desired outcome. This paper will focus on engaging citizens in various social marketing initiatives that involve multiple sector partnerships. By working together, multiple sectors may generate social change that goes beyond what any sector can individually accomplish. The purpose of this paper is to identify ways in which collaboration can be used to engage citizens and establish multiple-sector partnerships in social marketing campaigns. We address these issues through the lens of a case study of Lynnhaven River Now, a non-profit organization created to work with citizens, businesses, and government in Virginia Beach, Virginia to address water quality concerns in the Lynnhaven River. It is through this exploratory approach that information rich data is collected to look at social marketing campaigns in a unique way. This research is important because the collaboration and social marketing literatures have not otherwise been linked.

The first section of this paper introduces the concept of collaboration. The second section presents an overview of the social marketing literature. Next, the methodology used in this study is described, followed by the details of the case study and discussion. The paper concludes with several observations about collaboration and social marketing.

COLLABORATION

Before linkages between the collaboration and social marketing literatures are established, it is important to understand the definition of collaboration and the basic management philosophy utilized in collaborative arrangements. Today's public managers often face complex social problems defined within the public administration literature as "wicked" problems (Harmon & Mayer, 1986; Keast, Mandell, Brown & Woolcock, 2004; Rittel and

Webber, 1973). “These are the problems with no solutions, only temporary and imperfect resolutions” (Harmon & Mayer, 1986, p. 9). Increased demands for public services coupled with fewer resources further exacerbate the inabilities of unitary organizations to independently address these complex problems. As a result, public managers often identify interdependencies with nongovernmental partners and work across bureaucratic boundaries in order to increase government’s capacity for action.

The Nature of Collaboration

While various types of interactions are defined within the organizational theory literature and may be considered to address complex problems (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattesich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001), this paper will focus specifically on collaborative interactions. Collaborative interactions may be most appropriate in the following circumstances: when other types of interaction have failed; when complex situations of crisis occur; when problems are so interconnected that responsibility is shared; or when there is a win-win situation based on mutual interest (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Imperial, 2005; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004). Public managers may use collaborative arrangements when faced with complex situations that require high levels of interaction. Collaborative interactions are based on high intensity, long-term connections, and highly integrated relationships that may create blurred organizational boundaries (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Multiple partners work together to address complex problems that cannot be resolved individually (Gray, 1989). Mattesich, Murray-Close, and Monsey (2001) describe collaboration as follows:

“Collaboration connotes a more durable and pervasive relationship. Collaborations bring previously separated organizations into a new structure with full commitment to a common mission. Such relationships require comprehensive planning and well-defined communication channels operating on many levels. Authority is determined by the collaborative structure. Risk is much greater because each member of the collaboration contributes its own resources and reputation. Resources are pooled or jointly secured, and the products are shared” (p. 60).

Managing Collaborative Arrangements

Collaborative management is based on a participative approach that emphasizes shared power among all participants within a multi-organizational arrangement (Crosby, 1996). In these arrangements, public managers do not have authority to command a specific course of action. Instead, the collective group establishes goals that are intended to resolve problems that cannot be resolved by an individual organization (Agranoff, 2006; McGuire, 2006). Rather than formal authority based on position, all participants may lead and mobilize resources in order to attain the objectives of the collective group (Crosby, 1996). Collaborative management relies on flexibility, shared power, and diverse perspectives to attain the goals established by the collaborative group (McNamara, 2008).

Collaborative arrangements are typically convened by a referent organization (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2006; Wood & Gray, 1991). Personnel within this organization identify an important problem and play a significant role in bringing legitimate stakeholders together to achieve a particular purpose (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2006; Wood & Gray, 1991). Through resource and information exchange, a referent organization facilitates interactions between organizations and generates stability within the organizational environment (Morris & Burns, 1997). According to Gray (1989), a referent organization must have the following: power to persuade stakeholder participation, legitimacy and credibility among stakeholders, ability to establish collaborative processes, and capability to identify relevant stakeholders. Since personnel within the convening organization do not have formal power or authority over other organizations within the network, informal influence must be generated through expertise and credibility (Keast, Mandell, Brown & Woolcock, 2004; Wood & Gray, 1991). It is essential that all members of the collaboration perceive the convener to hold legitimate authority to organize the arrangement (Gray, 1985).

SOCIAL MARKETING

In a traditional sense, marketing is described as a business activity that includes an exchange process of goods or services between two or more parties (Kotler & Zaltman, 1971). A specific subcategory of marketing, known as social marketing, was first introduced in 1971 (Andreasen, 2002; Kotler & Roberto, 1989). Since this introduction, organizations from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors have increasingly used marketing logic to attain socially beneficial goals by promoting or preventing specific

behavior among a particular target audience (Andreasen, 1994; 2002; Fox & Kotler, 1980; Kotler & Zaltman, 1971; Rothschild, 1979). Social marketing is defined by Andreasen (1994) as follows:

“Social marketing is the adaptation of commercial marketing technologies to programs designed to influence the voluntary behavior of target audiences to improve their personal welfare and that of the society of which they are a part” (p. 110).

Approaches to Social Marketing

Social marketing uses a combination of legal, technological, economic, and informational approaches to induce social change (Fox & Kotler, 1980). Each approach induces change in different ways. A legal approach involves regulatory laws; a technological approach involves developing new technology; an economic approach involves providing financial incentives; and an informational approach involves creating awareness through persuasive information (1980). People often mistake the informational approach for social marketing. It is important to recognize that this approach, also defined as social advertising, represents only one of four ways to approach social marketing.

The information approach is most often used to inform the citizenry and generate awareness pertaining to the broader consequences of aggregated individual actions. A variety of tools such as public information campaigns, television ads, posters, dissemination of research findings, public hearings, or educational sessions can be used to convey a particular message (Weiss, 2002). Although these tools may differ in the ways they distribute information, all are intended to convey a particular message in hopes of producing a socially desired effect (2002).

In order for an information approach to be effective, it must reach its intended audience and persuade them to engage in the desired behavior (Kotler & Roberto, 1989; Weiss, 2002). While the tools within the information approach are most often used, a single social marketing tool may be unable to generate the desired social behavior. The more tools used in a social marketing campaign, the greater the likeliness of changing the targeted social behavior (Fox & Kotler, 1980; Weiss, 2002). For example, educational sessions rely on voluntary compliance and the use of this tool alone does not ensure desired behavior changes actually occur. Therefore, educational sessions may be a more effective tool when used in conjunction with other social marketing tools. Educational sessions combined with a legal approach based on coercion or an economic

approach offering financial incentives may do more to enhance awareness for a particular issue (Rothschild, 1999).

Social marketing tools can be utilized at all levels of government, but there is much debate surrounding their effectiveness (Andreasen, 2002; Weiss, 2002). These tools are most appropriately used in situations where the target audience is widely dispersed, voluntary compliance is expected, the desired outcomes are socially supported, or it is inappropriate to use authoritative tools (Weiss, 2002). Many governmental entities utilize social marketing tools because they are perceived to be an easy way to inform a large number of people and generate a specific policy outcome (2002). However, this simplicity can be deceptive. In order to change social behaviors, it is not enough simply to provide information to a group of citizens and hope that the intended outcome is achieved (Andreasen, 1994). Social marketing campaigns must be actively managed to ensure the desired behavior changes are achieved.

In traditional marketing, managers must consider the four P's related to a specific campaign: product, price, promotion, and place (Kotler & Zaltman, 1971). Desired exchanges among consumers are elicited by continuously balancing these four areas (1971). Similarly, social marketers must continuously balance the characteristics of the target audience, the information intended to influence behavior, and the communication channels used to deliver this information to ensure the socially desired behavior is achieved. Both traditional marketers and social marketers thus have specific elements of a campaign they must consider, but the important elements of a social marketing campaign differ substantially from those of a traditional marketing campaign (Kotler, Roberto, & Lee, 2002).

Social marketing can be done by individual organizations utilizing their available resources. For small organizations, this limits their ability to reach a target audience. Collaboration allows organizations to combine resources to better achieve those goals. However, collaboration requires certain compromises on the part of every member organization, and those must be balanced against the desire or need to achieve the stated goals. In the case of social marketing, organizations can collaborate to draw on expertise, reputation, market penetration, and resources to get their message in front of a larger audience and thus increase the chances that they will modify behaviors. Our case study explores ways in which organizations collaborate and share resources to deliver a social marketing message important to each individual organization. By themselves, none of these participating organizations have the

resources to achieve the desired results; however, by collaborating with other like-minded organizations in a multiple-sector partnership, each organization can draw on the strengths of the collaborative to accomplish their shared objectives.

METHODS

The methodological approach employed in this paper is a single case study design. Collaboration issues are generally complex, with many potential variables present in the setting. This situation does not lend itself to quantitative, large-N studies, but does fit well with an in depth case study approach that allows the researchers to gain deeper insight into the dynamics of complex human interactions. Furthermore, there is no extant literature available on collaborative social marketing campaigns, so there is little guidance in the literature about how to approach these questions. Therefore, the case study approach is an appropriate method to explore these issues.

The information in this section of the paper is drawn from a series of unstructured and semi-structured interviews conducted with representatives of Lynnhaven River Now, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, and the City of Virginia Beach. After we identified two or three individuals involved in the collaboration, we conducted interviews with those people, and then used a snowball sampling method to identify other key individuals in the collaborative social marketing arrangement. These interviews were conducted during January and February 2008 in various offices of these three organizations. In order to protect the confidentiality of the interviewees, no direct references to these people are provided in this paper. All interviews were conducted by the authors. We also reviewed a series of documents pertaining to the collaborative obtained by the researchers from the participating organizations. These documents were used to provide background information on the various organizations, their history, and their involvement in social marketing campaigns.

The interview data were reviewed by the research team, and examined for emergent themes. The team discussed these themes, and the data were reexamined against these themes for accuracy and consistency. Our examinations indicated that the themes were very consistent across all interviewees, leading us to conclude that these themes capture the essence of the nature of the collaborative social marketing efforts undertaken by this partnership.

CASE STUDY: LYNNHAVEN RIVER NOW

Lynnhaven River Now (LRN) is a small, nonprofit organization located in Virginia Beach, Virginia. The organization was founded in 2002 by three prominent Virginia Beach businessmen who were concerned about the deteriorating state of the river. The Lynnhaven River is a tidal estuary which flows into the Chesapeake Bay. The Lynnhaven was once famous along the East coast of the United States for its prized oysters, which declined dramatically over the past several decades due to pollution and runoff (Harper, 2009, July 7). The Lynnhaven River watershed is currently home to more than 200,000 people, which is almost half the population of the city of Virginia Beach. The three branches of the Lynnhaven have over 150 miles of shoreline and hundreds of acres of marsh, mudflat, and shallow water habitats (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2002).

The mission of LRN was stated by the founders in a simple, understandable form: clean up the River to once again allow oysters to be harvested and safely consumed by the public. Despite their personal wealth and standing in the community, the founders recognized that they needed to collaborate with other organizations to capture the expertise and resources needed to make LRN successful. The founders persuaded the City of Virginia Beach, other businesses and nonprofit organizations, and citizens to partner with LRN and get involved in the cleanup of the River.

The founders convinced city officials to enter into a memorandum of understanding to share city resources and help with the start-up of LRN. The first Director of LRN was a city administrator who split his time between his city duties and his new role as Director of LRN. By agreement, his salary for the two days a week he spent performing his duties as the Director of LRN was paid for by the founding businessmen from their own resources and through their fundraising efforts. This arrangement protected the city from any charges that public resources were being unfairly directed to the activities of a favored nonprofit group. This startup arrangement worked very well since the cooperation of many city departments, such as, Public Works, Public Utilities, and Parks and Recreation, were needed to accomplish the overall mission of LRN.

The city administrator who first served as the Director of LRN focused on three key areas. First, he focused his efforts on regulation. In other words, it was important to identify what regulations were needed to help clean up the river. Regulatory examples included no discharge zones and clean marina regulations.

Second, the Director of LRN focused on community outreach and education. This effort began with a simple campaign to get dog owners to “scoop the poop.” Third, special projects were initiated. These projects included oyster gardening, the use of rain barrels, and the elimination of residential septic systems.

To accomplish the objectives in these three areas the Director developed a committee structure for LRN. Each committee was assigned responsibility for one aspect of LRN’s mission, such as clean boating; education; special events involving cleanup and waterway adoption; public relations and marketing; landscaping; and oyster restoration. The committees were staffed by volunteers, city staff, members of the business community, and staff from other environmental nonprofit organizations. The use of this committee structure allowed LRN to operate with a small staff consisting of four employees, three of whom work part-time. This structure benefits from enthusiastic volunteers and the innovative ideas proposed by other organizations with expertise in environmental issues and city operations. LRN is a citizen-oriented organization; they excel at leveraging resources and generating grassroots participation through the committee structure. In addition to the working committees, an Executive Committee was established to oversee the operation of LRN.

Major Themes of the Case Study

Four important themes gleaned from our study of Lynnhaven River Now are particularly relevant to multiple-sector partnerships and the engagement of citizens in social marketing campaigns. A discussion of these four themes is presented in the following section of this paper.

Specialization within Collaboration

This first theme of this case study inquires into why LRN chose collaboration as a means to accomplish its objectives and mission. The clear answer is that the mission of cleaning up the Lynnhaven River could not be independently accomplished by a single organization. LRN identified organizations that were like-minded in their goals and approaches, and that also had resources to bring to the collaborative that LRN lacked. A collaborative partnership between the nonprofit, public, and private sectors was seemingly the only way to clean the river and accomplish LRN’s mission. Although all organizations were committed to the mission, each played a different role in cleaning up the River. Success required task specialization. One of the first important activities of

the founders was to identify organizations to include in the collaborative partnership. The City of Virginia Beach was a key partner in the collaborative process, but government officials did not have the needed level of credibility to affect behavioral changes among city residents. More than one interviewee commented that citizens were more willing to change their behaviors and understand how their actions adversely affected the cleanliness of the river if the message was delivered by a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization such as LRN. The city's role in the partnership was specialized to spearhead projects that did not directly involve citizen education or social marketing efforts.

In many senses, the organizations in the collaborative were not "chosen" to help; they volunteered to help. In essence, the collaborative is a coalition of the willing, in that they share goals and have at least some values in common. There are a limited number of organizations dedicated to environmental stewardship, and even fewer still with a focus in Southeastern Virginia. As will be noted later, there is a significant amount of communication of employees and donors between these organizations, and they are clearly known to each other. It is thus not surprising that these organizations gravitated together to address these goals. There appears to be no minimum or maximum number of organizations that need to be involved in order to achieve the goals of the collaborative; instead, the number of organizations depends on individual specializations and the availability of resources for the partnership. Collective specializations and resources must address sufficiently the problems at hand.

Funding and resources were essential to support the operations of LRN and its partners. This need was intensified because many of the nonprofit organizations involved in river clean-up were "chasing the same dollars." Funding for LRN was creatively raised primarily through two initiatives. First, citizen involvement played an important role in the initial funding for LRN. The founders asked residents living on the Lynnhaven River (the list was provided by the City Assessor's Office) to join LRN by contributing one thousand dollars a year for three years. This effort raised fifty thousand dollars. Second, LRN entered a contractual arrangement with the City of Virginia Beach to provide public education. This idea was proposed by a city executive who saw the contract as a legitimate way to financially support LRN. As one interviewee noted, "environmental cleanup is not a problem in need of a solution, but rather a solution in need of funding." For example, farmers and water treatment plants are willing to upgrade water

treatment methods and do the “right thing” but they need funding. Collaborating to raise money will always be a difficult challenge for partners since each organization involved has different funding needs and priorities.

Specialization in a collaborative setting requires that activities of the different partners be effectively coordinated by a “central player” capable of getting the attention of all the organizations involved and getting them to focus on the work needed to accomplish the objectives. The role of this central player or referent organization is discussed below.

The Role of a Referent Organization

The second theme in this case study addresses the role of LRN as the referent organization. More specifically, the three LRN founders formed the collaborative arrangement around the issue of poor water quality in the Lynnhaven River. The City of Virginia Beach, local businesses and nonprofit organizations, and citizens were identified as legitimate stakeholders. With the help of political and financial connections, the three founders persuaded these stakeholders to work with LRN to improve the water quality in the Lynnhaven River.

As a nonprofit organization, LRN relied on informal, mutually beneficial relationships to generate support and establish credibility. The LRN founders convinced the city manager of Virginia Beach that a partnership between the two organizations was necessary. Local businesses, such as a seafood restaurant wanting to serve oysters from the Lynnhaven River, generated financial support for LRN through fundraising events. Citizens were encouraged to become stewards of the river. Those living along the Lynnhaven River were asked to make a donation to LRN. Interviews with personnel from LRN and the City of Virginia Beach suggested that it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for the city to establish these same informal relationships. Within the network arrangement, LRN cultivated collaborative processes by incorporating city personnel and citizens into their committee structure. Based on their expertise and local connections with the citizenry, LRN was viewed as the legitimate convener of the collaborative arrangement.

The Movement of Key Players between Organizations in the Partnership

The third theme in this case study involves the movement of key administrators and environmental experts between the different

organizations in the partnership. As previously noted, a City of Virginia Beach administrator originally staffed LRN and was involved in establishing the organization's structure and mission. He also played an instrumental role in developing a close working relationship between various city agencies and LRN. When LRN became a financially viable organization, permanent staff members were hired. These staff members were drawn from other nonprofit organizations, such as the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, that partnered with LRN. Based on the interviews conducted, it became clear that this movement of key players created value congruence between partnering organizations. Collaborations function best when there is a high level of trust between the partners, and this movement of staff between organizations seemingly contributes to an environment based on trust.

The committee structure utilized by LRN enhanced opportunities to involve key personnel from partnering organizations. More specifically, subject-matter experts appeared to move among partnering organizations based on the demands of a particular project. In some cases, such as restocking the river with oysters, a project was begun by one partner and then turned over to LRN to manage and sustain. Despite the movement of the project across organizational boundaries, the original personnel were maintained regardless of their organizational affiliation. For example, the LRN committees included Virginia Beach school system science teachers who were instrumental in providing LRN access to school children for educational programs. The movement of these teachers between the school system and LRN was critical to the education mission of the organization. In addition, employees from private sector partners, such as the Dollar Tree Corporation, were also included on the LRN committees. As financial contributors to LRN, these private sector representatives could ensure their contributions were being used in the manner intended.

The movement of people between the partnering organizations not only contributed to strong, trust-based collaborative efforts, but also provided access to targeted populations and enhanced creativity as new ideas were widely shared among the partners.

Social Marketing and Education

The fourth theme of this case study involves citizen engagement through educational programs as a social marketing strategy. Several interviewees indicated that citizen appreciation is an important aspect in developing stewardship. If citizens do not

understand the impact of their actions, than they are more likely to behave irresponsibly. Therefore, LRN relies heavily on several different educational strategies in hopes of changing social behaviors that detrimentally impact the health of the Lynnhaven River. Some of the more important strategies and activities are highlighted in the following paragraphs.

First, the LRN staff works closely with science coordinators in the Virginia Beach school district. Presenting programs to teach school children about environmental problems within the watershed and potential solutions was a key activity. The potential for these educational initiatives to change behavior is twofold. Children, it was noted, are the future stewards of the environment. If they are taught socially desired behaviors at a young age it is more that they will engage in these behaviors as they get older. Educating children also provides a direct line of influence to their parents who may also be persuaded to change their behaviors. Education in the schools is an ongoing activity and workshops and projects are provided by LRN for teachers. All teachers are required to receive annual training for state certification; the LRN staff offers training opportunities for teachers to help fulfill these annual requirements.

A second strategy employed by LRN was to work closely with community civic organizations located within the Lynnhaven River watershed. Through education efforts with civic organizations, important topics such as the difference between point and non-point pollution were discussed. Although the majority of citizens do not participate in their local civic organizations, it was hoped that those who did participate would educate their neighbors about the pollution problems affecting the river and the steps necessary to reduce the level of pollution. Along the same lines, LRN provided workshops for interested citizens to teach river-friendly landscaping practices.

Third, community outreach was an important part of LRN's social marketing effort. LRN regularly set up booths at conventions and home and garden shows with appropriate literature available to educate citizens about river-friendly ideas and practices. In addition to educating citizens, one interviewee noted that social marketing can also motivate citizens to pressure their state and federal legislators to provide funding for environmental cleanup and pass laws to protect the environment.

A fourth educational strategy of LRN involved professional landscapers and lawn service companies. Since many homeowners in the Lynnhaven River watershed utilize the services of these professional companies, LRN specifically targeted their educational

efforts towards these companies. LRN provides educational courses for these professionals in such areas as nutrient management, the construction of water gardens, and the creation of buffer zones on customer properties to prevent runoff to the river system. In exchange for educational participation, LRN advertises specific landscapers and lawn service companies as river-friendly businesses. This allows concerned citizens to choose companies that utilize environmentally-friendly practices.

Lastly, LRN's educational strategies include outreach to City of Virginia Beach departments and employees. As a major partner in the cleanup of the River, it was important that the city focus on environmentally-friendly practices. It would not be possible to convince private sector organizations to do things that the city, as a partner, was unwilling to do. LRN provides training to city departments on such practices as pavement runoff containment.

When looking at the broader network of organizations focused directly or indirectly on the health of the Lynnhaven River, the educational initiatives of LRN can be used in conjunction with other social marketing tools to generate broad awareness. For example, LRN's educational initiatives can be used in conjunction with the Chesapeake Bay Foundation's (CBF) political approach to target lobbyists and political representatives. While LRN relies on voluntary compliance, the CBF is more likely to use coercion. By combining the effects of both approaches, social marketing is more likely to reach its target audience and alter individual behaviors.

CONCLUSION

The case described in this paper serves to highlight several important findings about collaboration and social marketing. First, and perhaps most importantly, collaboration allows organizations to address complex problems that could not be individually resolved, a finding consistent with our initial literature review. This is especially relevant to environmental initiatives where problems are typically difficult, expensive, or go beyond the ability of a single organization to address meaningfully. One of the main reasons organizations collaborate is to amass resources and expertise. Collaborations work well when organizations share values and goals; organizations seek out collaborative partners with whom they share goals and values.

Second, an important element in successful multiple-sector partnerships may be the presence of a referent organization. As noted in the literature review, referent organizations are important because

they facilitate relationships between members, act as a resource and information exchange, and generate stability within the collaboration. They also take a leadership role in the collaboration, and become the central “player” in the collaborative. Lynnhaven River Now was initially created and designed as a collaborative organization, and was created separately from its partners. The founders of LRN realized that they needed to connect with like-minded organizations, both public and private, to achieve their goal, and that this would likely happen only through collaboration. In essence, the purpose of LRN was to tap into a range of resources to clean up the river; as such, they occupy a location at the center of the collaborative “space.” Their central position allowed them to identify needed resources, identify those who held such resources, and provide a point of reference for like-minded individuals and organizations. The collaborative partners are involved *because* of LRN, not *in spite* of LRN. Furthermore, because of LRN’s status as a nonprofit organization, they are able to more easily cross sectoral boundaries than would either a traditional private sector or public sector organization.

At the same time, our case illustrates the critical role of specialization in collaborative arrangements. This is a theme that was not found in the extant literature, but rather one that emerged through the case study. Indeed, our review of the literature indicated that the boundary blurring (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007) expected to take place would mitigate against specialization, not enhance it. However, the case study reveals that this collaborative achieved much of its success because of specialization, not boundary blurring. If organizations seek additional resources through collaboration, it seems that they seek resources they don’t already have available. In our case, the City of Virginia Beach had significant resources to bring to the collaboration, yet they did not have money to fund all of LRN’s education programs. On the other hand, Dollar Tree Stores had money available, but lacked the in-house environmental expertise necessary to address water quality successfully. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation had information about, and access to, resources for oyster farming and education curricula, but lacked money, people, and time to address water quality in the Lynnhaven River. LRN itself lacked most resources, but had the credibility with citizens, as well as its potential partners, to serve as the focal point for the collaborative effort. The resulting collaborative arrangement brought all of the necessary resources together at the appropriate place and time to address the common goal.

Fourth, the movement of people between collaborative partners facilitates and enhances the collaborative process. Again, this is not an element discussed in the relevant literature, but that was stressed by nearly all of our interviewees. This movement not only helps achieve value congruence, it also serves as a conduit for the easy transfer of information about organizational capabilities and contacts—knowing who to call in an organization is ultimately as important as sharing goals or values. The LRN case illustrates the benefits of this movement, whether in the form of a city employee as its first Executive Director, the inclusion of former employees of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation on its staff, or its use of a committee structure to define, implement, and manage its various programs. This movement also serves to provide a mechanism to diffuse innovative ideas or programs among members of the collaboration. In the words of one member of the collaboration, “collaboration spreads innovation.”

Finally, our case suggests that social marketing can take place through a variety of forms. First, we posited that social marketers must balance between the characteristics of the target audience, the information needed to influence behavior, and the communication channels used to deliver their message. Our case study suggests that the collaborative targeted its campaign activities to meet the characteristics of the target audience—a largely affluent, suburban population who were also geographically positioned to make the biggest difference in water quality. The materials and messages disseminated by the collaborative were designed to include messages of both environmental awareness and solutions that could be easily implemented by the target audience in order to mitigate the environmental impact of suburban neighborhoods on the watershed. Finally, the collaborative targeted its means of dissemination to channels that would easily reach large numbers of people in the targeted areas. Using lawn care firms as a means of communication, for example, allowed for another channel of information seemingly separate from the major players in the collaborative. Likewise, the education programs targeted at school children provided another channel for both messages of environmental awareness and environmental solutions.

While the extant literature on social marketing tends to view these processes in direct, immediate terms (see, for example, Bloom & Novelli, 1981; Kotler & Roberto, 1989; Kotler, Roberto, & Lee, 2002), our case study suggests that social marketing can also take place in an indirect, temporally distant manner. While some of LRN’s programs are designed to change immediate behavior (the

Clean Marina program, or the “Scoop the Poop” program), many of their activities are also designed to alter behaviors in more indirect, subtle ways. The education programs offered by LRN are unlikely to have a significant immediate impact on the water quality of the river, inasmuch as school children are generally powerless to effect meaningful behavior changes. On the other hand, children can have some impact on the behavior of their parents, and as these children reach adulthood, the lessons learned as children may alter their future behavior. The same is true of LRN’s landscaping programs. Teaching landscapers about river-friendly landscaping techniques may have some immediate impact, but the ability of a landscaper to advertise river-friendly certifications will have an indirect, long-term effect on the river’s water quality.

Although the case presented here is suggestive of several important findings about collaboration and social marketing, we caution that some of these findings may be the result of the particular setting for this case. Environmental issues, for example, may be issues for which it is relatively easy to generate shared goals and values. Likewise, the existence of a willing and capable public sector partner, headed by an innovative leader, no doubt contributed to the specific successes of LRN. It remains the subject of future research to determine if these findings can be replicated in other settings.

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Dr. Madeleine W. McNamara, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration, Old Dominion University, Mailing Address: 328 Calhoun Street, Apt. B., New Orleans, LA 70118. Email: mwmcnamara@gmail.com

Dr. William M. Leavitt, Associate Professor and MPA Graduate Program Director, Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration, Old Dominion University, Mailing Address: 2084 Constant Hall, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, 23529. Email: wleavitt@odu.edu

Dr. John C. Morris, Professor and PhD Graduate Program Director, Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration, Old Dominion University, Mailing Address: 2084 Constant Hall, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, 23529. Email: jcmorris@odu.edu

TERRORISM AND THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: AN ENGLISH SCHOOL APPROACH

Yannis A. Stivachtis
Virginia Tech

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ABSTRACT

The investigation of the effects of the expansion of the European society of states on ideas and practices associated with terrorism has received too little attention in the literature. Addressing this limitation, the paper investigates how the expansion of international society and the spread of European ideas, norms and institutions have encouraged the use of terror as a means to achieve political ends. In so doing, the paper offers a historically-based theoretical framework that allows one to locate terrorism in its historical and systemic context and enables the reader to obtain a more holistic understanding of this phenomenon. It argues that the expansion of international society has given rise to five different albeit inter-related types of terrorism: 'system expanding', 'regime legitimacy-driven', 'system affirming', 'anti-systemic', and 'intra-systemic justice-oriented' terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

The forces driving terrorists today are similar to the forces that have driven revolutionaries in other times (O'Kane 2007, p. 1). Terrorism is not new, and it is not a modern phenomenon; examples go back at least as far as the first century after Christ (Burleigh 2008; Chariand and Blin 2007). Terrorism is not now, and never has been, the sole preserve of Islam. Research has shown that terrorism is common to Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, and atheism. The mixture of religious and political motives that has marked so much of contemporary terrorism since the Iranian revolution in 1979 is not new either. Rather, terrorism as it exists today has deep roots in several political and religious traditions. Its recent manifestations reflect broader developments in the evolution of ideas about the legitimate use of force to effect political change.

While scholarly interest in the study of terrorism existed prior to September 11, 2001, the tragic events of that day generated

new questions regarding the role of terrorism in international politics. Before 9/11, terrorism was mainly the subject matter of political scientists rather than international relations theorists (Rapoport 2006, p. 3). The reason for this is that terrorism did not fit well into either the realist or the liberal paradigms, which dominated the field (Kurth Cronin 2002, p. 31).

Political scientists have long faced the problem of identifying appropriate terminology to describe and classify the actors and actions involved in the political processes within and across states and cultures. This task has been particularly difficult in the study of political violence, especially regarding use of the terms 'terrorist' and 'terrorism' to describe specific perpetrators and acts of violence. From a scholarly point of view, the word terrorism clearly lacks precision and objectivity. Although some scholars refrain from using terrorism as a descriptive category, others have sought to refine its meaning (Schmid and Jongman 2005) or have preferred to substitute the more neutral term 'political violence' (Schmid 2004).

The only universally accepted attribute of the term 'terrorism' is that "it is pejorative" (Richardson 2006, p. 1). In other words, terrorism is something that 'bad guys' do. It seems that if one can pin the label 'terrorism' on one's opponent, one has gone a long way toward winning the public relations aspect of any conflict. As an al Qaeda statement notes "When the victim tries to seek justice, he is described as a terrorist" (cited in Richardson 2006, p. 4). Likewise, Abimael Guzman, the leader of the Maoist Shining Path organization in Peru, declared "They claim we are terrorists. I would like to give the following so that everyone can think about: has it or has it not been Yankee imperialism and particularly Reagan who has branded all revolutionary movement as terrorists, yes or no?" (cited in Richardson 2006, p. 4).

In this paper, 'terrorism' is not given any particular value like being 'bad' or 'good'. It is simply seen as the strategic targeting of civilians, their possessions, as well as sites (temples, churches, mosques, etc) related to their identities by state or non-state (transnational or sub-state) actors to achieve a political objective in pursuit of their perceived self-interest. This definition does not include any reference to law – domestic or international – for two reasons. First, this would presuppose not only the existence of law throughout the period under examination but also that this law has always been clear cut and widely accepted. But no such law existed during the initial phases of European expansion. Consequently, the absence of law would mask the real character of violence used by the

Europeans against civilian populations during the era in question. Second, it would easily create the impression that law is by definition 'just' and therefore terrorism would be something by definition 'bad'. This, for example, would make colonial laws appear 'just' and anti-colonial violence 'bad'.

Generally speaking, the literature presents terrorism as a unique type of political violence, in which the state, as perpetrator or target, is involved in unconventional conflict within and beyond its borders (Dekmejian 2007; Combs 2006.). Whether at the state or international level, from a state-centric perspective, the need is to understand where threats to state security come from, and what needs to be done to deal effectively with them (Banks *et al.* 2008; Nacos 2005).

Although the literature does provide a historical account of the phenomenon of terrorism, what is rather missing is a historically-based theoretical framework that would allow one to locate terrorism in its historical and systemic context so that one could obtain a more holistic understanding of this phenomenon. Because of its historical and systemic focus and character of investigation, the English School (ES) of International Relations is very suitable for such an endeavor. This is not to argue that the ES offers a better alternative in examining terrorism. It rather implies that the ES offers a complementary way of doing so, as well as provides a framework within which the general literature on terrorism could be placed and more effectively utilized.

The main area of ES inquiry with which this paper is concerned is the expansion of the European society of states and its gradual transformation into the contemporary world-wide international society (Bull and Watson 1984; Watson 1992). The investigation of the effects of Europe's expansion on ideas and practices associated with terrorism has received too little attention in the relevant literature, considering the links between the debates on civilization, on terrorism and on international society which all address the problem of legitimate international conduct.

Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and how the expansion of the European international society has encouraged the use of terror as a means to achieve political ends. In so doing, the paper seeks to add to the existing body of ES literature but, most importantly, to expand the research agenda of the English School. By relating the study of terrorism to the study of international society's expansion an additional link is established

between the international relations theory of the English School and Security Studies.

THE ENGLISH SCHOOL AND THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

Over the last fifteen years, there has been growing interest in the work of the English School. Although ES scholars have dealt with a significant number of central issues in world politics, only a limited amount of scholarly work is available in relation to the study of terrorism.

Despite the fact that all ES scholars who have studied the expansion of international society have pointed to the extermination of civilian populations during the era of the European expansion, the term ‘terrorism’ has not, nevertheless, been used to describe the activities of European powers overseas. The first ES scholar who used the concept of “terror” with reference to international society was Barrie Paskins (1982) who argued that the international society of the Cold War constituted a “community of terror.” For Paskins, the perpetrators of terror were the nuclear states that held humanity hostage to the fear of a possible nuclear holocaust.

In 1993, David Armstrong published his *Revolution and World Order* where he demonstrated how a revolutionary movement, namely the Russian communists, which had used terrorist tactics as a means to achieve its goals and which possessed an anti-state and anti-systemic rhetoric as well as ideology, was eventually socialized into the international system. Armstrong argues that the burden of consolidating the outcome of the October Revolution, as well as managing the Russian state helped in extinguishing the revolutionary spirit of Russian revolutionaries and provided them incentives to socialize to the state system (Armstrong 1993, p. 243). Adam Watson, however, takes a different stand and claims that the Soviet Union entered international society only after the end of World War II (Watson 1992). Other ES scholars have claimed that during the Cold War, the communist countries formed their own international society and therefore the global international system included two separate international societies.

Andrew Hurrell (2007) discusses terrorism and the ‘war against terrorism’ in relation to international law, which constitutes one of the fundamental institutions of international society. He argues that the specific challenges posed by terrorism have led to calls for a rethinking of the international law of war and has resulted

in increasing tensions amongst different bodies of international law. Richard Devetak focuses on the changing character of warfare and the impact of terrorism (Devetak 2005) and sees terrorism as the byproduct of the North-South divide (Devetak 2008). Barry Buzan and Ole Waever examine international terrorism with reference to the regional structures of security and their interplay with the global level. They suggest that international terrorism reflects change of tactics within the underlying state-based structure of international security, not a transformation of it (Buzan and Waever 2003, p. 467).

Taking a quite different stand and approaching terrorism from a different angle, Barak Mendelshon (2005) claims that al Qaeda not only poses a challenge to the sovereignty of specific states but most importantly challenges the international society as a whole. To this end, he demonstrates how al Qaeda's terrorist tactics undermine two basic institutions of international society: sovereignty and international law. In a subsequent research paper, Mendelshon (2007) focuses on the attempts by religious actors throughout history to render religion the dominant and constitutive element in world politics.

Yannis Stivachtis (2009a) reinforces Medelshon's argumentation while suggesting that the ascendance of al Qaeda marks the resurrection of the interpretation of religion which sees Islam as a rival to the logic of the state-based international society. Both scholars believe that if world order may take different forms depending on what organizing principles involved, as Hedley Bull has acknowledged (Bull 1977, Part III), then one may safely assume that there can be a world order based on religious principles. What distinguishes Stivachtis's work from Medelshon's is that the former seeks to investigate further the effects of religious terrorism on the institutions of international society by bringing into discussion two additional institutions: diplomacy and war.

Samuel Makinda (2002 and 2003) focuses on the political and social effects of colonialism and neocolonialism and argues that the struggle of the Asian and African political communities for freedom and political independence was successfully framed by colonial powers and their local agents as 'terrorism'. Makinda's work can be seen as the first attempt within the ES framework to relate the use of terrorist tactics in the developing world to the effects of the expansion of international society, where European colonial powers superimposed on local communities through the use of their military strength and organized them according to the European

archetype of statehood, without taking account of local realities (Bozeman 1960 and 1971).

A new effort to relate terrorism to the expansion of international society has been undertaken by Ayse Zarakol (2006) and Stivachtis (2008). The former argues that terrorism is a reflection of the perverse effects of international society's hierarchical expansion. According to Zarakol, "the story of terrorism is a narrative of the tension in the overriding dichotomy of our international system even as the labels of the two sides keep changing: Europe and Rest, developed and underdeveloped, West and East, North and South" (Zarakol 2006, p. 3). While Zarakol focuses on terrorism as a pursuit for justice within a state-based international system, Stivachtis's work focuses on 'transformative' terrorism that seeks to establish a world order that is not state-based. This paper is related to and simultaneously seeks to expand this part of terrorism-related ES literature.

TERRORISM AND THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

The expansion of European society of states and the spread of ideas, norms and institutions associated with it have given rise to five different although inter-related and mutually reinforcing types of terrorism: 'system expanding', 'regime legitimacy-driven', 'system affirming', 'anti-systemic', and 'intra-systemic justice-oriented' terrorism. It should be clarified that, in fact, all five types of terrorism are systemic forms since in one way or another they all related to the international system. However, the term 'anti-systemic terrorism' is employed to highlight the difference between terrorism that does not seek to undermine or overthrow the system of states and terrorism that tries to replace it with a different type of world order. The rest of the paper will examine each of these forms of terrorism in reference to the expansion of international society.

System Expanding Terrorism

The first instance of violence that fits the terrorism definition provided in this paper coincides with the expansion of Europe that brought the various regional systems in contact with one another (Bull and Watson 1984; Watson 1992 and 2009, Buzan and Little 2000, Part IV). During the sixteenth century, taking advantage of their military superiority the Europeans successfully devastated the pre-Iron Age civilizations of the Americas, and had a major impact

on tribal peoples in the Americas, Siberia and increasingly, in Africa. Specifically, Russia began its eastward march, occupying the Urals and penetrating into western Siberia. Spain destroyed the empires of the Aztecs and the Incas, and built up its own empire in Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and Peru. By 1564, Spain had also taken Philippines. Portugal established forts and trading posts along the western coasts of Africa, at the mouth of Persian Gulf, and in India and Indonesia, and set about establishing naval and commercial control of the Indian Ocean. It created a chain that linked to trading contacts in China and Japan, and began the transfer of the Asian trade with Europe from land routes to sea ones. Portugal also began the slave trade to South America where it was establishing a colony in Brazil.

During the seventeenth century, Russia occupied central and eastern Siberia, reaching the Pacific coast in 1637. Europeans discovered Australia but did not settle it. France, Britain and the Netherlands began a competitive penetration and settlement of North America, and also challenged the existing Spanish and Portuguese hold on Central and Latin America, and the trade route to Asia. Britain and France began their rival penetrations into India. The Dutch established themselves on the coast of West and South Africa, took Formosa in 1619, and began to challenge the Portuguese in Indonesia, and for trade with China and Japan. During this century, the main weight of European colonial expansion and settlement was in the Americas. European penetration into Africa and Asia was mostly about trade. This involved the establishment of fortified coastal trading stations rather than attempts to seize or control large territories. The European advance was beginning to challenge the classical empires of Asia but had by no means overthrown them. The success of the trade routes by sea replaced the traditional overland routes through Central Asia and the Middle East, thereby undermining the prosperity of the Ottoman Empire, which had previously served as the conduits for this trade.

During the eighteenth century, the main expansions were Russia's extension of its hold over the northern part of central Asia, across the Bering Strait into Alaska, and down the west coast of North America; and Spain's extension of its control northwards through Mexico and up the Pacific coast, and in South America, from Peru northward into Colombia and Venezuela. In both Asia and North America Britain succeeded in eliminating French power, and consolidating its own exclusive control. At the end of the century, however, this British success was undermined by the American

Revolution (1776-83). This revolution founded the United States as a new sovereign member of international society, and began its career as an independent centre of power and 'European' expansion. The eighteenth century was also the peak of the slave trade, during which the Europeans extracted some 10 million Africans to work the estates and mines of the Americas and the Arabs took over 4 million more to work in the Middle East (Buzan and Little 2000, p. 262). By the end of this century the power of European states and their empires was beginning to register seriously against some of the Asian empires, and competition amongst the Europeans was more significant than that between the Europeans and the local powers. India was largely under British sway, and the Ottoman Empire was being pushed into retreat by the advances of Russia and Austria.

During the nineteenth century, the balance tipped decisively in favor of the modern state, with only vestiges of the classical empires managing to hang on. In Europe itself, Germany and Italy finally took on modern state forms, though in Eastern Europe the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires still managed to retain older forms, albeit influenced by the modern state. European expansion abroad was combined with mass migrations of Europeans. The United States occupied the western two-thirds of its present territory, pushed Mexico southwards, purchased Alaska from Russia, and extended colonial control across the Pacific to Philippines, and into Central America and the Caribbean. Russia occupied Central Asia and the Vladivostok region. In South America, a set of new states established their independence from Spain and Portugal in early part of the century. During this century the Europeans penetrated and then colonized nearly all Africa, eroded and penetrated the Ottoman Empire and Persia, extended colonial control over most of South-East Asia, and, along with the United States, forced China (1842) and Japan (1853) to abandon their policies of closure and open themselves to western trade, culture, and political influence.

In the process of European expansion, terrorism was used frequently by colonial powers against those resisting it with population extermination and slave trade being the most illustrative forms of such violence. The result of the expansion of Europe was the creation of a global system whose units, rules and institutions were superimposed upon the local communities in various world regions. This superimposition would eventually give rise to a struggle against European domination that would feed a new round of terrorism which would be 'system affirming' and 'justice-orientated'.

Regime Legitimacy-driven Terrorism

The Treaty of Westphalia did not create the modern state; it just confirmed and legitimized its existence. Until the outbreak of the French revolution, the embodiment of state was the monarch. In absolute monarchies, the state was little more than the personal property of the ruler. The people were subjects rather than citizens. Socio-political integration was minimal. People and territory were added or subtracted from any given state quite casually as a result of war, dynastic marriages, and succession. This notion of sovereignty, however, was challenged by the French Revolution, which was the consequence, among other things, of changes occurring within the international society of the time.

Specifically, the American Revolution - that followed the long process of the European expansion in the "New World" - and the formation of a republic in the 1780s - that signified the entry of the United States into international society (Gong 1984; Stivachtis 1998) - served as a profound example to Europeans. The thirteen colonies began with a defensive revolution against tyrannical oppression, and they were victorious. The Americans showed how rational men could assemble together to exercise control over their own lives by choosing their own form of government, a government sanctified by the force of a written constitution. With this in mind, liberty, equality, private property and representative government began to make more sense to many Europeans. If anything, the American Revolution gave proof to that great Enlightenment idea - the idea that a better world was possible if it was created by men using Reason (Palmer 1959, p. 282).

The term 'terror' was acquired from the French Revolution, and, in its context, 'terrorism' represented the peoples' reaction to absolutism and the divine right of the monarch. The term referred to 'terror' from above, terror imposed by the state, rather than from below, from insurgents. Fundamentally, the 'terror' was simply the application of a particular philosophy: the people had to be reborn in a new way, and if some of them got in the way, they were enemies of the revolution and had to be removed.

There are three main legacies of the French Revolution to contemporary terrorism: first, terrorists are the self-appointed guardians of the will of the people; second, the doctrine of popular sovereignty serves as a basis for political legitimacy; and third, political ideology is a substitute for religion as a motivating force for terrorism. Prior to the French Revolution, all terrorist groups had

religious motivations, though in most instances these religious motivations had political ramifications (Reich 1998). After the French Revolution, and until the Iranian revolution in 1979, terrorist movements were motivated by political aspirations and political ideologies. These quite different ideologies were based on two assumptions that had been launched in the course of the French Revolution: first, radical change was possible and society could be remade; and second, humans are naturally good and evil comes not from inside humans but from the external structures of society. Thus the destruction of these structures would lead to the destruction of evil.

After the French Revolution, the forces of conservatism and reaction dominated European politics, but on the ground nationalism, liberalism, and republicanism were gaining adherents. Secret societies and conspiratorial student groups proliferated in European coffeehouses, culminating in the year of revolutions of 1848. The destruction in 1848 of revolutionary aspirations for a spontaneous uprising of the people led to a hardening of the nature of the opposition to the *status quo* and the gradual transformation from gentleman guerrilla to hardened terrorist. Karl Heinzen argued that 1848 demonstrated that the authorities were too ruthless and too powerful for a popular uprising ever to stand a chance of success. He concluded that murder is the chief instrument of historical progress and argued that as the authorities maintained themselves by murder, it was legitimate for the revolutionary to do so too. Added to his faith in murder was his faith in science, which he believed would enable the few to murder the many and thereby compensate for the paucity of recruits to the cause (cited in Richardson 2006, p. 31). This core philosophy of the terrorist has since been adapted by groups in pursuit of a range of different objectives.

'Regime legitimacy-driven terrorism' originated within the bounds of the European society of states. These ideas, however, reached the European periphery (the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus) only after the regional states gained their independence and joined international society. Furthermore, all of the eastern empires - Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire - were all land empires which made them more beholden to an absolutist ruling structure. They were slower to change and when change took place, it did not happen smoothly. By the time ideas, such as democracy and self-determination, reached the periphery of the European society of states, there was an element of urgency to them. The urgency in keeping up with developments in the western

European part of international society led the advocates to the drastic tactics. With the expansion of international society, enlightenment ideas were gradually spread throughout the globe and the use of violence became a tool in the fight against tyrannical regimes; a pattern that continues to date.

Apart from 'regime legitimacy-driven' type of terrorism, the French Revolution also provided the fertile ground for the development two other forms of terrorism: 'system affirming' and 'anti-systemic' terrorism.

System Affirming Terrorism

Following the French Revolution, nationalism became a force that many states had to reckon with. Unlike absolutism, nationalism became concerned about linking rulers to people, and state to society and territory. At least three major developments took place which differentiated modern states both from the absolutist predecessors and even more from classical empires. First, there was the rise of an independent commercial class. Second was the invention of nationalism as an ideology of the state; a political ideology that locates the right of self-government in a people who share a common culture either ethnically (ethno-nationalism) or contractually (civic nationalism). The third development was the introduction of democracy in the leading modern states. Later on, being a democratic state became a fundamental criterion for a political community to be regarded as 'civilized' and therefore eligible to join international society (Stivachtis 2006 and 2009b). As Mayall (1990) suggests, the rise of nationalism changed not only what states were internally, but also many aspects of how they related to each other. Nationalism overrode more extensive, cosmopolitan forms of shared identity such as religion.

During the nineteenth century, ideas associated with political developments in Western Europe were gradually transmitted to Eastern Europe and the Balkans – the periphery of the European society of states – and then to the rest of the world, thereby providing a justification for the use of violence in the pursuance of independence from imperial powers and the establishment of new sovereign states. In this process, however, one should never confuse general political violence with terrorism. The term 'terrorism' is only applicable as long as civilians from all sides in the conflict were the targets of violence.

From the time of Greek Independence, which challenged the European order established at Vienna in 1815, to the independence

of Kosovo, the world has witnessed many ethnic-related struggles where terrorism tactics were used. The problem has arisen out of the reality that the populations of most states (especially empires and colonial powers) have been heterogeneous, constituting a mosaic of groups with distinct identities defined by shared history, culture and vision of their collective self-interests. As a result, the use of terror became the means for these groups to achieve their political objectives, namely breaking away from other states and establishing their own. It is within this context that groups that fought for their independence from empires were framed as 'terrorists' while in the eyes of their own people were seen as 'freedom fighters'.

Even before the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires during World War I, there had been an upsurge of nationalism among many ethnic minorities living under imperial rule. Hence, President Wilson's call for self-determination of subject people went unheeded by his British, French, and Italian wartime allies. After World War II, the issue of national self-determination once again came to the forefront with the progressive dismemberment of the French, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, Belgian and British empires, culminating in the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Yugoslavia few years after. These imperial powers created ethnically diverse successor states by drawing borders that divided ethnic groups between two or more states. The multi-ethnic makeup of those newly independent states was a recipe for conflict, because their governments had adopted the integrationist model of nation-building pioneered by Western European states, which sought to dissolve ethnic identities into a single national identity as defined by the cultural norms of the dominant group. The unitary nation-state lacked mechanisms to accommodate diverse ethnic interests or promote inter-ethnic coexistence. Instead, in many instances, the ethnic group that gained power used the state apparatus to repress the less powerful ethnic groups setting the stage for interactive violence.

While the first wave of independence-driven terrorism occurred within Europe and the European-like states of the Americas, a new wave began in the non-European world. Specifically, it was after the First World War that the European society of states expanded for another time, and extended its fundamental institutions to new members (Wight 1977; Bull and Watson 1984; Stivachtis 1998; Watson 1992 and 2009). By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Europeans had extended their system to the entire globe, but the number of sovereign participants

was still limited. The European view was that non-European states should only be admitted to the European international society if they met the European standard of 'civilization' (Bull and Watson 1984; Gong 1984; Stivachtis 2003). As late as the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the European view of the world classified non-European territories into three tiers: in the first tier were the peoples of the Middle East, who could 'stand alone' relatively soon; in the second tier was tropical Africa, in need of years of European training and assistance; and in the lowest tier were the primitive peoples of the Pacific who would remain European subjects indefinitely (Louis 1984).

The First World War meant the end of European material control of the system. However, the European normative control continued to operate. World War I, in giving birth to the League of Nations, had an important impact on spreading certain norms across the globe. The League of Nations was open to all states recognized as independent. Moreover, the time between two world wars was a period of transition where the principle of sovereignty had just started to become universal and was treated as such in the League of Nations Covenant. At the same time, there were racist attitudes that still affected the way business was conducted (Vincent 1984). For instance, despite Japan's best efforts, the League of Nations Covenant did not embrace the principle of racial equality. As the European society of states spread over the world, many non-European rulers wanted to join it, in order to be treated as equals rather than inferiors, and if possible to have some say about how international society was run. The League had made this easier, by lifting the standard of 'civilization' requirement, and making sovereignty the main standard for membership.

It was in this political environment that the new wave of independence-driven terrorism gained momentum (Rapaport 2001, p. 420). The normative ideal of self-determination had broken out of the boundaries of Europe, as well as the European settled colonies. Unlike land empires that had been targeted previously, the new wave struck mostly in colonies more distant from the center. At the same time, the struggle for independence was accompanied by a struggle against the Euro-centric character of international law (especially with reference to human rights) and the Western-centric idea of state and its preferred organization (democracy). This is not to say that the developing countries objected in principle to human rights and democracy. It rather implies that their understanding of these norms and institutions differed from the Western understanding. This

struggle continues even today and takes place predominantly in Africa and Asia where many core ideas and principles associated with international society are facing a fundamental challenge (Makinda 2002 and 2003).

Independence-driven terrorism has been system affirming. Regardless of the violence of their methods, the terrorists actually had internalized several norms emanating from the European society of states although some norms and rules came to be contested. They wanted to create sovereign states that would join the international system as equals, who would then have potential chance of following the Western developmental trajectory. When independence was achieved, most of the institutions of the Western modern state were emulated, however irrelevant to the original cause: borders, educational systems, political and military reforms, etc. To date, the efforts of ethnic groups to achieve independence and statehood continue to affirm the centrality of state as the fundamental unit of international society. The fact that developing states have not managed yet to catch up with the Western developmental trajectory, has fed a new form of terrorism that has been ‘justice-oriented’.

Anti-systemic Terrorism

Historically speaking, international society has experienced two kinds of anti-systemic terrorism: one associated with secular ideologies and one associated with religious beliefs.

Secular anti-systemic Terrorism

The French Revolution provided the fertile ground for the development of a particular type of anti-systemic terrorism that is associated with anarchism and communism. This type of post-Westphalian terrorism first occurred within the confines of the European society of states and then spread to Russia and Eastern Europe.

The two nineteenth-century thinkers most often linked to terrorism are Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin. Marx was denounced as a ‘terrorist’ because of his support for the Paris Commune in 1871, but he did not consider himself a supporter of terrorism at all. He dismissed Bakunin’s idea of a peasant revolution as ‘schoolboy’s asininity’. Marx saw the Paris Commune as the first stage of a workers’ state, a radically democratic government, and an authentic representation of the French proletariat. He worried that terrorism might pose a premature threat to the state before the workers were ready to take it over. Although Marx saw the state as a mechanism of

oppression that should eventually be withered away, he objected to the efforts to destroy the state, arguing instead that the first goal of the organized urban proletariat should be to master the apparatus of the state. Marx's daughters were ardent supporters of the Fenians, who had carried out the Clerkenwell explosion in London in 1867, but Marx himself was not. While he shared the Fenian view of the injustice of British rule in Ireland, he had his eyes firmly fixed on the goal of proletarian revolution. He wrote to his close collaborator Friedrich Engels the day after the explosion explaining that

“The last exploit of the Fenians in Clerkenwell was a very stupid thing. The London masses who have shown great sympathy for Ireland will be made wild by it and driven into the arms of the government party. One cannot expect the London proletarians to allow themselves to be blown up in honor of Fenian emissaries” (cited in Richardson 2006, p. 83).

Engels replied on December 19 suggesting that

“The stupid affair in Clerkenwell was obviously the work of a few specialized fanatics In particular, there has been a lot of bluster in America about this blowing up and arson business, and then a few asses come and instigate such nonsense. Moreover these cannibals are generally the greatest cowards . . . and then the idea of liberating Ireland by setting a London tailor's shop on fire” (cited in Richardson 2006, p. 84).

Later Engels was outraged by the Fenian campaign of the 1880s in which bystanders were again killed. He argued that even revolutionaries must behave like soldiers and kill only those actually fighting against them.

Mikhail Bakunin was the most influential of the nineteenth-century thinkers on terrorism. His goal was to seize power quickly with a small group of elite coconspirators and unleash a mass revolt against property and authority. He believed that violence could generate immediate justice by sweeping away the oppressive institutions of the state. So, one had in Bakunin, the completion of the transition from the old-style insurrectionist, whose emphasis was on mass violence, to the advocating of violent terrorism by small groups claiming to represent the masses (Rubenstein 1987, p. 52).

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 'secular anti-systemic' terrorism was closely associated with Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), a terrorist organization that emerged in Russia in 1878 and lasted until 1881. This was the first group to use 'extra normal' acts of violence targeting civilians with the explicit purpose of violating those conventions that distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. Like Bakunin, the group believed in immediate action, arguing that a single act of destruction could achieve more than could ever be achieved by debates and publications. The group's philosophy was a kind of idealistic anarchism that required the destruction of the existing order as a prelude to a new and better society. The demands of Narodnaya Volya included convocation of the Constituent Assembly for designing a Constitution; introduction of universal suffrage; permanent people's representation; freedom of speech, press, and assembly; communal self-government; transfer of land to the people; gradual placement of the factories under the control of the workers; and granting oppressed peoples of the Russian Empire the right to self-determination. Although these demands were very much in line with ideas prevailing at the time in Western Europe and could make Narodnaya Volya's activities either 'regime legitimacy-driven' or 'system-affirming' type of terrorism, the rejection of the 'state' makes their action anti-systemic in nature. In other words, the Russian anarchists aimed at the introduction and implementation of the same ideas that were prevalent in the European society of states, in order to form a political unit called Russia. However, Russia was not to be constructed in accordance with the archetype of modern European state. Anarchism and the state could simply not go together.

Narodnaya Volya also believed that the assassination of a few government officials would ignite revolution across the land. Its actions were therefore precise and concentrated on killing a few key government players, most notably the tsar. It did succeed, in fact, in killing Tsar Alexander II in 1881. But instead of igniting a revolution, the peasantry did not react at all, urban public opinion was horrified, and the radical cause lost support.

Unlike Narodnaya Volya, the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party carefully sought to avoid the death of innocents and constrained itself within clearly defined limits. Its members believed, for example, that terrorism was justified only when the perpetrator was prepared to sacrifice his own life to atone for his actions. Vladimir Lenin, who was to prove such an inspiration for the social revolutionary terrorist movements of the late twentieth century, was

critical of the Russian anarchists, whom he considered misguided zealots. Therefore, Lenin's approach to the activities of the Russian anarchists was similar to Marx's approach to the activities of the Fenians.

The basic contradiction between the theory of state destruction and the practice of state management within the bounds of the international society reflected in the debate between Trotsky and Lenin. While the former advocated a 'world revolution' that could unite the proletariats and destroy their respective states, Lenin was hesitant to move into this direction and instead focused on managing the revolution within the boundaries of Russia. As Armstrong correctly points out, the burden of consolidating the outcome of the October Revolution, as well as managing the Russian state helped in extinguishing the revolutionary spirit of the Russian revolutionaries and provided them incentives to socialize to the state system (Armstrong 1993, p. 243).

Following the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union quickly became a superpower with a considerable part of the international system coming under its influence. Consequently, the spread of communist ideas world-wide became inevitable. It seems that the demands for independence during the de-colonization process that resulted in the numerical expansion of international society's membership provided the Soviet Union with an additional channel of political influence in the developing world. In this context, violence was used by communist groups in various countries and world regions against capitalist, colonial and oppressive regimes. Terrorist tactics continue to be used to date by communist-inspired groups, although the communist Soviet Union does not exist anymore. Likewise, terrorist tactics are still utilized by anarchical groups in their efforts to create a 'more just world'. This violence, however, can only be related to terrorism insofar as its targets are civilians.

Religion-driven anti-systemic Terrorism

History provides one with many examples of attempts by religious actors to render religion the dominant and constitutive element in world politics (Mendelshon 2007; Reich 1998). Prior to Westphalia and the establishment of the European society of states, religion had a critical role in shaping the political landscape. Westphalia, however, relegated religion to secondary position. While the European states accepted religion's role in the domestic affairs,

the Westphalian order kept religion subordinated to the logic of the state system.

However, developments over the last thirty years demonstrate that religion has maintained its ability to provide an alternative organization for world politics. Nowhere this can be better illustrated than in al Qaeda's world view (Stivachtis 2009a). This religious-based organization questions the legitimacy of the state and the international society and uses terrorism in its pursuance of an alternative world order (Wright 2006; Mendelsohn 2005 and 2007; Stivachtis 2008 and 2009a). The members of al Qaeda want to replace the nation state model with an ummah-community, which would theoretically mirror the Islamic empire that existed during Mohammed's reign. Regardless of whether this is aspiration that could ever be fulfilled, as an ideal it stands far apart from anything resembling the modern state. The political community evolved by this ideal is one without fixed borders; this would be a community united by faith under a ruler legitimized by that faith, where there was no presumption of equality for individuals, but rather a presumption of equality for believers. Organizations like al Qaeda do not seek to replace any particular government although this is one of the steps towards achieving their final goal. Therefore, they strike all around the world. Their aim is to bring down the international system because that is the only way rules can change.

Islam is not the cause of anti-systemic terrorism. It is a convenient vessel for al Qaeda to translate the grievances of people in a particular part of the world against the international society, for several reasons. First, while other non-European systems developed independently from Europe and have come into contact with Europe in a period of European might, the Islamic civilizations developed along side Europe. The memory of periods where Europe, and by proxy the 'West,' was the weaker and the more backward of the two systems lingers on. The memory of Europe's imposition is also alive. Second, the Islamic arrangement of organizing human communities offers an alternative world-demarcating principle to both the nation-state and the individualist justifications of the modern state system. While proponents of communism, for instance, could offer no viable alternative to organizing states other than by national self-determination, separation along religious lines is almost as commonsensical to the 'man on the street' as is organization along nation-state lines. Religious affiliation is at least as universalizing principle as nationalism is, and there is enough history of religious divides for the construction of primordial appeals along the veins of

nationalism. Finally, because Islam offers equality to those who join the ranks of believers, it is also appealing to those non-Muslims who are from parts of the world where because of their geography, race or ethnicity, can never be equals of the Western countries within the current system. Of course, one should not suppose that a more equal and equitable world could necessarily be created under this Islamic vision. What matters, however, to al Qaeda followers and other local terrorist organizations that have joined this anti-systemic cause under the al Qaeda banner, is that the current system has extracted too high of a cost for promises of equality and advancement that were never delivered. Therefore, al Qaeda's system replacement vision is appealing to all groups unhappy with the macro power distribution in the system. In this sense, 'religious anti-systemic' terrorism is associated with, as well as supports, 'justice-driven' terrorism.

All of this does not mean that only Islam would offer the right context for anti-systemic terrorism. Any non-Western ideology that does not recognize the legitimacy of the citizen-based state model, the dichotomies between public and private, or the sovereignty principle could give rise to anti-systemic terrorism. There is an emerging trend of Muslim movements studying Marx and socialism, so this is not a possibility that should be discounted (Tibi 1998; Zartman 2001).

Intra-systemic Justice-oriented Terrorism

Zarakol (2006, p. 3) argues that contemporary terrorism is symptomatic of a clash within the international system itself and she finds the efforts to term this 'a clash of civilizations' misleading. According to Zarakol (2006, p. 3), the term evokes a picture of separate entities and obscures power discrepancies. Therefore, what one witnesses is not a 'clash of civilizations' or systems, but rather an intra-system clash that is a direct consequence of the particular history of international society expansion. This clash cannot be attributed to economic or cultural differences alone. The limited room for upward status mobility within the international society is increasingly leading actors from the developing world to conclude that it is the system that needs to be challenged, rather than any particular state within it.

After the Second World War, the international system was transformed once again. Two non-European great powers, namely the USSR and the U.S. - who were nonetheless a part of the European tradition - emerged, and Europe ceased to be the center of the system. However, "The European tradition of an organized

international society was so strong that the U.S., the USSR and their allies agreed that the rules and practices of the previous period should remain provisionally in force with minor changes" (Watson 1992, p. 205). By the 1960s, most colonies had gained independence, thereby joining international society, but now, there seemed to be two different trajectories for having a say in how the global society of states was run.

By the 1970s, what had originally started as a European society of states spanned the entire globe. Europe was no longer at its center, but most of the original European institutions and norms - most importantly, territorial sovereignty based on national self-determination principle - had survived the various expansions of the international society intact (Mayall 1990). What had also survived was the distribution of material benefits and advantages across the globe between the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery. However, even though terrorists of this time were unhappy about the economic situation, they did not attempt to challenge the state system. In other words, despite all the rhetoric about nations disappearing and the workers around the world uniting in their fight, they did not really seek to replace the sovereign state model. They struck targets abroad, but their principal enemies were their home states, as well as the 'imperial powers' backing the 'servants of imperialism' at home. In this sense, there was an implicit belief in the institutions of modern international society although some of its norms and rules were simultaneously contested.

During the Cold War, it was common to interpret terrorism as the consequence of geostrategic rivalry between the superpowers (Luttwak 1983). This interpretation was not totally off the mark as most of the terrorist groups of the period had anti-imperialist leanings, and their activities were covertly encouraged by the Soviet Union. Three kinds of terrorist groups were active in the 1970s: anti-imperialist, anti-Israeli, and secessionist/nationalist. However, the latter two also used the anti-imperialist rhetoric. Terrorism as a phenomenon became truly international in this period as terrorist groups struck all around the globe. They trained at each other's facilities and shared weapons and know-how. Terrorist groups made their presence felt in the West. As Rapoport argues, "Many, such as the American Weather Underground, German Red Army Faction, Italian Red Brigades, and French Direct Action, saw themselves as vanguards for the masses of the third world" (Rapoport 2001, p. 421).

From an international society perspective, this period was marked with the dawning realization that joining the system of

sovereign states had not changed the relative ranking of the former colonies in the international status hierarchy and this partly accounts for the increasing resistance to and contestation of international society's norms and rules. For a brief period, decolonization and the idea of developmentalism had offered a hope to the former colonized world that independence would finally usher in progress and modernity. However, the system of exploitation remained more or less intact, though transformed. This idea was expressed in many different venues, such as the dependency literature in Latin America, the non-aligned movement, and the calls for the New International Economic Order.

'Intra-systemic terrorism' has been concerned mostly with economic distribution in the international system (Enders and Sandler 1999; Sandler and Enders 2004) and the place of former colonies within the system. There has been a concern over the advantages already accumulated by the advanced nations and the difficulty late-comers to the system were having in their attempt to shake off patterns of exploitation. No attempt to achieve economic reform managed to bring about any positive change. The end of heavy-handed state-centric economic approaches - such as the Latin American debt crisis - and the collapse of the Eastern bloc along with the Soviet Union drove home the point that alternative economic approaches to those espoused by the 'winners', which constitute the core of this international system, were not viable solutions. Even worse, many developing states and their peoples saw the proposed solutions as new schemes of exploitation and oppression.

Thus the victory of the West was not a victory for all. Economically, large gaps of material distribution remained. There have been relatively few countries, among those which were formerly colonized, to come close to closing the economic gap. Politically, the situation is perhaps even more troubling for those who are left behind. Among other things, it was realized that in the history of the modern international society, there has not been one non-Western, non-European state that has participated in the making of the rules or transformation of the institutions of the modern international system in a way that affected all the actors within that system. The original rules, norms and institutions stemming from the European society have more-or-less survived, intact, in each stage of the European expansion despite their contestation. If anything they have become more sweeping, more universal and more pervasive.

The case of China, however, has demonstrated to many countries in the developing world, that the combination of economic and military power on a great scale could transform a non-Western state into a major shaping force in international society. In this sense, they see the operation of certain international rules (such as those against WMD acquisition) and organizations (such as IMF) as the means of the 'West' to prevent that from happening.

Since the world-status hierarchy has not changed very much in the last couple of centuries, developing states and other actors in the system have come to believe that they cannot win. Economically, developing states try catch-up; culturally and politically, they have to keep bending, having to make costly light-speed political transitions, most of the time induced from above and outside. They cannot become great powers by altering the borders or by possessing WMD, because that is no longer allowed by the norms and the rules of the system (Lustick 1997, p. 679). They cannot even be left on their own to set up their own economic model or religious state. This global political, social and economic context reflects the perverse effects of international society's hierarchical expansion. It is precisely against these political, social and economic realities that contemporary terrorist groups fight (Devetak 2008).

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to investigate whether and how the expansion of the European society of states has contributed to the use of violence commonly associated with terrorist tactics. The paper argued that the expansion of international society and the spread of ideas, norms and institutions associated with it have given rise to five types of terrorism: 'system expanding', 'regime legitimacy-driven', 'system affirming', 'anti-systemic', and 'intra-systemic justice-oriented' terrorism. The paper suggested that although all five types of terrorism are systemic in nature, the term 'anti-systemic terrorism' underlines the difference between terrorism that does not seek to undermine or overthrow the system of states and terrorism that tries to replace it with a different type of world order.

These five types of terrorism seem to reinforce each other. It also appears that with the exception of the 'system expanding' form of terrorism, the rest seek to address the issue of justice and equality although they do so from a different angle and level of analysis. What unites these forms of terrorism is their critical stance towards

what the society of states represents, how it has developed, its refusal to treat its members in an equal manner, and its inability to deliver goods that are equally distributed among its members. The history of the expansion of the European society of states and its transformation to the contemporary global international society reveals that the geographical center of power in the modern international society has not shifted very much since the European society of states started expanding. A few non-Western countries improved their situation but were never fully accepted at the top. A system with so little upward mobility is marked with status stratification, where belonging is primarily determined by 'lifestyle' judgments.

This is not to deny that there is some economic and material mobility in the system. A very interesting feature of the modern international system is that ideologically and ontologically it does not legitimize status divides. However, status stratification has been part of this system since its inception. In the post-Cold War era, a system that has fully matured to span the entire globe still has not broken out of this status mold. The reality does not match the legitimizing rhetoric of the system, the rhetoric of 'equal opportunity'. The failure of the equality, prosperity, and upward mobility promise attached to the nation-state is what lies beneath the resentment in the developing world and it is as real as any economic grievance.

The real problem is people having to live with standards not of one's own making and still getting no respect or results. What is at the heart of this kind of behavior is not irrational anger but rather disillusionment with the current system and the core countries in the system. As long as the developing world sees the international society to continuing to displaying what they perceive as negative attitudes, threats to the existence of the state system coming from a variety of terrorist groups will also continue. Even worse, terrorist activities can even be exacerbated.

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Yannis A. Stivachtis, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Studies Program. Virginia Tech, 119 Major Williams Hall, Blacksburg, VA 24061. Email: ystivach@vt.edu

IRRELEVANT OR INDISPENSIBLE? THE STATE OF THE U.N. IN THE AFTERMATH OF IRAQ

William R. Patterson
Old Dominion University

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ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of the United Nations' refusal to authorize the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush predicted that the institution would become irrelevant in the realm of international affairs. The institution, he said, had failed to live up to its responsibilities and had not enforced its own resolutions. It had displayed its impotence in the face of Saddam Hussein's defiance and had therefore demonstrated its own insignificance. This article looks back at that claim and judges its accuracy. By examining the U.N.'s activity in the General Assembly, in the Security Council, in subsidiary organs and in peacekeeping missions, the article quantifies U.N. relevance in the first five years following the invasion.

INTRODUCTION

On the morning of September 12, 2002, a year and a day after the terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, President Bush spoke before the General Assembly of the United Nations. He made a strong (though flawed) case that Iraq was seeking weapons of mass destruction in violation of numerous United Nations resolutions. He argued that "Iraq's government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq" (Bush, 2002). Iraq constituted a grave threat, Bush contended, not only to America, but also to the relevancy of the United Nations and to the functioning of world order. "The conduct of the Iraqi regime," he said, "is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. The entire world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United

Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?" (Bush, 2002).

In 2003 the United Nations Security Council refused to approve President Bush's war against Iraq. In the eyes of many, this only proved that the U.N. was in fact irrelevant, that it did not have the power to enforce its own resolutions and was unwilling to face up to the challenge of Iraq. The purpose of this paper will be to analyze the relevance of the United Nations in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Has the U.N. become irrelevant as Bush forewarned or has it remained largely unaffected? If the U.N. remained essentially undamaged, does this prove that it is indispensable, that whatever its failings, states will continue to rely upon the U.N. because they must?

Though the issue of how the relevance of the United Nations has been affected by the Iraq War has been considered previously, this article contributes to the literature by taking a more comprehensive approach. Previous work has either focused on the U.N.'s relevance to the U.S. (Johnstone, 2004), or were written immediately after the war and therefore could only speculate about its long-term impact using the limited data available at the time (Berdal, 2003). The passage of time has allowed for the collection of a larger data-set and the ability to draw broader conclusions about the impact of the war on the U.N.'s relevance.

In order to judge the relevance of the United Nations, some way of measuring that relevance must be devised. In this paper, this is done through both a quantitative and qualitative analysis, comparing the U.N.'s level of activity both before and after the invasion. The activity level of the General Assembly and the Security Council are, of course, key indicators. Also of importance are the number and scope of peacekeeping missions undertaken by the organization. Finally, the activity of various subsidiary organs, such as the World Food Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund, and the World Health Organization, will be examined.

The quantitative analysis consists primarily of comparing raw numbers, for example, the numbers of resolutions passed in the General Assembly and the Security Council and the numbers of peacekeeping missions authorized both before and after the invasion. A precipitate drop in these numbers could indicate a significant negative impact on the organization's relevance. An organization experiencing reduced relevance would not likely continue functioning at the level it had previously. If the U.N. is no longer relevant in matters of world affairs, therefore, we should predict a

significant reduction in its activity. An organization that continues to function, on the other hand, is probably meeting some need.

A quantitative analysis, however, can only reveal so much. A qualitative assessment of the importance and effectiveness of the organization's actions is also essential in judging its relevance. Merely passing a large number of symbolic or completely ineffectual resolutions in the General Assembly, for example, would not be an indication of continued relevance. The organization is only relevant if its activities actually have an impact in the real world.

Irrelevant and ineffectual are synonymous and we would therefore expect an irrelevant organization, by definition, to be largely inactive and ineffectual. The level of activity at the United Nations will therefore be a crucial indicator of its continued relevance. If it indeed lost relevance, we should expect to see a drop off in the number of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions passed each year, a diminution in peacekeeping activities, and a reduction in other primary goals and tasks of the organization.

The Theoretical Context:

The effectiveness of the United Nations is an issue that falls within a broader theoretical debate. The utility of international institutions in general and international organizations such as the U.N. in particular, has been a major point of contention between international relations theorists. Realist and neorealist theories remain dominant in the field but have been increasingly challenged, particularly since the end of the Cold War, by competing theories such as liberal institutionalism and constructivism. How the United Nations has fared in the aftermath of the Iraq War is a useful test of these competing theories.

Realism has been the dominant theoretical paradigm for centuries. From the Peloponnesian War and Thucydides' observation that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (Thucydides, 1990, p. 505), to Machiavelli's primer on power offered to his Venetian master Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici in *The Prince*, to George Kennan's exhortations to the Truman administration on containing the expansion of Soviet power, realism has offered a potent framework from which to understand, and to practice, international affairs. This framework rests on several key assumptions about how the international system works: The international system is anarchic; States are the main actors in international relations; States are rational actors; States can never be certain about the intentions of other states; The primary interests of

states are to survive and maintain their sovereignty; and Survival and sovereignty are best protected by the acquisition of power.

The neorealists put particular emphasis on how the anarchic international system shapes the actions of states and on the importance of relative versus absolute power. These assumptions have led realists and neorealists to hold a fundamental distrust and disregard of international institutions and organizations. Because the international system is anarchic and since states cannot trust each other, each state must protect itself by acquiring the power necessary to defeat other, potentially threatening, state actors. As prominent realist John Mearsheimer explains, "Realism paints a rather grim picture of world politics. The international system is portrayed as a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other" (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995, p. 9).

According to realists, international institutions are ineffectual within the context of such a self-help context. Whatever power these institutions do have is merely a reflection of the power possessed by the state actors that have devised them. "Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behavior" (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995, p. 7). International institutions are merely a manifestation of the power of individual state actors who use them to meet their own objectives. As such, they have no independent effect on the international system as a whole or on the prevalence of violent conflict within that system.

Since the end of World War I and the development of the League of Nations, and then with the creation of the United Nations following World War II, realist assumptions concerning international affairs, and realism's skepticism regarding international institutions in particular, have been challenged. These challenges have gained increasing strength in the aftermath of the Cold War and the development of the European Union. Competing theorists, primarily within the camps of the liberal institutionalists and constructivists, argue that not only are institutions effective and important but that they are in fact key to the maintenance of peace and stability in the international system.

The tenets of liberalism were first articulated in a comprehensive manner by the philosopher Immanuel Kant in his article "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch." In this essay Kant delineated many of the key propositions that form the foundation of contemporary liberal theorists. Among these were: the

belief that cooperation among nations is possible; that institutions are important factors in creating such cooperation; that war is not inevitable and that world peace is an attainable goal; and that states can be depended upon to abide by various international norms and rules given that the appropriate structures exist.

Kant believed that human beings are by nature, evil and warmongering. "War itself," he says "requires no particular motivation, but appears to be ingrained in human nature and is even valued as something noble; indeed, the desire for glory inspires men to it, even independently of selfish motives" (Kant, 1983, p. 123). In this, Kant was more in agreement with the realists than with contemporary liberal institutionalists. Kant differed with the realists, however, in arguing that this natural tendency towards war does not mean that war itself is inevitable and that anarchy will forever reign supreme in international relations. On the contrary, he argued that it is precisely because of man's wicked nature that agreements and structures must be developed to overcome it.

Just as men have been compelled to divest themselves of their individual liberties in order to form powerful domestic governments which protect their interests and maintain order, so too shall states find it necessary to control each others' behavior through the development of international institutions. Kant argued that "perpetual peace is *insured* by nothing less than that great artist *nature* whose mechanical process makes her purposiveness visibly manifest, permitting harmony to emerge among men through their discord, even against their wills" (Kant, 1983, p. 120). He explained that "as nations, peoples can be regarded as single individuals who injure one another through their close proximity while living in the state of nature (i.e., independently of external laws). For the sake of its own security, each nation can and should demand that the others enter into a contract resembling the civil one and guaranteeing the rights of each. This would be a federation of *nations*, but it must not be a nation consisting of nations" (Kant, 1983, p. 115).

In other words, Kant believed that the anarchy that defines the international system can be tempered and controlled by a sort of social contract between all nations, just as individuals enter a social contract within states to control anarchy at that level. International institutions, in Kant's view, are an essential element in overcoming the international discord that leads to war. Liberal institutionalists, constructivists, and others, continue to believe that international institutions make a substantial contribution to peace.

Bruce Russett and John Oneal, for example, point to international organizations as one of the three corners of a

“triangulated peace” (the other two being democracy and interdependence). In a rigorous statistical evaluation they determined that “IGOs (intergovernmental organizations) had a strong and significant conflict-reducing effect during the post-World War II era and in the decades before World War I. Before 1914, international organizations were rare and so many states were not constrained by them from using force. For states that did share memberships in IGOs, however, the benefit was substantial” (Russett and Oneal, 2001, pp. 173-174). Russett and Oneal found the pacific influence of international organizations to be independent of other variables and that such organizations make a statistically significant impact on reducing conflict.

In addition to liberal institutionalists such as Russett and Oneal, constructivists have also argued that international institutions matter. The most prominent constructivist, Alexander Wendt, argues that realists fail to appreciate the degree to which the “fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material...and that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behavior” (Wendt, 1995, pp.71-72). According to constructivists, ideals and social interaction are at least as important in international relations as pure power capabilities.

Wendt does not deny that power considerations are often relevant but he does argue that they are not paramount and do not control the direction of all international interactions. He points out that “states sometimes do engage in power politics, but this hardly describes all of the past 1300 years, and even less today, when most states follow most international law most of the time, and when war and security dilemmas are the exception rather than the rule, Great Powers no longer tend to conquer small ones, and free trade is expanding rather than contracting” (Wendt, 1995, p. 76).

How power and anarchy are viewed by the states within the international system is dependent upon their social interactions, past history, moral ideas and other intangible considerations. The United States, for example, feels threatened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the North Koreans but is indifferent to the possession of such weapons by the British. This is because of the different history and relationships it has with the two countries. If power considerations were all that mattered, the UK would likely be seen as the greater threat. Instead, because the US and UK have a recent history of cooperation and share many of the same values and expectations, Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons is completely unthreatening to the United States.

According to constructivists, international institutions play a role in shaping international interactions thereby changing expectations and developing norms that are influential, if not absolutely controlling, on the behavior of states. Institutions can make anarchy less threatening and allow for a context within which trust is increased between state actors and war is therefore reduced. Power is but one element in international relations and its significance is ultimately a function of the social structure within which states interact and develop relationships.

The importance and effectiveness of international institutions is one of the primary points of contention between the realists on one side and the liberal institutionalists and constructivists on the other. Since the United Nations is one of the preeminent international organizations in existence today, the question of its relevance is an extremely important one within the context of this debate. An irrelevant U.N. would provide support to the realist theoreticians who are skeptical of all international institutions. A U.N. that remains relevant, despite the situation in Iraq, would, on the other hand, lend credence to the liberals and constructivists.

In order to judge whether or not the United Nations remains relevant in the wake of the Iraq War the rest of this essay examines both the quantitative and qualitative activity of the various organs of the organization since the beginning of the war and compares it with the activity of those organs prior to the war. If we find a precipitous drop in such activity it would be indicative of a major loss of relevance. If the level of activity remains constant or increases, however, this would constitute evidence that the organization remains at least as relevant as it was prior to the war.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Activity in the General Assembly has not changed as one would have expected if the United Nations had become irrelevant. In fact, the opposite has occurred. In only one of the five sessions of the General Assembly held since the Iraq War has the number of resolutions fallen below the average of yearly resolutions passed in the entire post-Cold War era. Table 1 presents the number of General Assembly resolutions passed from the end of the Cold War in 1991 until 2008.

Table #1: Resolutions Passed in the G.A.¹

G.A. Session/Year	Number of Resolutions
46 th Session – 1991	242
47 th Session – 1992	236
48 th Session – 1993	267
49 th Session – 1994	252
50 th Session – 1995	246
51 st Session – 1996	243
52 nd Session – 1997	252
53 rd Session – 1998	243
54 th Session – 1999	283
55 th Session – 2000	285
56 th Session – 2001	512
57 th Session – 2002	338
58 th Session – 2003	318
59 th Session – 2004	314
60 th Session – 2005	289
61 st Session – 2006	296
62 nd Session – 2007	278
63 rd Session – 2008	305
Average	289

The average number of resolutions passed in the General Assembly during the entire post-Cold War period was 289. In the years after 2003, only in 2007 did the number of resolutions passed fall below that average. In all other years, the number was considerably higher than the average. If the U.N. had become suddenly irrelevant it would be expected that the number of resolutions passed after 2003, the year of the Iraq invasion, would have dropped off precipitously. Instead we see that the numbers remained stable and were actually higher than the post-Cold War average.

Not only did the General Assembly continue to pass a large number of resolutions, but these resolutions were often stronger and more important than in the past. Several important resolutions were passed on the issue of terrorism, for example. Hilde Kramer and Steve Yetiv point to the passage of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy as especially important. “The most recent achievement of the Assembly,” they write, “is the Global Counter-Terrorism

¹ “Resolutions: General Assembly,” un.org.

Strategy, which was adopted on 8 September 2006. The Plan of Action includes measures to address the root causes of terrorism, measures to prevent and fight terrorism, measures to build the individual state's capacity to fight terrorism, and measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law" (Kramer and Yetiv, 2007, p. 412).

By September 2008, each of the 192 member states of the United Nations had confirmed their commitment to the strategy and its implementation. Various subsidiary organs of the General Assembly have worked vigorously to ensure that the strategy is being executed. A report issued by the Secretary General in July 2008 outlines how the strategy is being employed and details the work of various departments towards this goal. These measures have included: an increased emphasis on preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution by the Department of Political Affairs; the development of various legal instruments to universally criminalize particular terrorist acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking, terrorist bombings, financing of terrorism and nuclear terrorism; the provision of technical and legal assistance to member states that require it in order to implement the strategy; and the development of monitoring committees and other mechanisms to track member states' effectiveness in implementing the strategy (United Nations General Assembly A/62/898, 2008).

Another important measure passed by the General Assembly, with unanimous consent, was the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The convention has been ratified and came into force in July 2007. The treaty, according to international law expert David Fidler, "requires State Parties to make certain acts criminal offenses in national law, establish jurisdiction over such offenses, prosecute or extradite persons alleged to have committed the defined criminal offenses, and engage in cooperation and mutual legal assistance with respect to objectives of the Convention" (Fidler, 2007, p. 1).

In addition to terrorism, the General Assembly remained active on important questions such as international development (A/RES/61/211), climate change (A/RES/61/201), the international drug trade (A/RES/61/183), humanitarian assistance in countries ranging from El Salvador to Somalia (A/RES/60/217-220), human rights in Myanmar (A/RES/60/233 and A/RES/61/232) and many other issues. Contrary to the expectation that the General Assembly would be less active if the United Nations had become irrelevant in the wake of Iraq, it is found that this body was even more active than

in previous years and has continued to pass resolutions of high international importance.

SECURITY COUNCIL

The activity level of the General Assembly seems to have been unaffected by the Iraq War, but what about the Security Council which is generally considered to be the most important body of the organization? Analysis of the data, as presented in Table 2, reveals that here too the level of activity has remained steady in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Table #2: Resolutions Passed in the Security Council²

Year	Number of Resolutions
1991	42
1992	74
1993	93
1994	77
1995	65
1996	57
1997	54
1998	73
1999	65
2000	50
2001	52
2002	68
2003	67
2004	59
2005	71
2006	87
2007	56
2008	64
Average	65

In the entire post-Cold War period the United Nations Security Council has passed an average of 65 resolutions per year. In the years 2004 through 2008 there were three years that fell slightly below that average (2004, 2007, and 2008) and two years that were significantly above it (2005 and 2006). The average

² Security Council Resolutions, un.org.

number of resolutions passed in the 2004-2008 time period was 67, slightly above the average of the entire post-Cold War era. The level of Security Council activity, as measured in numbers of resolutions passed, has not been depressed by the Iraq War.

A question may be raised about the importance or quality of the resolutions passed. A purely numerical analysis does not tell us how important the resolutions were. It is possible that the Security Council continued to pass resolutions that were hollow and meaningless, a mere façade of continued U.N. relevance. Upon looking at the evidence, however, we find that the resolutions passed were indeed on important issues, ranging from terrorism and the situation in Iraq, to the reconstruction of Liberia and other conflict-ridden states.

On the issue of terrorism, Kramer and Yetiv argue that since September 11th the Security Council has been quite active in passing effective resolutions. “Before September 11, the Security Council had passed a total of 13 resolutions classified as dealing with terrorism, according to the United Nations, an average of about one a year. However, there has been a marked increase in terrorism-related resolutions passed by the Security Council since 11 September 2001; by the end of 2005, it had passed 20 resolutions, an average of 4 to 5 resolutions a year” (Kramer and Yetiv, 2007, p. 415). There are no indications that this activity was hampered by the Iraq War. In fact, in 2004 and 2005 alone the U.N. Security Council passed nine resolutions related to terrorism (Resolutions 1526, 1530, 1535, 1540, 1566, 1611, 1617, 1618, 1624). All of these resolutions were adopted unanimously.

Not only were these resolutions related to the important issue of terrorism, but they have also resulted in concrete actions in fighting terrorism. The Council has required all member states to impose an asset freeze, a travel ban and an arms embargo on all individuals and organizations named in the 1267 Committee’s Consolidated List. The 1267 Committee of the Security Council manages the sanctions regime against the Taliban and Al-Qaida and as of February 2009 had placed 396 individuals and 112 entities on the list. By that same date 48 states had frozen financial assets of persons or organizations on that list (United Nations General Assembly A/62/898, 2008).

Another important action taken by the U.N. Security Council in regards to terrorism was the passage of Resolution 1540 in 2004. The resolution obligates all member states to establish domestic measures designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons along with the materials needed to develop

means of their delivery. Resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008) have extended the original mandate and have provided substantial resources to member states in need of technical advice and expertise in order to comply with the original resolution. Resolution 1810 also instituted a comprehensive review to determine the extent of progress in implementing resolution 1540 in order to hold member states accountable.

The Security Council also passed important resolutions on security problems in Iraq, Haiti, Kuwait, Cyprus, Liberia, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Sudan, Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan. This seems to vindicate Shashi Tharoor's statement that "to suggest, on the basis of disagreement over Iraq, that the Security Council has become dysfunctional or irrelevant is to greatly distort the record by viewing it through the prism of just one issue. Even while disagreeing on Iraq, the members of the Security Council unanimously agreed on a host of other vital issues, from Congo to Cote d'Ivoire, from Cyprus to Afghanistan. Indeed, the Security Council remains on the whole a remarkably harmonious body. Authorizing wars has never been among its principal responsibilities – only twice in its 58 year existence has the council explicitly done so – and it seems unduly harsh to condemn it solely over its handling of so rare a challenge" (Tharoor, 2003, p. 75).

One of the most recent examples of strong action taken by the Security Council is Resolution 1874 (2009) which imposed sanctions against North Korea in response to missile tests. The resolution has sent a particularly strong message since it was adopted unanimously. The resolution imposes travel and financial restrictions and freezes the assets of ten individuals and entities associated with the country's nuclear and missile programs. The resolution also requires all states to inspect North Korean vessels if there are "reasonable grounds" to believe that they contain prohibited weapons related materials. This aspect of the resolution was acted upon in August 2009 when the North Korean ship MV Mu San was seized and inspected by the Indian coast guard (Crail, 2009, p. 1). The passage and enforcement of this resolution is a clear example of the continued relevance of the United Nations.

In the years following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Security Council remained active in producing effective resolutions on important issues. Its failure to authorize the war did not reduce its level of activity in international security affairs in any appreciable way. In fact, by demonstrating its independence from U.S. policy by refusing to rubber-stamp the war, the Council may have in fact

protected its relevance as an international organization rather than as merely a tool of U.S. foreign policy. One of the most important responsibilities of the Security Council is approving and operating peacekeeping missions in conflict-ridden areas throughout the world. The prevalence and success of these missions is considered next.

PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Peacekeeping has become one of the quintessential and defining tasks of the United Nations. A rapid reduction in the number of peacekeeping missions executed by the U.N. would be evidence for its declining relevance. Due to peacekeeping's central importance to the mission of the U.N., the strength and number of peacekeeping missions is a good indicator of the health of the organization overall. Hence, exploring the issue of peacekeeping is important to the examination of the U.N.'s continued relevance in international affairs.

At present there are eighteen on-going U.N. peacekeeping missions. There have been nine missions launched since the Iraq War began, one of which, the United Nations Operation in Burundi, has already been completed. Most of the missions were in Africa: Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Chad. The remaining three were in Lebanon, Timor-Leste and Haiti. Because these countries are in the developing world they have tended not to receive the attention that they deserve in the global, and especially the American, media. It's lamentable that successful operations tend to receive little notice while unsuccessful operations are given intense scrutiny. There is, therefore, a tendency to over-emphasize and remember the bad while glossing over and forgetting the good.

Another indicator of the growth in peacekeeping is in the number of personnel currently involved in such missions. In November 2001 there were 47,778 uniformed United Nations peacekeepers deployed throughout the world. By October 2006 that number had grown to 80,976 and by September 2007 the number was 83,445 (Uniformed Personnel in UN Peacekeeping, 2009). This increase amounts to a near doubling of peacekeeping personnel between 2001 and 2007. During 2007 alone, 110 different countries contributed peacekeepers to the United Nations (UN Document A/62/1, 2007).

U.N. peacekeepers have made substantial contributions to international peace and stability. The conflict in Lebanon represented a major risk to the area and could have resulted in

region-wide war if it had not been resolved. The United Nations played the role of a neutral and legitimate participant that allowed the stabilization of peace. The U.N. was likely the *only* organization that could have played this role since nearly every major power is perceived to be biased towards one side or the other in the over-all struggle in the Middle East.

The U.N.'s role in Africa has also been particularly important. No other international organization has been as successful in safeguarding life and helping to maintain peace in the troubled spots of the continent as has the United Nations. One of its most successful missions in Africa has been in Liberia where it has helped prevent the country from reverting to the civil wars that devastated it for a decade. The country has experienced an astounding growth rate of 10% in 2007 (Country Report: Liberia, 2007) which would not have been possible without the stabilizing impact of the U.N. mission there.

Peacekeeping is one of the primary missions of the United Nations and therefore serves as a good measure of the organizations functionality. The fact that the number of missions and the number of personnel from such a large variety of different countries has grown so dramatically is a good sign that the U.N. continues to be highly relevant. It would be regrettable indeed if one decision, that of the invasion of Iraq, were able to overshadow all of the successes that the U.N. has achieved in recent years. Fortunately, this seems not to have been the case as the utility of U.N. peacekeeping missions is unavoidably apparent to the world community. There is no other organization available to carry out the missions that the U.N. has undertaken in the quest for global security and peace.

SUBSIDIARY ORGANS

Peace and security, however, are not the only areas in which the United Nations has demonstrated its continued relevance. The World Food Programme (WFP), for example, has been highly effective in distributing food to starving populations throughout the world. The important work done by the WFP, the largest humanitarian organization in the world, was especially evident during the global food crisis that erupted in 2008. According to USAID, global food prices increased by 43 percent between March 2007 and March 2008. The increase was even higher for some staple foods such as wheat and rice. For the millions of people who live on less than \$1 a day and spend a majority of their income on food, such a drastic increase is catastrophic. The WFP responded to the crisis

immediately and by the end of the year had successfully delivered 3.9 million tons of food to 102 million beneficiaries in 78 countries, thereby helping to stave off its worst effects.

The World Food Programme is not the only subsidiary organ of the United Nations that has made a substantial impact on the world in the years following the invasion of Iraq. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for example, has brought considerable attention to the issue of global climate change and has helped develop an international consensus on the need to urgently address the problem. In recognition of the importance of the panel's work it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. The United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) is another example of an important organ of the United Nations. It has been actively involved in providing access to education for children throughout the world, protecting children from violence and abuse, and aiding children suffering from AIDS, among many other initiatives. The World Health Organization, as a final example, has continued to monitor and fight epidemics and debilitating illnesses throughout the world. Its response to the recent H1N1 flu epidemic is a case in point.

The work completed by these organizations has been substantial and broad. The number of lives saved, for example, by the World Food Programme, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization are incalculable. There is no indication that any of these organizations have reduced their activity since the invasion of Iraq. To the people aided by these organizations, there is no further evidence needed to prove the continued relevance of the United Nations.

CONCLUSION

In the final assessment of the U.N.'s continued relevance in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the United Nations comes out looking quite strong. This paper measured the organization's relevance through a quantitative analysis of the number of resolutions passed in the General Assembly and Security Council along with the number of peacekeeping missions instituted since the beginning of the war. It has also looked at the quality of the resolutions passed in order to determine if they have made any real and significant impact. Additionally, the role played by the World Food Programme, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization have also been briefly examined.

The data demonstrates that the United Nations has maintained a high level of activity in both the General Assembly and

the Security Council. The average number of resolutions passed in the General Assembly since the beginning of the war exceeds the average number passed during the post-Cold War era taken as a whole. The same is true of resolutions passed in the Security Council. It has been additionally demonstrated that these resolutions have not been merely symbolic. Rather they have addressed significant issues, such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation in North Korea, and have led to concrete actions.

Furthermore, peacekeeping missions, the U.N.'s most important role in regards to international security, actually increased in number in the years after the invasion of Iraq. This perhaps provides the clearest evidence that the United Nations' continued relevance throughout this period cannot be doubted. The execution of these missions has meant that the U.N. continued to play an important role in the resolution of international and internal conflicts. An irrelevant and illegitimate actor could not have carried out this level of activity.

Finally, U.N. accomplishments outside the purview of the General Assembly and the Security Council, such as the important work of the World Food Programme, UNICEF and the World Health Organization, also serve to demonstrate the continued relevance of the organization. Though not as dramatic or widely discussed as peacekeeping missions or the application of international sanctions, the work done by these subsidiary organs of the United Nations have made a substantial impact on the health and welfare of people throughout the world. These accomplishments should not be forgotten or excluded when judging the relevance of the organization as a whole.

In the face of the presented evidence, it seems impossible to reach any other conclusion than that President Bush was wrong about the consequences of the U.N.'s refusal to authorize the war in Iraq. Despite the war, the U.N. has remained highly engaged in international affairs. It is relied upon by the international community to carry out tasks which no other organization or group of states would be capable of, particularly in the realms of peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and dispute resolution. The United Nations, it may be concluded from this research, is certainly not irrelevant - but may in fact be indispensable.

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William R. Patterson, PhD Candidate, Graduate Program in
International Studies, Old Dominion University, Mailing Address:
4429 Loring Rd, Virginia Beach, VA 23456. Email:
wpatt001@odu.edu.

**REMARKS FROM THE 2008 AND 2009
VSSA SCHOLAR AWARD RECIPIENTS**

ORGANIZATIONS AND THE VIRTUES OF POLITICS
Remarks upon Receiving the Virginia Social Science Association
2008 Scholar Award in Political Science
April 5, 2008

Charles E. Walcott and Karen M. Hult
Virginia Tech

Virginia Social Science Journal, 2010, Vol. 45, pages 69-73

Peter Wallenstein's letter informing us of this award included an invitation to ponder "where we are and how we got there." Good questions, ones that one seldom stops to reflect upon. We will use this opportunity to focus upon what the two of us have achieved together. There is a lot of that to cover, as we have been working on basically the same project for somewhat more than twenty-five years.

Although we understand that such monomania could be taken as evidence of aversion to new experiences, we prefer to view it as commitment. (Indeed, it took over our lives, to the extent that along the way we got married.)

The journey began in the early 1980s when the two of us discovered that, in the context of entirely different research projects, we had been asking similar questions but finding little in the way of satisfactory answers in the existing scholarly literature. The questions revolved around the role of "politics" in formal organizations, and the literature in which we had been looking was organization theory. Despite theorizing emanating from disciplines such as economics, sociology, and psychology and fields like management and public administration, one thing appeared constant: "politics" was viewed as dysfunction, as unsanctioned and mean: the devious, unprincipled, back-stabbing and character-assassinating pursuit of "power" outside the neatly drawn lines of organizational hierarchies. That was how organization theorists tended to understand politics then, and it continues to describe a significant portion of them even now.

As political scientists, we came from a different tradition, that of Aristotle, who called politics "the master science," that which enables all other noble human works to exist. For us, as for Aristotle, politics is both a social necessity (for the non-violent resolution of conflict or the searching for ways to respond when no

guidebook is available) and a potential source of creativity (as when novel or “win-win” solutions are discovered through bargaining, argumentation, and collaboration). With that orientation, we were inclined to look for an organizational politics that was both pervasive and frequently benign. In the organization theory literature, that wasn’t to be found.

So we bent our efforts toward trying to sketch out an affirmative theory of organizational politics. We began with the notion that politics often involved authority relations, not just those of power. Moreover, inspired by the work of sociologist James Thompson, we defined “politics” abstractly, as coping not only with controversy, but also with uncertainty. We saw these problems occurring as organizations sought to define their goals (or ends) and devise means to achieve them. To understand what would happen as organizations coped with politics thus defined, we imported James March and Herbert Simon’s insight that organizations tend to “satisfice,” or to routinize acceptable solutions to recurring problems. This led us to describe and predict the occurrence of varying “governance structures,” or stable, recurrent routines for dealing with classes of common “political” problems and decisions. All of this was laid out in detail in our first book together, *Governing Public Organizations*, published in 1990.

The book was well received, but a persistent criticism emerged. The premise and the scheme developed from it were interesting, but how could one know whether it could actually guide fruitful research? We could not answer that, because we hadn’t done the original, empirical research required. So that became the agenda for the next fifteen years or so.

To do this research, we needed to find an organization that could be observed in the act, so to speak, of creating governance structures. After much discussion, we decided upon the White House as the object of study. A relatively large organization (more or less 450 people in recent decades), the White House Office also was a relatively recent creation (not formalized in law until 1939), one that had begun small and been elaborated over time. Indeed, it was then commonplace among observers to argue that each new president virtually reinvented the WHO to conform with an idiosyncratic leadership “style.” On the face of it, the White House thus constituted a hard case on which to test a theory of routinization and institutionalization.

Our research strategy focused mainly on employing the methods of the historian, sifting through thousands of documents at five presidential libraries (Hoover through Johnson), augmented by

previously done oral histories, a small amount of our own interviewing, and by secondary sources. Our approach employed qualitative data to explore a multivariate theoretical model, much in the same way one would use quantitative data. This was not a declaration of the superiority of the qualitative to the quantitative. We are comfortable with both. But it did represent a decision to let the problem drive the data and methods, rather than the reverse.

Our research technique consisted mainly of leafing through thousands of memos, organization charts, old newspaper clippings and other contents of the presidential archives. Archivists at the libraries were helpful, if often confounded when we told them we really did not care much about big issues as such, or even about the presidents much – we wanted to know what staff members there were and what they did all day. That’s what governance structures are made of.

Although the results of this research, published as *Governing the White House: Hoover through LBJ* (University Press of Kansas, 1995), generally confirmed our ideas about how organizational structures arise to address environmental demands and persist if they do so effectively, we also found substantial support for the impact of presidential agency – presidents and their peculiar purposes also matter. In particular we found that policy-making structures seemed to owe their origins more to presidential preferences, while structures for outreach (to the press, the public, Congress, the president’s political party and interest groups) were responses to the growing complexity of the political environment surrounding the presidency. Moreover, we came to understand that our theoretical model was closer to rational choice institutionalism – the idea that organizational structuring is consciously designed for strategic purposes – than we had initially thought. Our own theoretical perspective was thus broadened and we have tried accordingly to build appropriate intellectual bridges.

Encouraged by the response to this research and urged (by our publisher among others) to extend it, we next turned to looking at the administration of Richard Nixon and those that followed it. The approach was the same, but the questions we asked had to differ. Nixon’s White House represented the full flourishing of the “modern” White House, complete with an emphasis on public outreach and politics that would look normal to Karl Rove. But Nixon was followed by two presidents who vowed to be as unlike him as possible and to dismantle what he had created. To what extent they succeeded and why were still debatable. So we turned our theoretical attention from explaining growth to explaining

persistence, predicting that most of what Nixon put in would still be there when Carter went out.

In a nutshell, that is what happened. As we recounted in *Empowering the White House: Governance under Nixon, Ford, and Carter* (University Press of Kansas, 2004) Ford got rid of some “old Nixon hands,” but he kept a lot of them too, including Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney. He tried to eliminate the job of chief of staff, only to retain the aforementioned pair as “staff coordinators,” a job that differed from a chief of staff mainly in the modesty of its title. He tried to get rid of the communications staff, since Nixon’s had been discredited, only to see it reemerge when needed during the 1976 campaign. Ford could be forgiven, since he really had no transition period. Carter was another story. He had plenty of time and made plenty of changes – eliminating the chief of staff (again) along with other offices, running the White House more collegially and less hierarchically, shrinking the size of the staff, and so forth. Before he had left, however, the chief’s job was back again, many of the procedures and structures of the Nixon-Ford White House had been essentially reinvented, and the use of detailees from other agencies had effectively let the staff grow. Our finding: if governance structures are congruent with their task environments, they will survive. If eliminated, then like the Terminator they will be back.

In the course of doing this research, some interesting things happened to us. First, we became recognized as “presidency scholars,” something we really didn’t set out to accomplish. Along with this came a chance to participate in the White House 2001 Project (later christened the White House Transition Project); in this effort, we and a squadron of other presidency scholars prepared briefing books for the incoming White House staff (something we have repeated for the 2008 transition). The books, based on interviews with former staff, recited the consensus wisdom in Washington on how to operate a White House. There we were, in the middle of the scholarly wing of The Establishment.

So our next project was to write an article explaining why the conventional wisdom might be wrong. For the future, we are beginning to look closely at the Reagan administration.

What, then, have we learned from this adventure? Here are a few possible lessons:

- S A positive view of politics leads you to see things that viewing it as dysfunction misses.
- S Research projects take on a life of their own; if you’re lucky, they will lead you beyond where you expected to go.

- S That is most likely to happen if you allow research to be driven by curiosity or a sense of problem, not ideology or methodological orthodoxy.
- S Research in political science, as in much social science, is inescapably interdisciplinary; in this work, we employed the theories of sociologists and economists and the research tools of historians to study a government institution. If public administration is a social science field, we were working in its traditions, too.
- S Choose your collaborators carefully, as you may wind up marrying one.

**FINDING MY WAY BACK HOME: HOW THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT MADE ME A HISTORIAN**

Remarks upon Receiving the Virginia Social Science Association

2008 Scholar Award in History

April 5, 2008

Melvin Patrick Ely

William R. Kenan Jr. Professor of Humanities

College of William and Mary

Virginia Social Science Journal, 2010, Vol. 45, pages 74-76

I study and teach American history because I grew up in the South during the Civil Rights Movement.

In my elementary school in Richmond during the late 1950s and early 1960s, I learned that my country was founded on the principle of liberty and justice for all, and on the proposition that all people are created equal. At Sunday school, we sang that Jesus loved “all the children of the world, red and yellow, black and white.”

At some point during childhood, however, I became aware of the contradictions attending these lessons: Negroes (as we then called them) were protesting the denial to them of the liberty, justice, and equality that supposedly defined us as a nation, and they were challenging the requirement that they learn our society’s uplifting civic and religious principles in racially segregated institutions.

As a historian, I now see that this contradiction was compounded by an additional fateful paradox: the protests that exposed to me the dissonance between ideal and reality burgeoned in part because cracks were forming in the wall of Jim Crow apologetics. Segregationists resisted change, often doggedly, but many did so with a sense that they were plugging holes in a dike that had been fundamentally weakened. For me, a subtle but important sign that the forces of change were making headway came before I finished second grade: Senator Harry F. Byrd’s determination that no “white” public school should ever accept a single black pupil had given way to a policy of permitting desegregation within tight numerical limits.

That shift was enough to change my life. Exposure to black children who were admitted to the schools I attended came

gradually; I did not find myself in class with an African American student until seventh-grade physical education—and yes, there was only one, a quiet, earnest fellow whom I did not really get to know. But later, in the first year of high school, in homeroom and in French and PE classes, I found myself sitting and working out with black students, and a number of them became my friends. Those people's personal qualities and talents confirmed the idea of human equality I had learned in primary school and at church; it now struck me as outrageous that such people, or their parents, would have to petition to be recognized for what they were.

By this time, I had also begun to observe how complex the Southern (and the American) racial system really was. I knew certain whites who defended segregation, yet who not only related to individual blacks on terms that were superficially friendly—Southern life was full of that sort of thing—but who engaged African Americans without apparent condescension. I also began to develop an appreciation for the repertoire of stances and tactics—now assertive, now reserved, now ingratiating—that a black student, or any black person, might resort to in order to navigate within a society where whites wrote the rules.

This fusillade of impressions supplied themes for the books I would eventually write. In the short term, they turned me into a campaigner for change, albeit in small arenas; I can lay claim to no heroics, tell no stirring war stories. Still, the impressions, and the campaigning, did gradually lead me to become a historian. By the time I got to college, I wanted to understand more deeply the complexities and the contradictions of the society that had molded me—by which I meant the United States as a whole, but particularly the South and the state of Virginia. Pursuing those studies at a northern college—learning largely, as it turned out, from liberal professors who had grown up in the South—turned out to be a stimulating approach, and I gravitated toward research topics in Virginia history, the archival research and personal interviews for which I conducted largely *in situ*.

My time at college also raised to a new level the learning from black friends that I had begun in ninth grade: my mentor at Princeton was Henry N. Drewry, an African American native of Selma, Alabama, and alumnus of Talladega College whose engagement, integrity, kindness, and good humor embodied everything I admired in human character and provided a model I wanted to emulate.

Bouncing back and forth between Princeton and Richmond forced me to think in new ways about who I was and what my place

in the world and in America's paradox-ridden society might be. I recall coming home to Richmond in the fall of 1970 to work in a hopeless campaign to replace Senator Harry F. Byrd (Junior, by then) with a legislator who would oppose the Vietnam War. One gray fall afternoon shortly before that election which changed nothing, I walked alone through Hollywood Cemetery amid headstones of Confederate dead that displayed no names, only numbers. These were my people, and I was part of them; they had died defending a homeland I loved and, at the same time, a system I deplored—a homeland that, because of its attachment to the legacies of that system, I now doubted could *be* my home any longer.

Before very long, however, I came to realize that every society has its own hypocrisies and injustices, and I remembered that I had begun studying history precisely in an effort to understand those and even, perhaps, to help overcome them. So I *did* come home—first, upon finishing college, to teach in what at that time was the most thoroughly integrated high school in Richmond, and eventually, as soon as I got the chance, to ply my trade at William and Mary. The goal of my teaching, my research, and my writing throughout those years has been to prompt people, as the events of my childhood and youth had impelled me, to think more deeply about the society we all live in.

It is easy to wrap oneself in simplistic certainties—be they dogmas that deny the legitimacy of change or formulae that sound enlightened and progressive. Yet in orthodoxies and catechisms—even those rooted in values I share—I see illusions and, often, outright denials of reality.

I do not advocate iconoclasm for its own sake, and I deplore any tendency to manipulate historical evidence so as to aggrandize the historian him- or herself, or to advance an ideological agenda. I *do* believe that to question endlessly is the only intellectually honest path we can take—and the most socially useful. That conviction lies at the heart of my vocation as a historian and teacher.

ANTHROPOLOGY, HISTORY, LITERATURE

Remarks upon Receiving the Virginia Social Science Association
2009 Scholar Award in Anthropology

March 28, 2009

Richard Handler
Department of Anthropology
University of Virginia

Virginia Social Science Journal, 2010, Vol. 45, pages 77-81

I grew up in Western Pennsylvania and matriculated at Columbia University in the fall of 1968, a few months after the first major SDS rebellion at that campus, the aftershocks of which I experienced every final exam period during my four undergraduate years. I took my first anthropology course in my second year (in the fall, as I recall, but I cannot vouch for the accuracy of any of the memories I will be conveying to you, although I can vouch for the fact that they are my memories). At the same time, I took a course on the nineteenth-century British novel, during which I read Jane Austen for the first time. The works of Jane Austen, who is famous for her detailed observations of marriage and social life among the English country gentry, struck me as amazingly anthropological, an insight I pursued later on. In my anthropology course, I wrote a crudely functionalist paper on the uses of the concept of “school spirit” to keep students in line in my rural Pennsylvania high school. Jane Austen and a bit of Pennsylvania ethnography prefigured my anthropological career, which has focused on the critical observation of cultures of modernity.

I studied both English literature and anthropology at Columbia, but chose to pursue a Ph.D. in anthropology. I reasoned at the time that the study of literature confined one to texts, but that anthropology allowed one to study anything at all. As my most charismatic anthropology professor at Columbia, the much beloved Robert Murphy, put it, anthropology was an intellectual poaching license. I also chose anthropology over literature because I was more comfortable with the ethos of the discipline, grounded as it is in field research and therefore, as it seemed to me (and still does), less stuffy than more exclusively bookish, or high-cultural, fields.

At Columbia and other universities in the 'sixties and 'seventies, grand philosophical battles were being waged between materialists and idealists. Leaving aside the obvious connection

between materialist social science and Marxian politics, the epistemological struggle at Columbia pitted more-or-less Marxian proponents of “ecological anthropology” against more-or-less Marxian proponents of British and French structuralisms. I remember the excitement that was generated when Claude Lévi-Strauss gave a lecture in the spring of 1972 at Barnard College, in which he argued that his structuralism was not incompatible with the ecological anthropology that was in favor at Columbia at that time.

I studied at the University of Chicago between 1973 and 1979. Clifford Geertz had already left for the Institute for Advanced Study, but the department had by that time been made over into the dominant “symbols-and-meanings” department in North American anthropology. My first mentor, David Schneider, had studied under Talcott Parsons in the experimental Department of Social Relations at Harvard (as Geertz had done). In Parsons’ conception of the social-scientific division of labor, “culture” fell to anthropology, and Schneider, Geertz, and others took advantage of that opening to push American anthropology toward a historical and semiotic conception of culture, and away from positivist and materialist orientations.

My second mentor at Chicago was the great historian of anthropology, George Stocking. Stocking was in the process of rehabilitating the reputation of Franz Boas, whom he championed as a great innovator in cultural anthropology, as against Boasian grandchildren who had gravitated toward positivism and neo-evolutionism and, as a consequence, saw the need to kill and bury the old man. Stocking’s re-reading of Boas was synergistic with the symbolic approach of Schneider and Geertz. Moreover, his attention to the history of anthropology as a cultural and political process was congenial to those interested in a fully historicized culture theory.

Working with Schneider and Stocking, I began three different strands of scholarly work that reached fruition over the following three decades. First, for my master’s paper, I returned to Jane Austen and wrote what we Schneider students called “a cultural account” of kinship and marriage in her novels. Stocking, who is a famous worrier, wrote generous comments on the paper, saying that while it was professionally risky for a graduate student to base a doctoral dissertation on anything other than live fieldwork, it was nonetheless clear that I had found a “tribe” to call my own. But I knew he was right about fieldwork, so I chose a second, different project for my dissertation research, to be based on fieldwork in Quebec. Quite by accident, I arrived in Quebec City two months before the *Parti Québécois* won an election that gave them control of the provincial government (Nov. 15, 1976). Their project, to secede

from Canada, caught the attention of the world, and my work quickly mutated from an unfocused study of French Canadian culture to a specific symbolic analysis of nationalist ideology. The conceptual puzzle at the heart of this work (which has preoccupied me throughout my career) was the use of the culture concept by “the natives” themselves. Another way to say this is that anthropological theory and nationalist ideology derive from the same intellectual roots, and make use of some of the same concepts. The problem, then, for the anthropologist is how to stand aside from our scientific notions of culture when we study political movements in which people draw on the very same notions to construct their collective identity.

The third strand of scholarship that emerged from my graduate training concerned the history of American anthropology, in particular, the relationship between culture theory and literary endeavor in the work of such people as Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead (all of whom wrote poetry in the 'teens and 'twenties). This interest emerged from a seminar I took with Stocking on American anthropology between the wars. Every student was assigned one anthropologist to work on, and, in another happy accident, Sapir, the great anthropological linguist, fell to me. Sapir had the kind of genius and the kind of compelling voice that Jane Austen had, and moreover, as a culture theorist, he became an important ancestor for me.

In my first decade after graduate school, I was able to publish in all these areas, turning my dissertation into my first book, and my master's thesis into my second book, which I co-authored with Daniel Segal, another Schneider student who had written a term paper on kinship in Jane Austen. By the time I arrived at the University of Virginia, I was ready to begin a new field research project. Having devoted some attention to the politics of history in Quebec nationalism, I saw the possibility for studying a similar topic in Virginia. With encouragement from the archaeologist Mark Leone at the University of Maryland, and historian Cary Carson at the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, I embarked on a two-year field study of that famous outdoor history museum. I worked with people who were at the time graduate students in anthropology at UVA, Eric Gable and Anna Lawson. Every week during the school year in 1990 and 1991, we traveled from Charlottesville to Williamsburg to conduct 36 hours of fieldwork. In the summers, we sublet an apartment and spent the better part of our time at the museum. The three of us wrote in various combinations, with Anna producing a dissertation on African-American history at

Williamsburg and Eric and I publishing a book on *The New History in an Old Museum*, which appeared in 1997. The conceptual puzzle at the heart of this project was the relationship between historiography and politics, more particularly, the differing uses of objectivism and constructivism for political critique.

You will have noticed that I pay homage to ancestors. In the 'nineties, I published an interview with Clifford Geertz, which led to a request for an interview with David Schneider, which turned into a book-length monograph, called *Schneider on Schneider*, which I published in 1995. This was a unique scholarly project for me, giving voice to someone else (who just happened to be a wonderful story-teller). The rewards were great. Schneider was beloved by many students, and after his death, people would approach me at scholarly meetings to thank me for having captured David's voice.

As I have explained, I have always had an interest in the history of anthropology, and in anthropologists as cultural critics and story-tellers. I am currently pursuing these interests with writing in two areas. First, I have begun to write about what I call the anthropology of academic administration. Here, I am particularly concerned with the tension between liberal arts and business values, a tension especially pronounced during these times of economic disorganization. Second, after Sapir, Benedict, Mead, Geertz, and Schneider, I have become engaged by the voice of another great mid-century social scientist, Erving Goffman. I have written some essays examining Goffman's critique of modern individualism, essays that I hope to expand into a book. Both lines of inquiry continue my longstanding interest in the use of social scientific perspectives to generate critical observations of our own world.

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**NEVER CUT A CLASS, BECAUSE IT MIGHT CHANGE
YOUR LIFE? MY STORY**

Remarks upon Receiving the Virginia Social Science Association
2009 Scholar Award in Criminal Justice
March 28, 2009

Jay S. Albanese
Professor, Wilder School of Government & Public Affairs
Virginia Commonwealth University

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Believe it or not, this award began for me when I was a senior in college at Niagara University. I thought I might need a letter of recommendation somewhere down the road, knowing I was graduating in a few months, so I took a course from the Sociology Department Chair, Nick Caggiano. I had no real post-college plan, until one day, at the beginning of class, Prof. Caggiano read from a flyer, saying “it looks like Rutgers is opening a new School of Criminal Justice. It sounds interesting. You might want to take a look.”

As it turns out, Rutgers was the only graduate school I applied to, I got in, and after an interesting journey, here I am!

Is the take-away message: you should never cut a class, because it might change your life? I still believe to this day, however, that if I had cut that class, I might not have gone to graduate school. Certainly not then, anyway. As it turned out, I was fortunate enough to be the first Ph.D. graduate from the Rutgers School of Criminal Justice.

Of course, I was not born a success. In fact, I’m about as average as any of you. What makes *me* unique is the same thing that makes each of *you* unique. It’s *three* things really:

1. I work hard, but try not to be grim about it.
2. I make the best use of my God-given potential, and do it cheerfully.
3. I focus on tasks that I hope will make a difference in people’s lives.

It’s as simple as that. Opportunity is fleeting, of course; I find you must grab it as it goes by, because you don’t know when your next chance will come. It’s been said that opportunity is missed by most people, because it is dressed in overalls and looks like work. Also, there are two kinds of people, those who do the work and those who

take the credit. I try to be in the first group, because there is a lot less competition there. It seems there is more pushing and shoving to get credit than there is to do the hard work that justifies it.

Those of us gathered here today have something else important in common: it's the distinct advantage of having selected an *interesting* and *relevant* field of study. In fact, it's difficult to imagine a more important field of study! Human behavior is more important than natural science, technology, or anything else you can imagine. Because it's *behavior* that makes everything else work (or *prevents* it from working).

This basic point is illustrated by an early account of bullet-proof vests for police, which found that even though the vests had been proven to save lives, many police still did not wear them because they were simply uncomfortable. It's a classic example of good technology being undermined by a failure to account for behavioral reactions.

My four years at the National Institute of Justice witnessed a high level of research both in social science and in technology. Some of the best work in advancing technology, such as new forms of communications, DNA testing, less-than-lethal force, and forensic evidence gathering, I have seen repeatedly under-used or misused in the field, because of a failure to account for the *behavior* of human beings who have to make it work in practice in order to achieve any benefit. *This is why we need social scientists.*

And there is so much more to be done. More effort and experimentation are needed in connecting ideas with practice, theory into programs, and better dissemination of good ideas around the world. For those of you who think we are too small or insignificant to be effective, I have seen very modest efforts at training and education in remote corners of the U.S. and around the world make a difference in the lives of people, and there is *nothing* more important than that! Effectiveness is measured by effort and results, not by hand-wringing, idle chatter, or criticism without action.

All of us know that those who have experienced some degree of success in their lives have lived through many similar tribulations. No one has success on the first try. As Thomas Edison said, when he was trying to invent the light bulb, "I have not failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that don't work." Successful people learn from their failures, document the reasons why, and then get back to work. In today's society, the theme I sometimes see is, "If at first you don't succeed, destroy all evidence that you tried." For those people, the light's on, the door is open, but nobody's home. So their potential to make a difference in people's lives will never be fulfilled.

Similar to your own experience, my family helps me stay centered and keep my eyes on the most important things. Any of the success that anyone here has ever had is due, in part, to the encouragement of your family and friends at key moments in your life. We should never miss the opportunity to tell these people how much they mean to us. *And today is a good day to start.* So thank you.

And as we in social science study those around us, it can be seen that people can be divided into 3 groups: Those who make things happen, those who watch things happen, and those who wonder *what happened?* Yes, some people are born on third base, and think they hit a triple, but you and I know better. We know what it takes to succeed, and we don't accept our dog's admiration as conclusive evidence that we are indeed wonderful.

Please know that I greatly appreciate the recognition you give me today, understanding that it is not only due to my own hard work, but also the hard work of my teachers, colleagues, and other researchers from whom I have benefited, as well as my family and friends who support me both on and off the job.

My wish is that we all continue to think critically about all points of view, be tolerant of those who disagree with us, and that we share our abilities with those who might benefit from them. And remember that my career is testament to the take-away message: never cut a class, because it might change your life!

WHAT I DO AND HOW I DO IT

Remarks upon Receiving the Virginia Social Science Association
2009 Scholar Award in History

March 28, 2009

William C. Davis
Virginia Tech

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A few years ago David Nobbs, one of England's finest comedic writers, published an autobiography titled *I Didn't Get Where I am Today*. The title comes from one of the more noted lines of a character he invented some thirty years ago, but it rather aptly describes my road to becoming a professional historian.

The idea of research always gripped me, even as a child. Instead of waiting for my dotage, I got interested in genealogy before I was a teenager, and in high school made regular trips to the Sutro Library on the campus of the University of San Francisco, which had an excellent genealogical collection. Indeed, I would recommend genealogy to everyone, and especially youngsters, as a painless way of introduction to American history. For me, finding that I had ancestors [5 of them, none distinguished] in the Civil War is what made me curious about their experiences, and led to my interest in that conflict and its era. Having ancestors who settled in Jamestown in 1608 aroused my curiosity to know more about the first permanent English colony. Tracing some lines back to Anglo-Saxon times introduced me to the fascinating life and history of England before the Norman Conquest. For many people, I believe that knowing that some forebearer participated in or experienced crucial times makes those events more meaningful. Not that we can necessarily take any particular pride in what they did or experienced, since we had ourselves nothing to do with it, but still it makes those times somehow more personal.

If a few family heirlooms happen to survive, like photographs or keepsakes, it becomes even more real. We had nothing from any of my ancestors' Civil War experience except the pistol cartridge pouch of a great-great-grandfather who was a Union cavalryman from Missouri. Somehow in the move from Missouri to California it disappeared, and by the time I got interested in the Civil War, it was long gone. But then one day as a high schooler I was rummaging through a packing box that had remained untouched

somehow for several years, and there it was. My mother still remembers the scream of delight coming from me as I ran to the house holding the trophy over my head. I still have it, a direct physical link with my forebear and the critical events of his generation.

Coincident to the interest in history was an indefinable desire to write, and where that came from I cannot say other than to observe that everyone in my family was always reading and most of us are storytellers. My first endeavor was a parody on the Sherlock Holmes stories written when I was eleven years old, titled "Flintlock House." Happily I recall nothing other than the title. But I kept writing little short stories, and as a high school sophomore, now very much interested in the Civil War, I tried to write an article to submit to a magazine called *Civil War Times*. It was never finished or submitted, but when college came along, again as a sophomore, I wrote and this time finished an article that I submitted, and to everyone's surprise the magazine accepted it. Somewhere I still have a photocopy of the \$50 check they paid me, my first earnings from my pen.

That article changed and directed my life, so a bit about the background. It went back to genealogy. In college I came across a classic set of books titled *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. It is, in fact, a compilation of articles appearing in *Century Magazine* in the 1880s written by leading participants in the war. Some of the articles on individual battles are accompanied by what is called an order of battle, a listing of all of the units engaged. My great-great-grandfather Josiah Davis was a private in the 45th Virginia Infantry, an obscure regiment that saw little active service except in 1864. *Battles and Leaders* carried an order of battle for the May 15, 1864 Battle of New Market, Virginia, listing the 45th Virginia as being there. It was like striking gold for me, and I soon got interested in the fight at New Market [which became my second book in 1975]. The most interesting aspect to me was the Confederate commander, General John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky. The man fascinated me. He was elected Vice President of the United States in 1856 at the age of 35, making him the youngest we have ever had or are likely to have. He ran against Lincoln for the Presidency in 1862 and polled second out of four in the electoral count. He then took a seat in the Senate, but in 1861 fled and became a Confederate general. I was gripped by the question of what would make a man who had ranked so high in the old Union become seemingly the ultimate traitor. Even more intriguing, in the near-century since his death, nothing

had been published on his life except a very pedestrian master's thesis.

Breckinridge became that first article. Having gotten a foot in the door with the magazine, I wrote more articles for them during the balance of my college years, and then when I finished my MA in 1969 the publisher offered me a summer job as an editorial intern before I was to start doctoral studies at the University of Chicago. The summer job lasted twenty-one years. When it was time to go to Chicago, I had the prescience to see that PhD's in history were going to be a glut on the market in the 1970s, and so when the publisher offered me a full-time job I took it and have never regretted the decision. Over the ensuing two decades, I rose from intern to vice president, corporate editorial director, and president of a marketing division, of a company that started with one little enthusiast magazine and grew into a major periodical publisher.

All the while I kept writing. When the Breckinridge article appeared in 1967, a member of the Breckinridge family in Kentucky saw it and invited me to take advantage of an enormous cache—two trunks and other assorted materials—of John C. Breckinridge's personal papers. In 1974 my first book, a biography of Breckinridge, appeared, to win several prizes, and thereby opened the doors for the fifty or more books that have followed in the past thirty-five years. When I left the publishing world in 1990 to move abroad for awhile to recharge, I continued research and writing, and then in 2000 stepped into the academic world by coming to Virginia Tech to help set up the Virginia Center for Civil War Studies.

Though my work long ago shifted away from military history, and even from the Civil War era itself, still all of this was started by my interest in my ancestor Josiah Davis and the 45th Virginia, which led me to the Civil War, which led me to *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* and the order of battle for New Market that introduced me to Breckinridge, which resulted in that first article in 1967. Which gets me back to David Nobbs's title. I later discovered what virtually all historians have known for some years now. Despite still being an invaluable source, *Battles and Leaders* is severely compromised by the nature of its authors. The articles are mostly written by generals and higher ranking officers of both sides, almost always with some personal agendum, either to claim more credit for victories than they deserve, or to cast blame for defeats on others. The articles suffer all of the weaknesses of any memoir, which are by nature subjective. The editors of the series apparently relied on the memories of these generals and a few documents in compiling those orders of battle, too, so they are also flawed. Years

later when I researched and wrote my second book *The Battle of New Market* I discovered that my ancestor's regiment the 45th Virginia, in fact, was nowhere near the battle of New Market, but was more than 100 miles away in Southwest Virginia. Josiah Davis did not fight in that battle and he never even saw John C. Breckinridge.

In short, my whole career grows out of an editorial error. I didn't get where I am today.

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