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# *From the Editors...*

Dear Readers,

This marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Virginia Social Science Journal, a multi-disciplinary scholarly journal in the social sciences. In celebration of our landmark we have embraced technological change and move to this new, online format!

This year also represents a momentous year in American Civil Rights history (Assassination of Malcolm X, Civil Rights March on Montgomery, Alabama, passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Watts Riots, President Johnson's establishment of affirmative action enforcement). In celebration of those important historical landmarks, the fiftieth volume of the journal has a theme: Equality—but equality broadly construed. Accordingly, this issue's articles examine civil rights history, residential segregation, the intersection of race, poverty, and hunger, access to higher education, and civil liberties in the United States after 9/11.

The editorial board thanks the article referees for their thoughtful feedback to the authors. We sincerely hope you enjoy this semicentennial volume.

Sincerely,

KIRT VON DAACKE

BRIAN CRIM

# The Effects of Individual Characteristics on Perceptions of Security Levels and Civil Liberties: An Examination Over a Decade After 9/11

PJ VERRECCHIA & NICOLE HENDRIX

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**ABSTRACT** This study uses a survey of undergraduate college students at two schools in the eastern United States to investigate their levels of trust in the government and how safe they feel over a decade after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We found that women and younger students tend to trust the government more than males and older students. In addition, consistent with past research we discovered that the women in our sample feel less safe than the men. Race did not have a significant effect on either trust in government or feelings of safety, nor did year in school.

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## INTRODUCTION

No one in the continental United States had witnessed an attack so severe on American soil before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). The attack “powerfully shaped perceptions and emotions of the American public that few other events have” (Pillar, 2011, p.1). Researchers have compared the impact of 9/11 to an earthquake as “Both events are without warning and have the possibility of another aftershock” (Torabi & Seo, 2004, p. 179). These attacks changed the United States government’s handling of terrorism, “from a minor concern to a ‘War on Terror’” (Powell, 2011, p. 90). In an effort to prevent any aftershocks, on October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed the USA Patriot Act (or the United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) into law. This act was designed to increase the surveillance and investigative powers of law enforcement agencies in the United States in an effort to combat terrorism. The act, which received near unanimous support in both houses of Congress, numbers 342 pages and references other surveillance laws including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Right to Financial Privacy Act.

Public concern about terrorism follows a “sawtooth pattern” where support for efforts to counter terrorist attacks “spikes upward” following an attack and “subside gradually downward as time passes without another attack” (Pillar, 2011, p. 2). Surveys conducted after the passage of the Patriot Act indicated that the public had “real positions” towards it, with 90% of respondents either in opposition or support (Best & McDermott, 2007, p.3). The split in support seemed to come down to

a debate about safety versus civil liberties or, more precisely, a “trade-off between civil liberties and personal security” (Davis & Silver, 2004, p. 29) which has continued to the present time.

## REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Research conducted after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 has been wide reaching, from the relationship between fear and risks of terrorism (Altheide, 2006; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischhoff, 2003; Nellis & Savage, 2012; Powell & Self, 2004; Rubin, Haridakis, Hullman, Sun, Chikombero & Pornsakulvanich, 2003), changes in individual behavior (Torabi & Seo, 2004), and the effect of conflict on group solidarity, both real and claimed (Collins, 2004; Skitka, 2005). Our research hopes to add to the body of work conducted by focusing on fear of another terrorist attack, trust in government, and the debate between supporting civil liberties or supporting government efforts to prevent another terrorist attack. On September 29, 2001, former United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra O’Connor said, “We’re likely to experience more restrictions on our personal freedom than has ever been the case in our country...It will cause us to re-examine some of our laws pertaining to criminal surveillance, wiretapping, immigration and so on” (as quoted in Davis & Silver, 2004, p. 28).

Since we are discussing a civil liberties versus security trade off, the competing issues are fundamental to the founding ideas that we, as citizens, are to be protected from the government. At stake is support for civil liberties and freedoms against the efforts of the government to prevent another terrorist attack. Therefore we expect that some of the ideas that have been researched before (i.e., patriotism) should play a role in deter-

mining individual attitudes towards this debate. Gibson and Bingham noted that “The exercise of rights generates costs, and these costs are sometimes so substantial that conflict ensues” (1985, p. 108-109). Sniderman, Fletcher, Russell and Tetlock described an “unavoidable” collision between civil liberties and other values we hold dear (1996, p. 244). Davis and Silver said, “We may sincerely believe in free speech and association, but we may also believe in protecting our society from those who use these freedoms to plan and carry out criminal attacks” (2004, p. 29). And McClosky and Brill suggested that liberty means striking a balance between freedom and control (1983).

There is also a body of work that refers to the war on terror as a moral panic (see Beckett & Sasson, 2000; Bonn, 2010; Hawdon & Wood, 2014). In his 1963 book *Outsiders*, Howard Becker stated that a moral panic, if successful, leads to the creation of entities that centralize government power (i.e., The Department of Homeland Security). There are some who see the 9/11 attacks as an opportunity to expand state power, which would also necessitate the need to keep people from feeling safe. If people felt there was no immediate threat, the civil liberties vs. safety debate becomes mute.

Civil liberties as a concept emphasizes the importance of due process rights including “legal restrictions against unreasonable searches and seizures, respect for habeas corpus, the right to legal counsel, and prohibition of illegal detention, torture, and cruel punishment” (Sung, 2006, p. 315). National security relates to protecting a nation from attack and while “most Americans place a high priority on national security” (Williams, Foster & Krohn, 2008, p. 141), some advocates are willing to set aside due process rights if they would harm a nation’s ability to capture anyone who threatens national security (Johnson & Locy, 2003). This compromise is not new, as Levin (who documented infringements on due process during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the War on Terror) stated, “civil liberties are often among the first casualties of war” (2002, p. 19).

In 2004 Davis and Silver used a national survey of Americans shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America that investigated people’s “willingness to trade off civil liberties for greater personal safety and security” (p. 28). The data came from a random digit dialing telephone survey of persons 18 and older conducted between November 14, 2001 and January 15, 2002. The final sample size for the interviews was 1,448 “with an oversample of African Americans and Hispanics” (Davis & Silver, 2004, p. 32). Davis and Silver found that sense of threat was negatively associated with support for civil liberties and trust in government was positively associated with support for civil liberties. In addition, African Americans were less willing to trade civil liberties for security than whites and Latinos and liberals were less willing than moderates and conservatives to sacrifice civil liberties for safety, but that this decreases as threat of terrorism increases. However, due to the timing of the survey Silver and Davis could not ask questions relating to other civil liberty issues such as “military tribunals, the rights of foreign prisoners...and the rights of American citizens accused of fighting for the enemy” (2004, p. 32).

Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, members of Congress endorsed the idea of some form of national identification system as a way to fight terrorism. A number of national polls conducted after 9/11 showed that over two thirds of Americans expressed support for a national identification card (O’Harrow & Krim, 2001). This raises issues for some, related to the “tradeoff concerns for security, privacy and convenience” (Hiltz, Han & Briller, 2002, p. 1). Civil liberties groups raised serious concerns about national identity cards on the grounds that they could facilitate information sharing among government agencies and increase police power (Sheeres, 2001), and other critics argued that any security benefits that would come from a national identification system are outweighed by threats to civil liberties, like overzealous surveillance (Neumann & Weinstein, 2001).

Attitudes towards a national identity card were explored by Starr Hiltz and colleagues. Using a telephone survey of 400 adults in New Jersey between January 20 and 22, 2002, they found that over two thirds of respondents (67%) felt that requiring a national identity card was an excellent or good idea (2002). Support for a national identification card was also strongly related to support for other government activities that would monitor Americans more closely. This study was only conducted in one state and shortly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 so it is interesting to explore if people would support a national identification card and come down on the side of safety (versus privacy) today.

## METHOD

Our analysis focuses on two main areas as they relate to security and safety. The first has to do with government power in regards to things like requiring citizens to carry a national identification card, law enforcement power, and freedom of speech and assembly. Our other area of examination concerns the threat level perceived by people in regards to their fear of another terrorist attack<sup>1</sup>. Indexes were created using the responses to each set of questions.

## Demographic Factors

Personal background factors reflect broader contexts (e.g. cultural and historical) where the tension between civil liberties and empowering government can be examined. Since we are conducting our research at two institutions of higher education, we are interested to see if the individual characteristics (i.e. demographic variables) have an effect on their feelings toward how safe they feel and their trust in the government.

**Race.** Previous research has demonstrated that African Americans tend to support civil liberties due to a general distrust in government (see Davis, 1995; Davis & Silver, 2004). Hispanics have been shown to have little faith in government due to not feeling fully a part of American society (Howell & Fagan, 1988). Therefore it is assumed that in the civil rights versus safety debate, people of color will come down on the side of civil rights.

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1 The specific questions asked can be found in Appendix A.

**Age.** Research has cited a “conservative nature of aging” (Davis & Silver, 2004, p. 32) so one might expect that older respondents might be more in favor of maintaining civil liberties. However, older citizens were more emotionally affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 than younger respondents (who, for our population, would have been between seven and 11 years old on 9/11) so it will be interesting to see if this assertion holds true today. In addition, research has indicated that older people tend to be more concerned about privacy than younger people (Lim, Cho & Rivera Sanchez, 2009). It must be noted, however, that some studies (see Abdullah, Sukuma, Jamhari & Musa, 2012) found age had no effect on trust in government.

**Gender.** Research in this area has been mixed. Some research has demonstrated that women are more concerned about a future terrorist attack than men (Abdullah et al., 2012; Lerner et al., 2003; Powell & Self, 2004; Rubin et al., 2003). Lim and colleagues found that women were more concerned about personal privacy than men (2009), and Torbi and Seo (2004) found no gender effect on behavioral differences in the year after the 9/11 attacks. However these studies focused more on concern regarding another terrorist attack and not trust in the government. We hope to add to the lack of research in this area.

**Year in School.** Although we did not find any literature addressing the class standing of students and its influence on attitude toward the government, we thought that since college students were our primary research target that it made sense to include this as an independent variable. We hope to add to the paucity of research in this area with our results.

**Data and Measures**

A survey was created by the authors and placed on SurveyMonkey in the fall of 2013. An email link was sent to the student body as well as all faculty and staff at the two institutions of higher learning where the authors are associate professors. The schools are located in the Mid-Atlantic Region of the United States. However, due to the low number of responses of faculty and staff (n=188) compared to the number of undergraduate students who responded to the survey (n=1126) we decided to limit our analysis to the responses of the undergraduate students.

*Table 1. Demographic Variables*

		n	%	n	%
<b>GENDER</b>	1119	Female		Male	
		657	58.3	462	41.0
<b>RACE</b>	1121	Non-White		White	
		114	10.1	1007	89.4
<b>AGE</b>	1078	20 and below		21 +	
		436	38.7	642	57.0
<b>YEAR IN SCHOOL</b>	938	Underclassmen		Upperclassmen	
		313	27.8	625	55.5

**Demographics**

The majority of our sample is made up of white students. Race was dichotomized as non-white (coded 1) and white (coded 2) and whites accounted for 89.4% of the sample. Due to the wide variability in the ages of our sample (range=17-64) we recoded age into a dichotomous variable. Respondents age 20 and younger were coded as 1 and made up 38.7% of the sample while those 21 and older were coded as 2 and made up 57% of the sample (4.3% of the sample did not indicate an age). Females (coded 2) made up 58.3% of our sample and males (coded 1) accounted for 41% of the sample (.6% of the sample did not indicate a gender). We recoded year in school into a dichotomous variable, coding underclassmen (freshmen and sophomores) as 1 and upperclassmen (juniors and seniors) as 2. Just over half of the sample (55.5%) were upperclassmen while 27.8% were underclassmen (16.7% did not indicate their year in school).

**Dependent Variables**

A Trust in Government index was created by combining the responses to eight questions regarding the government’s power (i.e. I trust the federal government). These questions were originally coded on a Likert scale with 1 as strongly disagree, 2 as disagree, 3 as neutral, 4 as agree and 5 as strongly agree. The mean index score was 22 which indicates a neutral to moderate trust in the government among our sample of undergraduate students<sup>2</sup>. The Cronbach’s alpha for this index was .702.

A Feelings of Safety index was created by combining the responses to four questions regarding how safe people feel (i.e. I am concerned about flying on an airplane). This question was originally coded on a Likert scale with 1 as strongly disagree, 2 as disagree, 3 as neutral, 4 as agree and 5 as strongly agree. The mean score was 9 which also indicates that our students have moderate feelings of safety<sup>3</sup>. The Cronbach’s alpha for this index was .688.

**Hypotheses**

Our first hypothesis is that, consistent with prior research, the people of color in our sample (non-white) will trust the government less than the whites in our sample. The second hypothesis, also regarding race, is that the people of color in our sample will feel less safe than whites.

Our third and fourth hypotheses deal with our respondent’s age. Consistent with prior research we are hypothesizing that our older respondents will trust the government less than our younger students and also that they feel less safe. Our fifth and sixth hypotheses are that, even though the research regarding gender has been mixed, women in our sample will feel less safe and trust the government less than males.

2 Scores on the index run from 8 (strongly disagree with all of the questions) to 40 (strongly agree with all of the questions).  
 3 Scores on the index run from 4 (strongly disagree with all of the questions) to 20 (strongly agree with all of the questions).

Table 2: Logistic Regression Models

Variable	TRUST IN GOVERNMENT INDEX				FEELINGS OF SAFETY			
	B	S.E.	t	Sig.	B	S.E.	t	Sig.
<b>GENDER</b>	1.771	0.356	4.971***	0.000	1.226	0.189	6.48***	0.000
<b>RACE</b>	0.513	0.559	0.917	0.359	-0.162	0.297	-0.546	0.585
<b>YEAR IN SCHOOL</b>	0.321	0.482	0.667	0.506	0.240	0.256	0.938	0.349
<b>AGE</b>	-1.028	0.457	-2.246*	0.025	-0.043	0.243	-0.176	0.860
<b>CONSTANT</b>	19.922	1.374	14.503***	0.000	6.752	0.730	9.254***	0.000
<b>MODEL ANOVA</b>	8.318***				10.968***			
<b>R-SQUARED</b>	0.035				0.045			

Note: \*\*\* p < .001 \* p < .05

Our last two hypotheses deal with an area in which there is a lack of research, the effect of year in school on feelings of safety and trust in government. We will look at this variable in a similar light as age since upperclassmen tend to be older than underclassmen, though not by a significant amount. Therefore we are hypothesizing that the upperclassmen in our sample will feel less safe and trust the government less than our underclassmen.

### ANALYSIS

To test our hypotheses we ran a logistic regression model to assess the effect of the individual characteristics on the Trust in Government Index. Of the four independent variables two were significant in the model. The women in our sample demonstrated less trust in the federal government than the men ( $t=4.971$ ,  $p<.05$ ) which is what was hypothesized. We also discovered that our younger respondents trust the federal government more than our older respondents ( $t=-2.248$ ,  $p<.05$ ) which was also what was hypothesized. Race and year in school showed no effect on the dependent variable.

We then ran a logistic regression model to assess the effect of individual characteristics on the Feelings of Safety Index. Of the four independent variables only one was significant in the model. The women in our sample feel less safe than the men ( $t=6.480$ ,  $p<.05$ ), which was as we hypothesized. None of our other hypotheses regarding feelings of safety were confirmed. The last thing we did was run a Pearson’s correlation coefficient between our two indexes. Not surprisingly, we found a significant though weak relationship between them ( $r=.178$ ,  $p<.05$ ). Those who trust the government more also tend to feel safer. However, this relationship only explains 3.1% of variance in responses regarding these topics.

We also analyzed the eight Trust in Government and four Feelings of Safety questions individually. Almost half (49.5%) of our respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “The government should be able to arrest and detain non-citizens indefinitely if that person is suspected of being a member of a terrorist organization,” while 33.1% disagreed or strongly disagreed. A majority of respondents (58%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “Teachers have the right to criticize American policies toward terrorism.” We did not find support

for citizens carrying a national identification card as less than half of our sample (46.5%) agreed or strongly agreed with that statement.

Our sample was consistent regarding their view of law enforcement and the power they should have in regards to terrorism. Over half (56.1%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “Law enforcement should be able to search property without a warrant on the suspicion of terrorist activity,” while only 28.1% agreed or strongly agreed. Just over 50% (50.4) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “Law enforcement should be able to record telephone conversations in order to prevent terrorist attacks,” and just under half (47.7%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “Law enforcement should be free to monitor email in order to prevent terrorist attacks,” while 31.2% agreed or strongly agreed. A vast majority (74.6%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “People who participate in nonviolent protests against the United States government should be investigated.” Interestingly, responses to the statement “I trust the federal government” was the only statement with the majority of responses being neutral (35%).

We also analyzed the four Feelings of Safety questions. Almost half of our sample (43%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “I am concerned that there will be another terrorist attack against the United States in the next six months.” Almost seventy percent of our respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statements “I am concerned about flying on an airplane” (69.9%) and “I am concerned about the safety of the food and drinking water” (66.3%). The overwhelming majority (91%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “I am concerned about opening my mail.”

We also ran correlations between the eight Trust in Government questions and the four Feelings of Safety questions. People who are concerned that there will be another terrorist attack against the United States in the next six months believe that everyone should have to carry a national identification card ( $r=.144$ ,  $p<.05$ ), and feel that law enforcement should be free to search property without a warrant on the suspicion of terrorist activity ( $r=.192$ ,  $p<.05$ ), record telephone conversations to prevent another terrorist attack ( $r=.183$ ,  $p<.05$ ), and monitor email in order to prevent another terrorist attack ( $r=.216$ ,  $p<.05$ ). They

also believe that people who participate in nonviolent protests against the United States government should be investigated ( $r=.216, p<.05$ ) and that teachers do not have the right to criticize American policies toward terrorism ( $r=-.080, p<.05$ ). While all of this is not surprising, what is surprising is that the people who are concerned about another terrorist attack and want to grant law enforcement leeway to investigate others do not trust the federal government ( $r=-.070, p<.05$ ). Maybe their mistrust of the federal government is one reason they are concerned about another terrorist attack, or perhaps they trust local government (i.e. law enforcement) more than the federal government. Perhaps we found what Davis and Silver (2004) expected, which was that citizens make distinctions “between different levels of government” and that it was “law enforcement that was most immediately responsible for the safety and protection of American citizens” (p. 30).

## DISCUSSION

As Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav stated, “The effects of terrorism depend heavily on how a target population responds” and “not everyone responds in the same way” (2005, p. 604). We expected that a number of demographic variables would affect people’s trust in the government and feelings of safety and were surprised to see that was not the case.

Unlike previous research (see Davis, 1995; Davis & Silver, 2004; Harlow & Dundes, 2004) we did not find a significant race effect regarding how our sample felt regarding trusting the federal government or safety. This could be due to a couple of factors; one, our sample was heavily skewed to non-white students ( $n=1007$ ) compared to non-whites ( $n=114$ ). Or perhaps the views of African Americans may be influenced less by outside threats (i.e. terrorist attacks) and more by feelings of “white hegemony” (Harlow & Dundes, 2004, p. 459) that exist in American society. The other possibility could be that our research is being conducted 12 years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.

Our research found that women are more trusting of the federal government than men. As previously stated there has much research conducted in this area but perhaps the findings have to do with a concern regarding another terrorist attack. If women are more fearful of another attack perhaps one thing that assuages this fear is the hope that our federal government will keep us safe. Another interpretation of the data is that women are more trusting of local law enforcement than men, since three of our Trust in Government index questions ask specifically about law enforcement. Whatever the case, determining why gender would have an effect on trust levels in the government is an interesting area for further research.

Our research discovered that age had an effect on trust in the government and it was in the expected direction; in other words, we did find a “conservative nature of aging” (Davis & Silver, 2004, p. 32). Our younger students were more trusting of the federal government than our older students. Perhaps the emotional effect of the September 11 terrorist attacks have stayed with our older students and perhaps it was never there for our younger students. The mean age of our sample is 26.56

years, and over half of our sample (54%,  $n=611$ ) was 10 years old or younger when the September 11 attacks occurred, while less than 20 percent (17.6%,  $n=198$ ) was 18 or older.

Only one individual characteristic had a significant effect on feelings of safety and that was gender; our female students feel less safe than our male students. This was as hypothesized and is consistent with prior research (Lerner et al., 2003; Powell & Self, 2004; Nellis & Savage, 2012; Rubin et al., 2003). However we were surprised that we did not find significance with any of the other individual factors. For instance, if our older students trust the federal government less then it would seem that they would also feel less safe. Once again the lack of race effect is probably due to the uneven racial makeup of our sample.

One area where we expected to find significance was in the year in school of our students, yet there was none on either dependent variable. While this area of research has yet to be explored, we assumed that our findings would be in line with previous research regarding age. While we had many more upperclassmen (625) than underclassmen (313), if anything one would think that this would be significant in the same way that age was. However the age difference between our underclassmen ( $m=19.49, sd=4.97$ ) and upperclassmen ( $m=24.72, sd=8.00$ ) was only about five years. We dichotomized this variable due to the variability in the classes of our sample, and perhaps future research should examine undergraduate students by grade level.

Perhaps the implications of our findings for the security vs. civil liberties debate comes down to the eye of the beholder or the messenger. Even if our respondents experienced 9/11 differently, there are still terrorist attacks being carried out. Perhaps some of our sample are getting one message and some are getting a different message. If the media influences what side people come down on in this debate (and it inarguably does), perhaps any differences in attitude can be attributed to the media they consume. This is a fascinating area to explore in future research.

## CONCLUSION

This is an exploratory study with methodological limitations. First we used a convenience sample at the two schools where we are employed, and while we had over 1,000 undergraduates in our sample our findings cannot be generalized. Second, our data was heavily skewed towards whites and was not representative of our student populations. Our sample was 58.3% women but our schools have female populations of 54% and 52%. Additionally, the percentage of white students in our sample (89.4%) is not representative of our schools (78% and 80%). In addition since this is cross sectional research any insights we found regarding trust in government and feelings of safety cannot be used to forecast the future.

Consistent with prior research (see Davis & Silver, 2003; Hiltz et al., 2002; Huddy et al., 2005) we found that as people are more fearful of another terrorist attack they are willing to support greater government power to restrict the rights of their fellow citizens. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 a

heightened concern about terrorist attacks “galvanized support for government anti-terrorist policy” (Huddy et al., 2005, p. 606), and it would appear that is still the case with undergraduate students. However since history is a threat to internal validity we cannot be certain if this is due to the September 11 attacks or other events (e.g., the Fort Hood Shooting and the Boston Marathon bombing). Future research should try to parse out any interaction between past and more recent terrorist attacks.

Another area of future exploration is why gender would be the only independent variable that would have an effect on both trust in government and feelings of safety. This could be due to how young people are socialized in this country. The fact that our findings are consistent with prior research in this area would suggest as much, but more work needs to be done to determine why this is.

## APPENDIX A

### Trust in Government Questions:

Everyone should be required to carry a national identity card at all times to show to a police officer upon request.

The government should be able to arrest and detain noncitizens indefinitely if that person is suspected of being a member of a terrorist organization.

Teachers have a right to criticize American policies toward terrorism.

Law enforcement should be free to search property without a warrant on the suspicion of terrorist activity.

Law enforcement should be free to record telephone conversations in order to prevent terrorist attacks.

Law enforcement should be free to monitor email in order to prevent terrorist attacks.

People who participate in nonviolent protests against the United States government should be investigated.

I trust the federal government.

### Feelings of Safety Questions:

I am concerned that there will be another terrorist attack against the United States in the next six months.

I am concerned about flying on an airplane.

I am concerned about the safety of the food and drinking water.

I am concerned about opening my mail.

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# Brown v. Board of Education and Segregated Universities: From Kluger to Klarman—Toward Creating a Literature on Federal Courts and Undergraduate Admissions

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**ABSTRACT** Higher education remains an understudied dimension of the history of race and education, and it remains poorly integrated into broad histories of the wider subject. Yet not only did court cases regarding higher education prove crucial in the run-up to the 1954 and 1955 decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court on K–12 schooling in *Brown v. Board of Education*, *Brown* swiftly brought progressive change on the racial front in higher education across at least the Border South and in fact soon influenced developments in the former Confederate South. This article examines the history, in all seventeen segregated states, that brought historically “white” “public” institutions of higher education, particularly in arts and sciences curricula at the undergraduate level, from absolute exclusion of African Americans to at least nominal non-segregation by the late 1960s. Thus it facilitates looking back, from the sixtieth anniversary of the rulings in *Brown v. Board*, to perceive anew the sea change—much of it wrought by *Brown*—in the racial landscape in public higher education across the South. At the same time, a survey of the leading literature on the subject of race and higher education reveals how inadequate—how undeveloped or misleading—the literature largely remains.

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## INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 1954 and 1955 rulings in the school desegregation cases, an early analysis focused, as scholars generally have ever since, on elementary and secondary education. The authors nonetheless raised the question: How, they asked, would the decisions in *Brown v. Board of Education* “affect school segregation in public colleges and universities?”<sup>1</sup>

In the six decades since then, the two leading studies of *Brown* have each given only a cursory look at the question—and not only cursory but distinctly negative as to whether the Court’s rulings spurred an early end to “separate but equal” in public higher education. Richard Kluger, in *Simple Justice* (published in 1976), offered a glimpse of white resistance—strident and successful—to desegregation at the University of Alabama in 1956 but then noted that, two decades later, some progress had become evident there.<sup>2</sup>

Michael J. Klarman, in *From Jim Crow to Civil Rights* (published in 2004, so on the fiftieth anniversary of the first *Brown* decision), supplied a single dismissive paragraph, with this topic sentence: “*Brown* also retarded progress in university desegregation.” Early in a related survey of race in the United States, Klarman observed: “It was harder for blacks in the South to vote or attend an integrated graduate school immediately after *Brown* than before”; but never in the rest of the book did he

return to the subject of *Brown* and higher education.<sup>3</sup>

It is surely time to reconsider what roles the rulings in *Brown v. Board* may have played in shaping the racial landscape in higher education. This essay emphasizes historically white schools, and among these only public institutions, and only in the seventeen officially segregated states. Near the end, brief consideration will be given to the need for further work on what kind of impact *Brown*—together with other court opinions and associated efforts to undermine segregation—had on private schools in the South, on historically black institutions, and on higher education outside the South.

The focus here is on the first decade after the decisions in *Brown*, for in subsequent years other tools were available to spur desegregation, including—especially in combination—the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Higher Education Act of 1965, one of which barred racial discrimination in programs receiving federal funds, the other greatly increasing the amounts of those funds. The decade between the 1954 and 1955 Court rulings and the 1964 and 1965 legislative enactments offers a window through which to discern the more or less direct effects of *Brown v. Board*.

A survey of the rise of segregation in colleges and universities is first in order, followed by such considerations as what is meant, or what should be meant, by the term “desegregation”; to what extent a distinction between postgraduate programs and undergraduate schools is necessary; and whether the segregated “white” schools were in fact, as is often said, “all-white.” The

1 Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence Clyde Ferguson Jr., *Desegregation and the Law: The Meaning and Effect of the School Desegregation Cases* (New York: Random House, 1957), 181.

2 Richard Kluger, *Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality* (1976; New York: Knopf, 2004), 753, 774.

3 Michael J. Klarman, *From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 393; Michael J. Klarman, *Unfinished Business: Racial Equality in American History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4.

analysis rests on archival work in one or more long-segregated, historically-white, state-supported institutions in every one of the seventeen states—institutions that, between at least 1890 and 1935, and in most cases from their origins to at least the middle of the twentieth century, maintained categorical exclusion of African Americans as students or faculty. Two examples, one from Florida, the other from North Carolina, each highlight how *Brown* promoted the dismantling of segregation at a state university.

This essay will also examine some of the literature on *Brown* to assess how well it pulls undergraduate desegregation into the broader narrative of what *Brown* meant for state policy, institutional practice, and black opportunity in a world that was emerging from a time when King Color—the twentieth century’s analogue to the Old South’s King Cotton—had absolute power, on the basis of racial identity, to sort out which students might attend which schools, including programs in every discipline and at every level of higher education.

### RACE AND HIGHER EDUCATION BEFORE *BROWN V. BOARD*

*Brown v. Board of Education* expressly overturned, at least regarding public schools, the ruling in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) that segregation was not inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. But *Plessy* had applied primarily to railroad travel, and in any case racial segregation in public education originated long before 1896. Southern elementary schools were segregated almost everywhere from the beginning of post-Civil War public education. In Virginia, for example, the same 1870 law that provided for a system of public schools specified that they would be racially segregated. In higher education, a similar rule emerged, as one state or another—among them Mississippi and Virginia—made some provision for black access to separate colleges.<sup>4</sup>

*Plessy v. Ferguson* did not inaugurate segregation in any public institution of higher education in the South, any more than it had done so in any elementary or high school. Examples of integrated schools in the South—at the University of South Carolina in the 1870s; in elementary schools of New Orleans at about the same time; or in Maryland’s law school in the 1880s—had ended years before the 1896 decision. In higher education, the practice of “separate but equal” (or separate and unequal) had its origins well before *Plessy* but later than in elementary schooling—not because higher education was more likely to be integrated, but because states were slower to provide black residents any access at all to public institutions of higher education. So the switch “from exclusion to segregation,” as Howard N. Rabinowitz helpfully puts it, came later there than at the lower levels.<sup>5</sup>

4 Howard N. Rabinowitz, *Race Relations in the Urban South, 1865–1890* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 152–81; Peter Wallenstein, “Race, Law, and Southern Public Higher Education, 1860s–1960s,” in *Signposts: New Directions in Southern Legal History*, ed. Sally E. Hadden and Patricia H. Minter (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2013), 369–92.

5 Wallenstein, “Race, Law, and Southern Public Higher Education,” 389n13; Liva Baker, *The Second Battle of New Orleans: The Hundred-Year Struggle to Integrate the Schools* (New York: HarperCollins, 1996); David S. Bogen, “The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the Admission of Maryland’s First Black Lawyers,” *Maryland Law Review* 44 (summer 1985): 939–1046; Rabinowitz, *Race Relations in the Urban South*.

In establishing the nation’s system of land-grant institutions of higher education, the Morrill Land-Grant College Act of 1862—passed early in the Civil War, thus before the Emancipation Proclamation let alone the Thirteenth Amendment—made no reference to black access. In 1890, by contrast, in offering enhanced federal funding for land-grant institutions under the Second Morrill Act, Congress gave express approval to racial segregation, so long as states made “a just and equitable division of the fund to be received under this act between one college for white students and one institution for colored students.”<sup>6</sup> Soon, more states established schools “for colored students” so as to qualify for the additional funding for white schools and at the same time insulate the white schools against black access.

By the early years of the twentieth century, seventeen states maintained a dual system of public higher education to go with their dual system of public elementary and secondary education. More particularly, each of those states supported a pair of land-grant institutions, often referred to as the “colleges of 1862” and the “colleges of 1890” (though the white schools sometimes had later origins, and the black schools sometimes had earlier roots). Thus there emerged Delaware State College to match up with the University of Delaware, and South Carolina State College to counter Clemson.<sup>7</sup>

*Plessy v. Ferguson* occasioned no sudden shift in policy regarding black access to public institutions of higher education. Nonetheless the ruling supplied a benchmark as well as a slogan, “separate but equal”—a defense against desegregation but also the basis for claims by black southerners to some semblance of equal treatment within segregation, in schools at every level. Over the next half-century, policy makers across the South, virtually all of them everywhere white, paid far more mind to maintaining the separation than to achieving an equality of benefits in separate institutions.<sup>8</sup> Between 1890 and 1948, nowhere in the former Confederacy—and not much in the Border South—was public higher education less than fully segregated in any institution, in any program, at any level.

Exceptions were the University of Maryland’s law school beginning in 1935, followed by graduate programs at West Virginia University a few years later. The change in Maryland, which resulted from a successful suit in state court, applied only to the law school in Baltimore. Subsequent desegregation took additional litigation, at mid-century, whether for access to a nursing program in Baltimore or a graduate program at College Park.<sup>9</sup> The change in West Virginia emerged in the wake of a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Gaines v. Missouri* (1938),

6 Joel Schor, *Agriculture in the Black Land-Grant System to 1930* (Tallahassee: Florida A&M University, 1982), 169–71.

7 *Ibid.*, 47–149; Jean L. Preer, *Lawyers v. Educators: Black Colleges and Desegregation in Public Higher Education* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 5–26.

8 Louis R. Harlan, *Separate and Unequal: Public School Campaigns and Racism in the Southern Seaboard States, 1901–1915* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958); Peter Wallenstein, *Cradle of America: A History of Virginia* (2nd ed., rev.; Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014), 357–56.

9 Kluger, *Simple Justice*, 186–95, 278, 289; Peter Wallenstein, ed., *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement: White Supremacy, Black Southerners, and College Campuses* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008), 26–29, 33.

a ruling that, if a state offered a program of legal study for white residents, it had to do the same for black students. According to *Gaines*, that is, the state could offer a program of legal education to everyone, or to nobody; or it could offer a segregated program for people of each race; but it could not constitutionally provide in-state benefits of higher education for whites only, even if it offered to pay the way for black citizens to go out-of-state to enroll in such a program.<sup>10</sup>

By no means did the Supreme Court order the University of Missouri to admit *Gaines* (as is often said), but states were served notice that they faced new constitutional limits on their discretion in addressing the demands of black citizens for access to programs in higher education. Despite the ruling, many states continued to operate as though the *Gaines* case had never been decided, supplying black citizens with some limited financial support to attend out-of-state programs that would admit them, rather than either desegregating in-state programs or supplying a parallel set of programs. Any number of such programs, in fact, were initiated after *Gaines*.<sup>11</sup> Yet such efforts, never universal in any case, could not entirely forestall black enrollment at some southern universities.

So not in all southern states did the beginnings of black enrollment at historically white institutions await the decisions in *Brown*. Cases from Oklahoma and Texas, decided in 1948 and 1950 by the U.S. Supreme Court, brought limited black enrollment in law schools or graduate programs in those two states. They also served as crucially important steppingstones on the path to *Brown v. Board of Education*, but their more immediate effect could be seen in two ways in higher education. Just as West Virginia authorities had acted in the wake of the 1938 *Gaines* case, so too did their counterparts in Delaware and Arkansas after the 1948 ruling from Oklahoma. By the early 1950s, typically following a directive from a lower federal court, such programs began to open across the Border South and even in the Upper South states of Virginia in 1950 and North Carolina in 1951.<sup>12</sup>

Nor did black *undergraduate* enrollment at nonblack institutions of higher education necessarily await *Brown*. Rulings by federal courts at mid-century regarding graduate or professional programs in Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, and Virginia, for example, soon translated into one or more black undergraduates studying engineering at the University of Kentucky, the University of Maryland, Oklahoma State, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute.<sup>13</sup>

10 *Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada*, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Preer, *Lawyers v. Educators*, 31–57; Mark V. Tushnet, *The NAACP's Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, 1925–1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 70–77; Klarman, *From Jim Crow to Civil Rights*, 148–52, 160–62.

11 Klarman, *From Jim Crow to Civil Rights*, 160–61.

12 *Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma*, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); *Sweatt v. Painter*, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Kluger, *Simple Justice*, 258–84; Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 21–34. For detailed treatments of the Texas and Oklahoma stories, see Gary M. Laverne, *Before Brown: Heman Marion Sweatt, Thurgood Marshall, and the Long Road to Justice* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), and Cheryl Elizabeth Brown Watley, *A Step toward Brown v. Board of Education: Ada Lois Sipuel Fisher and Her Fight to End Segregation* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014).

13 Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 26, 33, 36–37.

Across the South, the policy of “separate but equal” in public education—including higher education, and certainly undergraduate schooling—remained in force until after *Brown v. Board*. The term “pre-desegregation” can describe the period—whatever the constitutional regime, whether before or after *Brown*—during which black southerners tried, but failed, to enter historically white institutions. The term “proto-desegregation” (that is, an early form of desegregation) fits the phenomenon by which, on the basis of the “equal” in “separate but equal”—rather than actual desegregation all at once—a token one or more black southerners were admitted to an otherwise nonblack institution, for example a black student to the law school, even though other programs on the same campus continued to exclude any and all black applicants.

Moreover, following the 1950 Supreme Court decision in the case from Texas, *Sweatt v. Painter*, a state court order—based on the grossly unequal physical facilities and curricular offerings at Delaware State College—opened all undergraduate programs at the University of Delaware to black students. Rather than overturning *Plessy*, the Delaware court was insisting that equal opportunity be supplied, something the state of Delaware had utterly failed to do at Delaware State and evidently could do then only at the University of Delaware.<sup>14</sup>

Mandated in-state opportunities for professional higher education could mean, then, that undergraduates, too, might enroll—but nowhere, aside from Delaware, did that translate to an end to black exclusion from all other undergraduate programs. Then that restriction, too, came under attack. Weeks before the May 1954 ruling in *Brown*, a federal district court decision led to black enrollment at a regional four-year institution, Southwestern Louisiana Institute (today's University of Louisiana at Lafayette), where a remarkable eighty black students proceeded to take classes in fall 1954, as work by Michael G. Wade has revealed. The basis for that decision lay in the considerable distance that black students in the area otherwise had to travel to go to college.<sup>15</sup>

Every such instance of a change in legal interpretation and institutional practice is best understood as working within, not repudiating, the *Plessy* formula of “separate but equal.” Yet each instance—certainly those related to public law schools in Texas and Oklahoma—eroded the former policy of absolute exclusion of African Americans from enrolling in any and all programs at a historically white institution. Despite the proto-desegregation that had come to a number of institutions of higher education in the South, full desegregation of student enrollment had yet to take place almost anywhere, and though non-segregated enrollment was an important step, it was only a step, on the way to a desegregated institution.

14 Kluger, *Simple Justice*, 289–90, 428–40; Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 29–32. See also Robert J. Schneller Jr., *Breaking the Color Barrier: The U.S. Naval Academy's First Black Midshipmen and the Struggle for Racial Equality* (New York: New York University Press, 2005).

15 Michael G. Wade, “Four Who Would: *Constantine v. Southwestern Louisiana Institute* (1954) and the Desegregation of Louisiana's State Colleges,” in Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 60–91.

## VIRGIL HAWKINS AND THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW SCHOOL

The constitutional principle in *Plessy v. Ferguson* of “separate but equal” continued in force until the ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education*, even though some black students were able to enroll in some programs on some campuses. In a case that came from Florida regarding black access to law school, and in a case from North Carolina about access to undergraduate programs (where black students were already attending the law school), federal courts considered whether and how *Brown* should affect higher education.

In 1949, a handful of black Floridians went to court in an effort to gain entrance to the University of Florida. Displaying no inclination to change its policy and practice of black exclusion, Florida responded by authorizing new graduate and professional programs at Florida A&M College, the state’s black land-grant school, newly designated as Florida A&M University. Nevertheless one black applicant—Virgil Hawkins—continued his litigation, in state court and in federal court.<sup>16</sup>

The Florida Supreme Court routinely held against Hawkins, and the U.S. Supreme Court did not prove much more helpful. One week after handing down the 1954 school desegregation decision in *Brown*, the nation’s high court sent the *Hawkins* case back to Florida with instructions that it be reconsidered in light of *Brown*. But the state attorney general observed that *Hawkins* could readily be distinguished from *Brown*, in that the emphasis in *Brown* on the psychological damage that segregation could inflict on young children hardly applied to Hawkins, a middle-aged man. Two years later, in 1956, Hawkins having persisted in his efforts against an entirely obstructionist Florida establishment, the case was back in the nation’s capital. This time the U.S. Supreme Court insisted that, whatever language it may have used about “reasonable” speed in its 1955 implementing decision in *Brown*, higher education did not require a period of adjustment that might support a claimed need for further delay. There was, the Court insisted in *Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida*, “no reason for delay” in admitting Hawkins to “a graduate professional school.”<sup>17</sup> *Brown II* had no relevance; it supplied no justification for further delay. *Brown I* sufficed; segregation should end.

The Florida Supreme Court nonetheless found a reason to bar Hawkins’s admission. The state court could not believe, it said in 1957, that the U.S. Supreme Court “intended to deprive the highest court of an independent sovereign state of one of its traditional powers, . . . the right to exercise a sound judicial discretion as to the date of the issuance of its process in order to prevent a serious public mischief.” Hawkins returned to the U.S. Supreme Court, which directed him to the lower federal courts. District Judge Dozier DeVane balked, but Hawkins took his case

to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which agreed with Hawkins and, in April 1958, sent the case back to Dozier for action. This time, in June 1958, Judge Dozier issued an order directing the University of Florida to cease using race as a basis on which to deny admission into its graduate programs. The breakthrough was clear; so were the limits. Adopting the Supreme Court’s rhetoric from back in 1956, the district judge stated that the University of Florida could no longer maintain a policy “limiting admission to the *graduate* schools and the *graduate professional* schools . . . to white persons only.”<sup>18</sup>

At the same time, Judge Dozier noted that Hawkins himself could not benefit from the ruling. The University of Florida had raised its entrance requirements—the minimum score on an entrance exam—sufficiently to bar Hawkins from enrolling. Yet, as a direct consequence of the *Hawkins* litigation, the law school did admit a black applicant that year, George H. Starke Jr., and small numbers of other black graduate and professional students followed. By that time, the matter was no longer in the courts, and the story moved from legal conflict to social or institutional history. The second black law student, W. George Allen, before he graduated in 1962, did what he could to recruit black undergraduates to the university, the first small batch of whom enrolled that same year, including transfer student Stephan Mickle, who graduated in 1965.<sup>19</sup>

Even after *Brown*, and even in a graduate or professional program, the state of Florida rebuffed efforts to enroll an African American in a nonblack school. Although the results came grudgingly and late, public higher education—at first at the law school, eventually at the undergraduate level—began to go through the process of desegregation in the state of Florida. The U.S. Supreme Court expressly linked the *Hawkins* case to the rulings in *Brown*. The Court also used language that limited its ruling in *Hawkins* to graduate and professional programs. But a case from North Carolina, decided by the Supreme Court in March 1956—the same month as the key ruling in *Hawkins*—clearly linked *Brown* with desegregation at the undergraduate level.

## LEROY FRASIER AND UNDERGRADUATE PROGRAMS AT UNC

In April 1955—shortly before *Brown II*; nearly a year after *Brown I*—three students at the city of Durham’s all-black Hillside High School applied to the University of North Carolina, in the neighboring town of Chapel Hill. Leroy Frasier Jr., his brother Ralph, and their classmate John Brandon were planning to go to college, and if accepted at UNC they would be the first African Americans ever to take undergraduate classes at the state university.<sup>20</sup>

16 Lawrence A. Dubin, “Virgil Hawkins: A One-Man Civil Rights Movement,” *Florida Law Review* 51 (December 1999): 913–56; Wallenstein, “Black Floridians and the Desegregation of Higher Education, 1946–1966,” paper presented at the First Biennial Allen Morris Conference on the History of Florida and the Atlantic World, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla., February 2000.

17 Wallenstein, “Black Floridians”; Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 41.

18 Wallenstein, “Black Floridians”; Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 42; *Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida*, 162 F.Supp. 851, 853 (1958).

19 Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 42–44.

20 Peter Wallenstein, “Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement: Desegregating the University of North Carolina,” in Winfred B. Moore Jr., Kyle S. Sinisi, and David H. White Jr., eds., *Warm Ashes: Issues in Southern History at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 280–300, at 286–88; Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 34.

Each supplied the school the required personal references and a record of his academic achievements. Eight days later, each received a letter from the UNC director of admissions that laid out the material way in which the applicant had failed to satisfy another entrance requirement. UNC was a white school. That was not entirely true—like many southern so-called “white” schools, UNC did admit Chinese students, for example, and after a federal court ruling in 1951 it had begun admitting black students into certain graduate and professional programs—but it did not accept African Americans for undergraduate study. During the 1954–1955 school year, officials in the UNC system were still advising African American prospective undergraduates that their racial identity barred their admission.<sup>21</sup>

Turned down on grounds of the school’s racial policy, the three asked the school to change its policy, but the Board of Trustees emphatically reasserted the old policy. The trio’s next move was to bring suit in the federal courts to overturn the UNC policy of excluding all black undergraduates. Their lawyers included Conrad Pearson—who had been involved in an unsuccessful court case against racial exclusion at UNC back in the 1930s, as well as the successful later suit to open the law school to black enrollment—and Floyd McKissick, one of the law students at North Carolina College for Negroes who had brought the mid-century case, which led to his own admission to the UNC law school in June 1951. For Pearson and McKissick, the suit they filed in 1955 for three prospective college freshmen was the necessary next step toward breaking down segregation throughout public higher education in North Carolina and, indeed, across the South.<sup>22</sup>

The main argument by these black lawyers on behalf of these black applicants and plaintiffs held that the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Brown* knocked the constitutional props out from under “separate but equal” in undergraduate programs at public universities. But according to the state’s attorneys, *Brown v. Board* applied only to “the lower public schools,” and the nation’s high court “did not decide that the separation of the races in schools on the college and university level is unlawful.” The three students and their lawyers—and indeed all black North Carolinians who might wish, then or at sometime in the future, to attend the state university—gained a victory in September 1955, when the federal district court interpreted *Brown* as applying to all levels of public higher education as well as elementary and secondary schooling: “That the decision of the Supreme Court was limited to the facts before it is true [wrote Judge Morris Soper], but the reasoning on which the decision was based is as applicable to schools for higher education as to schools on the lower level.”<sup>23</sup>

UNC enrolled the trio in September 1955. But the school and the state did not give up their fight to stay all-white—or, that is to say, nonblack, at the undergraduate level—and appealed the district court ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court. In the meantime, the state attorney general advised the university to admit

no additional black undergraduates—none not party to the suit. At the Supreme Court, the three young men’s lawyers included Thurgood Marshall as well as Conrad Pearson and Floyd McKissick. In March 1956, in *Board of Trustees v. Frasier*, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision.<sup>24</sup> The judgment in *Brown*, banning racial segregation in public education, should indeed be understood as applying to higher education as well as to elementary and secondary schools. The three black freshmen at UNC could retain their places, and more black undergraduates could apply for admission and expect that their applications might be accepted.

What’s more, within months—in summer 1956, as a direct consequence of the Supreme Court’s upholding the lower court decision—black undergraduates began taking classes at North Carolina State; and that fall two black undergraduates enrolled at Woman’s College, UNC’s school in Greensboro for nonblack women. At both institutions, black undergraduates had earned degrees by 1960.<sup>25</sup> The entire state system was beginning to change as a consequence of a lower federal court ruling, affirmed by the Supreme Court, that *Brown* applied to public education at the undergraduate level, not just K–12.

In short, the story regarding the University of North Carolina that unfolded soon after *Brown* revolved around whether the high court’s rulings applied to public *higher* education—and specifically at the undergraduate level—as well as elementary and secondary schools. North Carolina provides an illuminating case study of how a southern state university might respond to *Brown* as though the ruling had no relevance—and yet how federal courts could see *Brown* as requiring the admission of otherwise qualified black applicants to undergraduate programs. UNC balked, but following *Brown* the federal courts ended the ban on black undergraduates there.

### **BROWN V. BOARD AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 1950s**

Authorities in neither Florida nor North Carolina acted as though *Brown* had any bearing on higher education, but a number of states acted as if it did. By fall 1955, every state university in the six states of the Border South—from Delaware to Oklahoma—had begun to admit black undergraduates, without restriction as to what they wished to major in. Delaware had already done so after a ruling in state court in 1950. The others had all acted in response to either *Brown I* or *Brown II*. In 1954, *Brown I* led directly to policy changes in Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri (far more published work is needed on each of these). *Brown II* soon did the same in Oklahoma—the last among the Border South states—as well as in Texas and Arkansas among the states of the former Confederacy. In each instance, without litigation to obtain a ruling that segregation

21 Augustus M. Burns III, “Graduate Education for Blacks in North Carolina, 1930–1951,” *Journal of Southern History* 46 (May 1980): 195–217; Wallenstein, “Desegregating the University of North Carolina,” 281, 283–84, 287.

22 Wallenstein, “Desegregating the University of North Carolina,” 288.

23 *Ibid.*; *Frasier v. Board of Trustees*, 134 F. Supp. 589, 592 (1955).

24 *Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Frasier*, 350 U.S. 979 (1956); Wallenstein, “Desegregating the University of North Carolina,” 289; Richard Paul Chait, “The Desegregation of Higher Education: A Legal History” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1972), 139–41; Neal King Cheek, “An Historical Study of the Administrative Actions in the Racial Desegregation of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1930–1955” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1973), 182–201; William A. Link, *William Friday: Power, Purpose, and American Higher Education* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 82–84.

25 Wallenstein, “Desegregating the University of North Carolina,” 289–94.

in undergraduate programs must go, modest black enrollment quickly took place.<sup>26</sup>

By then, enrollment desegregation had come to undergraduate education in the flagship universities of nine of the seventeen previously segregated states, eight of them in response to *Brown*. In the eight remaining states of the former Confederacy, however, *Brown* led to no immediate change in policy, no immediate movement toward non-segregation, and in fact the desegregation under way at Southwestern Louisiana Institute was rolled back by legislative action. In those eight states, undergraduate programs at public nonblack universities continued to resist all desegregation, and the mantra “separate but equal” continued alive and well, in K–12 and in higher education alike. In most of those eight states, protracted litigation proved necessary before undergraduate programs were opened to black enrollment.

As a result of the *Frasier* litigation, the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in *Brown* moved the timing up when one state system began to admit black undergraduates into programs from which they had always before been categorically excluded. *Frasier v. Board of Trustees* demonstrated that *Brown v. Board of Education* could be called upon to obtain decisions in federal court designed to break down barriers to black admission into undergraduate programs. Including the seven states that responded directly to *Brown*, as well as (after subsequent federal court rulings) Florida and North Carolina, *Brown* led directly to change in nine of the seventeen southern states (albeit only on the graduate level in Florida), eight of them by fall 1955.

In sum, *Hawkins* and *Frasier* each resulted in the partial desegregation of one state university or another. The mid-century cases on higher education created an environment in which successful litigation could be brought in *Brown*. In state after state—but not everywhere, certainly not right away, any more than in K–12 schools—*Brown* in turn fostered the desegregation of higher education.

Far more than before *Brown*, citizens later—and not a whole lot later—had the freedom, regardless of their racial identities, to attend the school of their choice. State governments had lost the ability to determine—absolutely, categorically—otherwise; and white citizens had lost the ability to demand that their state do so. *Plessy* did not inaugurate school segregation, and *Brown* did not promptly result in wholesale desegregation. But each of the two decisions is, with good reason, a symbol of a regime, if not a marker of sudden historical transformation.

## THE LITERATURE ON *BROWN* AND HIGHER EDUCATION

Having raised the question as to the impact of *Brown v. Board* on universities, an early analysis discussed the *Hawkins* litigation regarding the Florida law school, but the authors

ignored that case’s fraternal twin, *Frasier*, on undergraduate studies. And they declared in error that, in *Hawkins* in 1956, the Supreme Court had expressly extended the ruling in *Brown* to “the field of higher education” (that much was true) and thus to “all public schools” (clearly an overstatement). Decades later, a study relating the law of desegregation to historically black colleges included a chapter on “Applying *Brown* to Higher Education” but, given the focus on black institutions, made no mention of either *Hawkins* or *Frasier*.<sup>27</sup>

Richard Kluger published *Simple Justice*, his magisterial book on the long journey to *Brown*, in 1976. In 2004, Michael Klarman published perhaps his generation’s equivalent, *From Jim Crow to Civil Rights*, a similarly big book that stretches over more time and more topics than Kluger did. Kluger detailed the salient events that led up to *Brown v. Board*, and he offered an epilogue that surveyed developments on the racial front during the two decades that by 1976 had elapsed since the decisions in *Brown*. Kluger’s book is considerably older now than the litigation in *Brown v. Board* was at the time that he recounted it. Published nearly thirty years after Kluger, and a half-century after *Brown*, Klarman’s book explores the full range of topics dealing directly with race that the Supreme Court ruled on between the 1890s and the 1950s, from *Plessy* to *Brown*. Education is only a portion of that story, higher education only a subset of that portion, and undergraduate education only a fragment of that subset, before let alone after *Brown*. Yet what Klarman offers about post-*Brown* higher education may well summarize the general state of scholarly knowledge, or at least those dimensions of it that have made it into broad understanding and synthetic studies. So if he is misleading, much may be at stake in setting the story straight.

The state of the literature on individual schools available for many years for scholars to draw on regarding desegregation is signaled by three institutional studies published between the 1960s and the 1990s. A history of the University of Maryland misleads both as to the timing of the school’s admission of its first black undergraduate and as to situating Maryland in the context of the region’s history. Whether with respect to the first black individual, an engineering student who enrolled in 1951, or the more general policy, which came in 1954 directly after *Brown*, Maryland was not the first southern state university to desegregate enrollment in its undergraduate programs; that would be its neighbor Delaware.<sup>28</sup>

A history of the University of North Carolina recounts the federal court ruling in 1951 that brought the beginnings of black enrollment in the UNC law school (and led to similar change in some other programs, starting with the medical school). But that book nowhere mentions the litigation that took place a few years later—on the basis of *Brown*—so that black undergraduates could attend the university too.<sup>29</sup>

26 George Lynn Cross, *Blacks in White Colleges: Oklahoma’s Landmark Cases* (1975; Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 132; Watley, *A Step toward Brown v. Board of Education*; Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 33–34. See also Peter Wallenstein, “Naming Names: Identifying and Commemorating the First African American Students on ‘White’ Campuses in the South, 1935–1972,” *College Student Affairs Journal* 20 (fall 2000): 131–39.

27 Blaustein and Ferguson, *Desegregation and the Law*, 193–97; Samuels, *Is Separate Unequal*.

28 George H. Callcott, *A History of the University of Maryland* (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1966), 353.

29 William D. Snider, *Light on the Hill: A History of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 246–48.

A history of the University of Arkansas recounts the beginnings of black enrollment in the law school in 1948—and then skips directly to the presence of black players on the varsity football team two decades later, as if undergraduate education did not have to be desegregated in the meantime, a change that was in fact directly linked to *Brown v. Board of Education*. World War II veteran Silas Hunt gained admittance into the law school in Fayetteville in 1948, and Edith M. Irby entered the medical school in Little Rock the same year. In 1955, the university admitted three young black women, Maxine Sutton, Billy Rose Whitfield, and Marjorie Wilkins, into the nursing program, and thereafter ever more black undergraduates enrolled. Much later, the university recruited two black football players, Jon Richardson and Jerry Jennings, in 1968, and Gordon D. Morgan as a black faculty member in sociology in 1969.<sup>30</sup>

Not readily linked to *Brown*, but also not generally included under the term “desegregated,” is the broad question of black exclusion from or inclusion in intercollegiate athletics at historically white schools. Excellent books that recount this later dimension of desegregation in the South include studies of college basketball or football by Frank Fitzpatrick, Joe Formichella, Barry Jacobs, and Charles H. Martin.<sup>31</sup> The direct linkage of a lone black law student in 1948 with black football players twenty years later belies the long series of changes that had to take place between those two markers.

That the literature has been maturing is seen, for example, in an impressive analysis of racial identity and higher education in Texas since the Civil War. Amilcar Shabazz supplies a model history of developments in higher education on the racial front in one state across the entire century after emancipation—in black schools as well as nonblack institutions; in the legislature as well as the courts; and in community colleges, four-year institutions, and graduate and professional programs.<sup>32</sup>

Other books published in recent years each provide a model reconstruction of the story of segregation and desegregation at one major southern state university. This literature includes

30 Robert A. Leflar, *The First 100 Years: Centennial History of the University of Arkansas* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Foundation, 1972), 276–82, 287; Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 23–25, 33 (see also 232, 255). See also Gordon D. Morgan and Izola Preston, *The Edge of Campus: A Journal of the Black Experience at the University of Arkansas* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1990).

31 Frank Fitzpatrick, *And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Kentucky, Texas Western, and the Game That Changed American Sports* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999); Joe Formichella, *Staying Ahead of the Posse: The Ben Jobe Story* (Montgomery, AL: River City Publishing, 2008); Barry Jacobs, *Across the Line: Profiles in Basketball Courage—Tales of the First Black Players in the ACC and SEC* (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2008); Charles H. Martin, *Benching Jim Crow: The Rise and Fall of the Color Line in Southern College Sports, 1890–1980* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010). See also Pamela Grundy, *Learning to Win: Sports, Education, and Social Change in Twentieth-Century North Carolina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), and Lane Demas, *Integrating the Gridiron: Black Civil Rights and American College Football* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010).

32 Amilcar Shabazz, “The Opening of the Southern Mind: The Desegregation of Higher Education in Texas, 1865–1965” (Ph.D. diss., University of Houston, 1996), published as *Advancing Democracy: African Americans and the Struggle for Access and Equity in Higher Education in Texas* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). For subsequent work on Texas, see Dwonna Goldstone, *Integrating the 40 Acres: The 50-Year Struggle for Racial Equality at the University of Texas* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006), and Laverne, *Before Brown*.

work on the University of Alabama, the University of Mississippi, the University of Oklahoma, and the University of Texas.<sup>33</sup> Each of these books makes available work of high quality for scholars who seek to synthesize such state and institutional studies into region-wide analyses. Shabazz’s work has the added value of focusing scholarly attention on a state that—unlike Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia—displayed no notable disorder at the time and thus escaped much attention in the press then or by historians generally since.

Two books from recent years tell the story of initial black access to the University of Georgia. In September 1950, shortly after the Supreme Court’s decisions in June that year in graduate education cases from Oklahoma and Texas, Horace Ward initiated an effort to enroll at the University of Georgia Law School. In February 1957, after years of stonewalling by the university and the state, a crushing loss in federal district court convinced him to abandon his quest. After completing law school at Northwestern University, though, he returned to Georgia and was one of the attorneys who proved victorious in federal court in gaining the admission of two black applicants, undergraduate transfer students Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes, in January 1961, just over ten years after Ward had begun his quest for his own admission as a law student there.<sup>34</sup>

Richard Kluger told, in rich detail, the stories of Lloyd Gaines in Missouri; Ada Lois Sipuel Fisher and George W. McLaurin in Oklahoma; and Heman Marion Sweatt in Texas. Doing so, he set the stage for his treatment of the K–12 cases—how they arose, how the NAACP chose to address them, and how the federal courts ruled in them along the road to *Brown*. In his epilogue, Kluger referred briefly to the court-ordered admission of graduate student Autherine Lucy at the University of Alabama in January 1956 and her expulsion a few days later, leaving the impression that *Brown* had, after all the effort that went into it, brought little near-term reward in higher education.<sup>35</sup>

Twenty-five years after Kluger published his account in 1976, surveys of *Brown*’s first half century began to appear. These books each have considerable merit in synthesizing and interpreting the history of race and law in K–12 education. Yet, like Kluger, they offer little if anything on developments in higher education in the wake of *Brown*. Books by James T. Patterson and Peter Irons each mention the 1950 University of Delaware case (which led to black undergraduate enrollment there, without regard to curriculum), in the context of the Delaware K–12 litigation that was included in the cluster of cases decided in *Brown*—and nothing further about higher education.<sup>36</sup>

33 E. Culpepper Clark, *The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation’s Last Stand at the University of Alabama* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), a truly pioneering work; Charles W. Eagles, *The Price of Defiance: James Meredith and the Integration of Ole Miss* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Watley, *A Step toward Brown v. Board of Education*; Laverne, *Before Brown*; also Frank Lambert, *The Battle of Ole Miss: Civil Rights v. States’ Rights* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

34 Robert A. Pratt, *We Shall Not Be Moved: The Desegregation of the University of Georgia* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002); Maurice C. Daniels, *Horace T. Ward: Desegregation at the University of Georgia, Civil Rights Advocacy, and Jurisprudence* (Atlanta: Clark Atlanta University Press, 2001).

35 Kluger, *Simple Justice*, 753; Clark, *Schoolhouse Door*, 17–21, 54–96.

36 Peter Irons, *Jim Crow’s Children: The Broken Promise of the Brown Decision* (New York: Viking, 2002); James T. Patterson, *Brown v. Board of*

Another able survey, by Robert J. Cottrol, Raymond T. Diamond, and Leland B. Ware, pays considerably more attention to higher education, especially before but also after *Brown*, yet it neither mentions *Frasier* in North Carolina nor links *Brown* directly to real changes in the 1950s in any number of other states. A commentary by Charles J. Ogletree Jr. has much to say on many topics, but not about *Brown* and undergraduate schooling in the 1950s. An analysis by Charles T. Clotfelter addresses developments in higher education, mostly after the 1960s, but is thin and not at all reliable on the immediate pre- and post-*Brown* years.<sup>37</sup> In short, five leading surveys of the five decades after the *Brown* decisions offer readers little if any advance over Kluger in assimilating higher education into the story of *Brown* and public education in a post-*Brown* world.

By contrast, an unpublished dissertation on South Carolina moves back and forth, in illuminating fashion, between K-12 desegregation and racial change in public higher education, both in 1963.<sup>38</sup> Virginia offers an opportunity to develop similar connections, in that something more than proto-desegregation there did not begin until after the courts (state and federal) threw out the legislature's Massive Resistance program in 1959. It made some difference, no doubt, to early black students when they arrived at a desegregating Virginia Polytechnic Institute as late as 1966 and 1967 whether they had attended high schools where some desegregation had taken place. Of course, it made a difference whether white students, too, had attended "desegregated" high schools before enrolling in institutions of higher education in which they would have black classmates. One writer on sports makes strong connections—for example in Kentucky—between desegregation in high schools and the beginnings of black access to varsity football programs at the collegiate level.<sup>39</sup>

## CONTRA KLARMAN

What about Michael Klarman's approach to *Brown* and higher education? His *From Jim Crow to Civil Rights* provides astute treatments of the Supreme Court's pre-*Brown* decisions—regarding Lloyd Gaines, for example, or Ada Lois Sipuel Fisher. For the immediate post-*Brown* years, by contrast, Klarman

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Education: *A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

37 Robert J. Cottrol, Raymond T. Diamond, and Leland B. Ware, *Brown v. Board of Education: Caste, Culture, and the Constitution* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003); Charles J. Ogletree Jr., *All Deliberate Speed: Reflections on the First Half Century of Brown v. Board of Education* (New York: Norton, 2004); Charles T. Clotfelter, *After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School Desegregation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 148–50, 237n12.

38 Maxie Myron Cox Jr., "1963—The Year of Decision: Desegregation in South Carolina" (Ph.D. diss., University of South Carolina, 1996). For more on South Carolina see Peter Wallenstein, "Higher Education and Civil Rights: South Carolina, 1860s–1960s," *History of Higher Education Annual* 23 (2003–04): 1–22, and Marcia G. Synnott, "African American Women Pioneers in Desegregating Higher Education," in Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 199–213, at 211–13.

39 Jeffrey L. Littlejohn and Charles H. Ford, *Elusive Equality: Desegregation and Resegregation in Norfolk's Public Schools* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 80–113; Warren H. Strother and Peter Wallenstein, *From VPI to State University: President T. Marshall Hahn Jr. and the Transformation of Virginia Tech, 1962–1974* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2004), 292–96; Charles A. Martin, "Hold That (Color) Line! Black Exclusion and Southeastern Conference Football," in Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 166–93, at 170–71, 178, 185, 190; and Martin, *Benching Jim Crow*.

supplies but one paragraph, referred to at the outset of this article; its topic sentence declares in full: "Brown also retarded progress in university desegregation."<sup>40</sup>

"Klarman's "backlash thesis" regarding higher education and white southerners' responses to the decisions in *Brown*—the idea that progress already under way, or looking promising, on the cusp of *Brown* got reversed in reaction to the Supreme Court's rulings in K-12 education—may well have merit. But this single paragraph contains statements that appear factually unreliable or conceptually uncertain, not to mention ruthlessly selective in their choice of supporting evidence. "By 1955," he writes, seemingly intending to provide a pre-*Brown* baseline for calibrating a post-*Brown* pullback, "roughly 2,000 blacks attended desegregated universities in southern and border states." Yet few (if any) southern universities qualified as "desegregated" as early as 1955; most of those students were black teachers taking graduate courses, and only during the summer; and anyway that date came after at least *Brown I* if not *Brown II*. A statement about the University of Texas—that, in the wake of *Brown*, it "quickly reversed a decision to extend desegregation to undergraduates"—hardly appears consistent with Shabazz's accounts.<sup>41</sup>

Virgil Hawkins in Florida and Horace Ward in Georgia, both of them candidates for admission to law school, might have been startled at the implication that the decisions in *Brown* in 1954 or 1955 had anything of consequence to do with explaining their lengthy and futile travails in the courts from mid-century on through the mid-1950s. The Frasier brothers, for their part, might be surprised to find no mention of their court victory or their enrollment as undergraduates at the University of North Carolina in the wake of—and expressly on the basis of—*Brown v. Board of Education*.

Klarman's "backlash thesis" might have relevance to higher education, especially for Louisiana—or at least Southwestern Louisiana Institute—and perhaps other Deep South states. But it seems imperative to acknowledge—not deny; not skip over—the state actions to which *Brown I* or *Brown II* led more or less immediately in seven states: Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Texas, and Arkansas. Scholars must, moreover, include—not ignore—the immediate response, through the federal courts, in North Carolina. Delaware had already, in effect, made the change before *Brown*; and in eight among the remaining sixteen historically segregated states, as a direct result of *Brown I* or *Brown II*, black undergraduates could and did suddenly find themselves eligible for, rather than categorically excluded from, admission to programs in any undergraduate area of study at the leading public university.

As for the other eight states, change consistent with *Brown* began in 1958 at the graduate or professional level at the University of Florida—and by 1963 even at the undergraduate level,

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40 Klarman, *From Jim Crow to Civil Rights*, 393; repeated in an abridged version of the big book, Michael J. Klarman, *Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Movement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 157.

41 Klarman, *From Jim Crow to Civil Rights*, 393; Shabazz, "Opening of the Southern Mind," 322–30; Shabazz, *Advancing Democracy*, 156–59. *Brown v. Board of Education* spurred the beginnings of desegregated college enrollment at a number of private institutions as well.

even on the main campuses at Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, Florida, Virginia, and Tennessee. Black undergraduate enrollment soon thereafter began at Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge. Auburn and Mississippi State each admitted a black undergraduate in 1965, the last of the historically nonblack land-grant institutions—the South’s “colleges of 1862”—to do so. Also by 1965, at least one black undergraduate had earned a degree at the state university in Georgia (Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes), at Mississippi (James Meredith), at South Carolina (Henrie Monteith), at Alabama (Vivian Malone), and at Florida (Stephan Mickle).<sup>42</sup>

Even if, in higher education, *Brown* “retarded progress” (as Klarman puts it) on the racial front in several states, a careful analysis supplies no worse than a split decision, according to which the rulings in *Brown* impelled change at universities in half the segregated states and stiffened white resistance in some others. Moreover, continued categorical black exclusion persisted for only a few more years at even the most resistant universities in even the most recalcitrant states. At every flagship campus across the South except Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge, at least one black undergraduate received a degree by about the tenth anniversary of *Brown II*. In short, *Brown* caused a tremendous break in historical continuity, even if not everywhere or all at once.

Stated differently, where *Brown* spurred the movement toward desegregation the change was generally not a whole lot in the early years, and where *Brown* may have retarded such change, it was not for very long. Regardless, the greatest single change on the racial front at any institution was getting past “separate but equal”—generally best revealed by the admission of even one black applicant into an arts and sciences undergraduate program that had previously been off-limits to all black students. At school after school, *Brown* accomplished that.

And once that much had been accomplished—in the aftermath of the initial black undergraduate enrollment—then the many other aspects of “desegregation” had a chance to begin to develop, among them black athletes representing their school; black faculty teaching there; renovations in the curriculum; and changes in the broader culture of the institution.<sup>43</sup> In addition, changing relations between campus and community included the effects of black student enrollment on the racial practices of nearby businesses.<sup>44</sup> All these are integral parts of the larger

story of the legacy of *Brown*, although the changes that can be most directly linked to the decisions in *Brown* can be found in the first ten years after 1954.

## FACTS, IDEAS, AND WORDS—CONCEPTS AND LANGUAGE

Appropriate language is central to any surefooted treatment of these matters. First, segregation and desegregation. “Desegregation”—in the sense of an end to a categorical ban on African American student enrollment—might happen in one program, such as a university’s law school, while leaving other programs emphatically still closed to black students. A federal court order led the University of Tennessee to admit its first graduate student in 1952; not until the threat of a court order nine years later did the first black undergraduates enroll at Tennessee.<sup>45</sup> Thus “desegregation” is best understood as a process, a series of steps, not something that happened all at once. It makes little sense to characterize a university as “desegregated” if only one program, or a restricted collection of programs, would admit black students. Thus the term “proto-desegregation” seems more appropriate, in view of how schools with one or more anomalous black students remained in fact overwhelmingly segregated. This is true even if the analysis focuses solely on student enrollment, not on such other major dimensions of full access to an institution as on-campus housing, the recruitment of faculty, or participation in athletics.

Directly related to this redefinition of “segregation” and “desegregation,” it is essential to distinguish between general undergraduate curricula, on the one hand, and graduate and professional programs, on the other. Care is crucial here, since, as various examples in this essay have shown, programs in engineering—or architecture, veterinary medicine, or pharmacy—could be undergraduate and yet treated as professional. Available at an in-state white school but not at any black school in that state, they provided a means of gaining entrance as a pioneer black student, though not in such a way as to open up other programs.

The University of Mississippi offers an alternative narrative illuminating the problem of declaring a school “desegregated” once it had admitted its first black student. James Meredith, who enrolled at Ole Miss under court order on October 1, 1962, graduated in August 1963. Two months before Meredith’s graduation, in June 1963, it had taken a federal court order to get Cleve McDowell enrolled in the University of Mississippi Law School. When McDowell was expelled that September, the “desegregated” university had no black students; and getting black transfer undergraduate Cleveland Donald Jr. enrolled in June 1964 required yet another court order. Shortly thereafter, for the first time, a black applicant, freshman Irvin Walker, gained admission to Ole Miss without a court order.<sup>46</sup>

42 Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 50.

43 Of course that aftermath also included the controversy over affirmative action, as well as the fate of black institutions after the end of black exclusion from historically nonblack schools. Regarding these various matters see Preer, *Lawyers v. Educators*, 189–222; Link, *William Friday*, 249–366; Shabazz, *Advancing Democracy*, 138–217; Goldstone, *Integrating the 40 Acres*; Hayward “Woody” Farrar, “Prying the Door Farther Open: A Memoir of Black Student Protest at the University of Maryland at College Park, 1966–1970,” in Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 137–65; Fabio Rojas, *From Black Power to Black Studies: How a Radical Social Movement Became an Academic Discipline* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Noliwe M. Rooks, *White Money/Black Power: The Surprising History of African American Studies and the Crisis of Race in Higher Education* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006); and Barbara A. Perry, *The Michigan Affirmative Action Cases* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007).

44 Glenda Alice Rabby, *The Pain and the Promise: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Tallahassee, Florida* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999), and B. J. Hollars, *Opening the Doors: The Desegregation of the University of Alabama*

and the Fight for Civil Rights in Tuscaloosa (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013).

45 Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 34–35.

46 David G. Sansing, *Making Haste Slowly: The Troubled History of Higher Education in Mississippi* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1990), 140–214; Nadine Cahodas, *The Band Played Dixie: Race and the Liberal Conscience at Ole Miss* (New York: Free Press, 1997), 82–116. Much the fullest treatment is Eagles, *The Price of Defiance*, 201–424.

Also, black students and “all-white institutions.” A great many historically “white” institutions, whether public or private, were not in fact, as is often said, “all-white”; they enrolled ethnic Chinese and others, as a rule categorically proscribing African Americans and nobody else. Thus the segregated schools on the “white” side of the racial divide across the era of segregation are better characterized as “nonblack,” a term used at times in this essay in place of “historically white.”

So the situation in the 1950s and 1960s cannot be clarified using rhetoric and imagery that have “nonwhite” applicants seeking to gain access to “all-white” institutions. That was not the matter in controversy. For example, some Chinese Mississippians began enrolling shortly after World War II—in considerable numbers, but the point is that they were enrolling at all—as undergraduates at both Mississippi State College and the University of Mississippi. White Mississippians were exercised at the prospect of black Mississippians, not a broader category of nonwhite residents, making their way into classrooms and dormitories at the university. What was happening at the university in 1962 was not a nonwhite student making his way past the obstacles to enrolling at an all-white school, but a black student gaining access to what previously had been an absolutely nonblack institution.<sup>47</sup>

### PRIVATE SCHOOLS, BLACK INSTITUTIONS, AND HIGHER EDUCATION OUTSIDE THE SOUTH

This review has dealt not with private institutions but only with public colleges and universities, which were more obviously subject to federal—and state—authority. Yet the distinction, though necessary, is itself problematic. The term “public” must of course mean “state-assisted,” since large portions of the “public” were by law and definition utterly excluded—exactly what is meant by “segregated.” Moreover, private institutions might also be subject to state laws that long mandated racial segregation—and also eventually to federal directives that promoted desegregation. Elizabeth S. Peck writes, for example, about Berea College’s having to end black enrollment when the U.S. Supreme Court in 1908 upheld a Kentucky law (itself modeled after a Tennessee law) prohibiting non-segregated student populations at any institution, private or public. Berea resumed some black enrollment in 1950, as soon as state law once again permitted. Melissa Kean explores administrative deliberations at several elite white southern private universities in the 1950s and 1960s, as *Brown v. Board of Education* (together with pressure from foundations, accrediting agencies, and other sources) presaged a change in private institutions as well as public ones.<sup>48</sup>

47 Wallenstein, *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement*, 7; Wallenstein, “Identity, Marriage, and Schools: Life along the Color Line/s in the Era of *Plessy v. Ferguson*,” in *The Folly of Jim Crow: Rethinking the Segregated South*, ed. Stephanie Cole and Natalie Ring (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2012), 17–53, at 28–35. In writing about Ole Miss and its place in developments across the South, Eagles, in *The Price of Defiance* (page 3), continues the misleading characterization of nonblack schools as “all-white.”

48 Elizabeth S. Peck, *Berea’s First 125 Years, 1855–1980*, with a final chapter by Emily Ann Smith (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1982), 39–62, 194–95; Melissa Kean, *Desegregating Private Higher Education in the South: Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and Vanderbilt* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008). The 1904 Kentucky law targeting Berea was modeled on a 1901 Tennessee law aimed at non-segregation at Maryville College.

In addition, this essay has focused on black access to historically white institutions, but of course black institutions also played into civil rights history on many levels. Black colleges supplied much of the leadership for civil rights initiatives; James Meredith, for example, used his experience at a black college in his quest to transfer to a white university. Joy Ann Williamson recounts and compares some key developments at two Mississippi colleges in the 1960s, one private (Tougaloo College), the other one public (Jackson State College). The very success of *Brown v. Board of Education* in opening up historically white institutions to black enrollment, black athletes, and black faculty raised pressing questions about the future of black institutions after the end of black exclusion from historically nonblack schools.<sup>49</sup>

One final thought. Historians of the South tend to presume to know what is southern about the South without, however, ever systematically exploring developments outside the region. One exploration that breaks open the study of race in the mid-twentieth-century non-South is Thomas J. Sugrue, *Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North*—a very fine book that is missing, however, a chapter on higher education.<sup>50</sup> Racial desegregation in the realm of higher education outside the South went through much the same kind of process as in the South, and not necessarily much earlier. The biggest difference between the regions, by no means to be understated but far too easily overstated, had to do with whether the exclusion of African Americans—from classrooms, residence halls, athletic fields, and so on—was a function of state policy. Still left undone, then, is an integration of the history of the South with that of the rest of the nation. How different was the South? And did *Brown* perhaps have an impact in propelling change outside the South, too?

### CONCLUSION

So what are the prospects for a significant literature on the impact of *Brown v. Board* on higher education? With the appropriate concepts and language—black schools versus nonblack institutions, rather than white versus nonwhite; general undergraduate programs versus graduate or professional studies; desegregation at every institution as a process, a series of steps, not best understood as a single event or point in time—one can make better sense of the trajectory of racial change in higher education in the aftermath of *Brown*. As the story in every state, and at least at every major school, becomes better revealed, more accurate and useful generalizations can emerge about what changed and when and how. At that point, at last, perhaps it will be possible to pull together the stories of, on the one hand, K–12 schooling and, on the other, higher education—to get both right and see how they relate in a single master narrative of the origins, impact, and legacy of *Brown* in public education. Not yet achieved, six decades after *Brown*, is

49 Joy Ann Williamson, *Radicalizing the Ebony Tower: Black Colleges and the Black Freedom Struggle in Mississippi* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2008); M. Christopher Brown, *The Quest to Define Desegregation: Black Colleges, Title VI Compliance, and Post-Adams Litigation* (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1999); Albert L. Samuels, *Is Separate Unequal? Black Colleges and the Challenge to Desegregation* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004).

50 Thomas J. Sugrue, *Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North* (New York: Random House, 2008).

a full understanding of the struggle over access and equity and higher education.

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# Funding Higher Education: Negotiating a Fundamental Tension

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**ABSTRACT** Our history of educational subsidies and student lending reflects a fundamental tension regarding the nature of higher education: it is both a public and private good. Historical trends, notably decreasing state support relative to revenue and stagnant real wages, have resulted in higher average debt burdens for college graduates. Colleges have responded to the need to raise revenues with pricing strategies that have questionable efficiency and equity effects. Income contingent lending is one proposed solution to the growing inaccessibility of a college education. We argue that new lending programs must account for the duality of higher education as both a public and private good. We must also situate higher borrowing needs within a larger social context.

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## INTRODUCTION

American households are finding it increasingly difficult to save enough to cover the cost of a college education. Over the past 25 years the share of revenue from state and federal sources at over 600 public, four-year colleges and universities has declined leaving students to assume more of the cost of higher education (The Chronicle, 2014). In nearly half of states, tuition revenue at so-called public colleges and universities now exceeds state contributions. Indeed, if Virginia continues its recent pattern of funding, one study estimates that state aid to its public colleges and universities will end in 2038 (The Chronicle, 2014).

While state funding has declined relative to other revenue sources, tuition for post-secondary education has been rising at a rate exceeding inflation for over 30 years. Organizations such as FinAid currently recommend that individuals planning for higher education expenses anticipate a tuition growth rate double that of inflation. With an inflation target at 2%, tuition will double during the eighteen years it takes an infant to reach college age.

Against this backdrop, real wages for middle and lower income households have been stagnant, begging the question of college affordability and accessibility (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012). In his 2015 State of the Union Address, President Obama demonstrates his commitment to affordable higher education with a new initiative to make two years of community college free to responsible and eligible<sup>1</sup> students. The President reinforces this initiative in his Fiscal Budget of 2016. While the idea of free community college is in its infancy, it has focused attention on college access and has nudged the debate

over college funding towards a discussion of the state's role in providing affordable education.

For the average student, grants and scholarships constitute only about one-third of the tuition payment (Sallie Mae, 2014, p.6). While parent income, savings, and borrowing have traditionally covered the rest, student borrowing as a payment method has increased and now accounts for twice as much as parent borrowing. Given that low-income families are more likely to agree that the responsibility for paying for college lies with the student (31%) compared to middle-income (17%) and high-income families (9%), the socioeconomic status of a student's family of origin plays an enormous role in determining who goes to college (Sallie Mae, 2014, p. 10).

The predictable result of decreasing state support relative to college revenue, stagnant if not declining real wages for middle and lower income households, and rising tuition is an increase in average student debt. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York reports that student debt now tops credit card debt as the single largest source of household debt other than mortgages (Lawler 2014). According to the Congressional Budget Office, approximately two-thirds of the growth in the federal loan program between 1995 and 2009 is due to a rise in the number of borrowers, while one-third stems from larger loan balances per borrower (CBO 2010). It is worth noting that there is a significant difference in the average debt load of students from non-profit schools (both public and private) compared to for-profit schools.<sup>2</sup> Ironically, students who attend private, for-profit schools are more likely to borrow, have higher debt loads, and suffer higher default rates than students who attend

1 Students must maintain a 2.5 GPA, enroll at least half-time, and make progress towards a degree.

2 According to the College Board, 57% of public four-year college degree recipients (bachelor's) who graduated with debt in 2011-12 borrowed an average of \$25,000. This compares to 65% of private, nonprofit graduates whose average debt was \$29,900 and 96% of for-profit students with loans averaging \$32,700 (U.S. Senate 2012).

not-for-profit schools, whether private or public. Hence it is the private educational corporation that relies the most on taxpayer subsidies for its operational revenues.

Higher debt levels for college graduates are challenging whether or not the return on a college education is worth the cost. In addition, there are growing concerns about the debt load of young graduates delaying significant economic decisions like buying a car, purchasing a first home, and saving for retirement. These reactions point to the dual nature of higher education as both a private and public good and the fundamental tension that characterizes current debates over public funding of education. For some, a college education is a private good to be consumed for personal gain at personal expense. For others, higher education is a public good in the economic sense, meaning that the entire nation benefits from a more educated workforce and citizenry. As such, it is only fair that the expense necessary to acquire a college education be shared by the public at large. Negotiating this fundamental tension must be the task of any public policy or market solution to the current state of affairs. It is our goal in the remainder of this paper to situate this fundamental tension in historical time, illustrate its effects on college administrators, and introduce a popular policy response to college accessibility and debt management, income contingent lending.

### HIGHER EDUCATION: FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE GOOD

Nearly fifty years ago, Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 provided for educational opportunity grants for high school graduates “of exceptional financial need” defined as those students who would be financially unable to attend college without access to grant funding. Prior to this moment, federal aid for college was virtually non-existent (the GI bill being the notable exception) and social norms together with discriminatory attitudes and laws meant that the traditional college campus was populated with mostly white men, from middle and upper income families. Together with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which made racial discrimination illegal and promoted equal opportunity for women, Title IV proved to be a landmark in the history of higher education for expanding access to college for everyone regardless of race, gender, or socioeconomic background. The initial effects were impressive. By the end of the 1970’s, the percent of black college graduates had nearly doubled and female college graduates had more than doubled (U.S. Census, 2012, p.151).

In his remarks to his alma mater before signing this historic piece of legislation, President Lyndon B. Johnson, acknowledged the social benefits of expanding educational opportunities to students, stating “we will reap the rewards of their wiser citizenship and their greater productivity for decades to come” (Johnson, 1965). In the midst of a civil rights movement where customs and laws allowing for exclusion and privilege were increasingly attacked, it was natural to appeal to a public or common good. The outcome of the Higher Education Act in particular was a mixture of public funding for public institutions combined with federal subsidized Stafford loans for use at the public or private college of choice.

This notion of education possessing significant “neighborhood effects” sufficient to justify public expenditures was also popularized by economist Milton Friedman. At the primary and secondary levels, Friedman acknowledges the public good nature of education for promoting literacy and common values, though he argues for the subsidization of individuals rather than institutions through vouchers. In a voucher system, schools compete for students who use their vouchers to attend the school of their choice. This competition for the best students serves as motivation for producing quality education. Government plays the role of umpire, ensuring that both private and government administered schools maintain a minimum common content. Furthermore, the unfair penalty assessed against parents who pay taxes (and thereby subsidize public education) but choose private education for their own children, is eliminated.

At higher levels of education, Friedman’s position shifts over time, from one recognizing the legitimate role of government in subsidizing higher education for its social benefits to one that sees no justification for government subsidy at all. In 1955, Friedman states that “public expenditure on higher education can be justified as a means of training youngsters for citizenship and for community leadership-though [ . . . ] restricting the subsidy to education obtained at a state-administered institution cannot be justified” (p. 134). As with primary and secondary education, Friedman calls for subsidizing individuals not institutions. Thus all public dollars spent on higher education should be distributed through vouchers forcing any government administered institution to charge the full cost of education. Again, competition will improve educational quality and vouchers will end the “unfair” treatment of private schools that struggle to compete with subsidized (and thus cheaper) public school tuition.

By 1980, however, Friedman stresses the purely private nature of higher education. In reference to the two most utilized reasons for subsidizing education with tax-payer dollars, the social benefits offered and the promotion of equal educational opportunity, Friedman, along with co-author Rose Friedman, now argues that the former simply does not exist while the latter is not promoted in a system of subsidized education. As such, “there is no case,” states Friedman, “for subsidizing persons who get higher education at the expense of those who do not” (Friedman and Friedman 1980, p.183).<sup>3</sup> After closing the subsidy door, however, Friedman opens the loan window by further stating that “there is a strong case for providing loan funds sufficient to assure opportunity to all” (1980, p. 183). Here, Friedman proposes to replace the mortgage-style, fixed-money loans that dominate lending practices with income contingent loan financing where borrowers pay an agreed upon percentage of their post-graduation salaries for a contracted number of years.<sup>4</sup> By replacing public subsidies with equity capital,

3 Acknowledging the political infeasibility of eliminating all subsidies to higher education at the time, Friedman calls a voucher system for higher education the “least bad way” to finance educational services. Only a voucher system, where total spending on education is distributed equally to students, avoids the problem of taxing the poor to pay for the higher education of the “well-to-do.”

4 Technically, Friedman would apply the payment calculation only on that part of the salary above what he/she would have made without the

Friedman promotes higher education as a private good through a student loan program paid for only by those who purchase higher education.

Friedman's abandonment of the public nature of higher education and thus his denial of a collective responsibility for its continual maintenance coincides with a broader ideological shift in society at the time towards individualism over collectivism. The public good that Johnson wished to support with subsidized federal loans and direct spending on libraries and teacher training has become by the 1980's, a private good that can be supported via private financing, bequests, and other voluntary contributions. In economics, this shift is driven by a free-market neoliberal ideology that equates education with any other private good and turns students into customers of learning.

### **PRICING HIGHER EDUCATION: FROM SHARED RESPONSIBILITY TO INDIVIDUAL BURDEN**

As the "climate of opinion" regarding the role of government in higher education funding changes, so too must tuition pricing models. Tuition prices at both public and private colleges are set primarily using a cost-plus model as described by St. John, wherein the price is comprised of operating costs plus "prestige, tuition charges at competitive institutions, and disposable personal income" (1992, p. 166). A one-size-fits-all cost-plus model, originally supported by substantial subsidies from the state, remained the preeminent pricing strategy through the 1980s when, according to St. John, colleges and universities by necessity became more strategic in their approaches to pricing (1992, p. 167). During this time, state revenue to public colleges and universities begins to shrink relative to overall revenue and the need for new revenue sources puts upward pressure on tuition.

As the traditional cost-plus model proves to be an insufficient source of total revenue, new models such as the high-tuition, high-aid approach begin to emerge. Referred to in the literature as the "Robin Hood" pricing strategy, this model charges the full tuition price to those able to pay while offering large amounts of grants and institutional scholarships to need-based applicants (St. John, 1994, p. 301). Notice the public-private tension that plays out in this scenario. As the neo-liberal state acts to make individual students assume more responsibility for the cost of their education (a private good), colleges and universities counter with a pricing strategy that makes more subsidies available at the institutional level, given the public good nature of education. Only now, the shared responsibility of paying for a public good is concentrated within the higher education community rather than the public at large.

Designed in an effort to preserve the affordability of higher education, the Robin Hood strategy purportedly creates equity by having those able to pay more do so, while those unable to pay receive off-setting aid. However, merely increasing aid in conjunction with tuition ultimately fails to address equality of opportunity in higher education as high published tuition tends to deter low-income and debt-averse students from applying to college. Additionally, as news of such tuition "set asides" is

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degree.

made public, students who borrow to pay the high tuition price feel as though it is unfair that they personally bear part of the financial burden of "someone else's" education.

While a high-tuition, high-aid strategy has proven cost-effective for most institutions, particularly within the private college setting, research conducted by St. John (1994) found that "it has limited viability when extremely high percentages of current students are recipients of need-based grants" (p. 325). Furthermore, such high-tuition, high-aid strategies rely on the unlikely assumption that tuition is price inelastic, meaning that price increases do not have adverse effects on total revenue. Indeed, a decrease in overall enrollment in public universities has been noted in response to increases in published tuition (Heller, 1999, p. 78), suggesting that the published cost remains a critical factor in the decision to attend college. Yet another study by Bryan and Whipple (1995) similarly notes that "except for schools with very high or very low images, relative tuition increases typically decrease college enrollments" (p. 561). Such findings raise doubt regarding the presumption of improved equity under high-aid, high-tuition scenarios.

Following Heller and others and assuming that higher education overall is price-elastic, lowering tuition rates would be more effective in the long-run for raising revenue and enrollment. When paired with the lack of clarity regarding financial aid and grants available, the high prices effectively function as a barrier to entry for many first-generation and minority students who would otherwise pursue higher education. Given that lowering tuition and fees may not be an option, the challenge then becomes to determine viable alternative methods of paying for higher education costs without imposing a large post-graduation financial burden.

More recently, colleges and universities have reacted to the limitations and perceived unfairness of the high tuition, high aid model with differential tuition models. Under this pricing model, students are charged different tuition prices depending upon their choice of major. Students are supposed to enroll in majors more efficiently than when all disciplines of a given institution charge the same amount and the institution benefits by collecting the maximum willingness to pay from each student. Yet, in considering demand for specific academic majors, Shin and Milton find that five of the six majors analyzed were price-elastic (2008, p. 719). Paired with less institutional aid and grants, debt-averse students predominately from low-income households may be deterred from pursuing study in higher priced majors that could ultimately yield higher future earnings.

States have responded to the growing demand for student loans by offering savings programs meant to lessen the need for borrowing. Such programs originally debuted in Florida and Michigan in 1988 and have continued to grow in popularity (Doyle, McLendon, & Hearn, 2010). Although nuanced from state to state, the basic premise of these programs is for parents to enroll and "lock-in" a contractual tuition rate today, thereby circumventing potentially higher costs later. Participants then make payments toward the agreed upon total to be applied to an in-state institution. Despite ideas that low and moderate in-

come households might benefit from a structured prepayment tuition plan well before their children actually enter college, proportionately more high-income families (26 percent) utilize such programs as compared to low-income families (11 percent) (Sallie Mae & Ipsos Public Affairs, 2014, p. 8).

From a public good perspective, the trend towards price discriminating tuition plans and state sponsored savings programs are the survival tactics and coping devices that institutions have been forced to adopt within a framework that views higher education as a private good. They are inherently inequitable as they are more likely to reproduce existing inequalities than provide for equal opportunity for advancement. Moreover, by placing more of the financial burden for higher education on students and their parents, such programs ignore research indicating positive social benefits from higher education (Moretti, 2004). From a private good perspective, however, these trends represent strategic and long-term planning aids. Students can control the amount of debt they incur by majoring in a discipline they can afford and by choosing to save early.

### INCOME CONTINGENT LENDING

A popular response to rising tuition, increasing debt burdens and the growing concern over debt manageability has been the income contingent loan (ICL). Two types of ICLs exist: those akin to mortgage-style payments and human capital loans. Mortgage-style ICLs debuted in the United States during the 1970's at Yale University (Vodopivec, 2008, p. 430).<sup>5</sup> They are the only type of ICL currently offered by the federal government. While students are responsible for a fixed loan amount, payments are made as a monthly percentage of income rather than as a standardized fixed-sum stream of payments.

The human capital loan has not been successfully implemented in the United States. But, as we will see, it has several attractive features for those who favor a public good approach to higher education funding. Ironically, this concept was first proposed by Milton Friedman in his 1955 article on the role of government in education.<sup>6</sup> In it, Friedman singles out professional and vocational training as highly specialized education that has no public good qualities whatsoever. In other words, the higher income commanded by these professions would fully compensate for the cost to acquire the education and skills. Since no public subsidy can be justified, society would suffer an underinvestment in human capital as only those born into families of means would be able to pay for such advanced learning. Friedman saw the solution, not in more public subsidies for students, but in the federal government providing equity capital in the form of income contingent loans.

Friedman justifies government provision of loanable funds on two grounds: the natural monopoly position of the federal

5 The Yale experiment with ICL's ended in 1978. The unique character of the program provides important lessons for those crafting similar programs today.

6 Friedman proposed a Human Capital Contract where borrowers paid a percent of income for a fixed amount of time. Since there is no total loan amount, there is no pre-payment option.

government in terms of administrative costs and the apparent underinvestment in human capital he discovered in his research with Simon Kuznets<sup>7</sup>. Friedman (1955) notes:

*A loan to finance the training of an individual who has no security to offer other than his future earnings is therefore a much less attractive proposition than a loan to finance, say, the erection of a building: the security is less, and the cost of subsequent collection of interest and principal is very much greater. (p.137)*

But, Friedman rejects the fixed-money loans popularized by the Stafford loan given the variations in "ability, energy, and good fortune" (p. 137) of student borrowers because he fears the default rate would be high on such loans. Indeed, the very condition necessary for such loans to be made available from private lenders, a high enough interest rate to compensate for defaults, ensures that a high amount of defaults will occur. It is this concern that leads Friedman to adopt a human capital approach to student lending. Presumably, defaults would be lower with income contingent loans and the interest rate charged to borrowers would also be less with government financing given their natural monopoly position.

As mentioned previously, under a human capital lending program, a student borrower would agree to pay a percentage of his or her future earnings for a specified number of years. "In this way, a lender would get back more than his initial investment from relatively successful individuals, which would compensate for the failure to recoup his original investment from the unsuccessful" (Friedman, 1955, p.138). For Friedman, such a program should be self-sustaining such that only those who acquire specialized education are responsible for its cost. And while he prefers a lending program where private businesses (like life insurance companies), non-profits, and even colleges and universities supply loanable funds, Friedman acknowledges the considerable market imperfections that would likely result in an under investment in human capital if lending were left solely to the private sector.

Ultimately, Friedman argues that a federally sponsored income contingent lending program "would make capital more widely available and would thereby do much to make equality of opportunity a reality, to diminish inequalities of income and wealth, and to promote the full use of our human resources" (Friedman, 1955, p. 142-3). According to Friedman, ICLs are a cost efficient and practical way to eliminate public subsidies while avoiding an underinvestment in human capital.

More recently, ICLs have been promoted by those wishing to renew the shared social responsibility of higher education funding. Early during the Clinton Administration, support for a federal income contingent loan program gained momentum on grounds that ICLs would encourage greater public service. When introducing the nation's first income contingent loan bill, Senator Edward Kennedy remarked that ICLs would allow students "to pursue careers and to take lower paying jobs they prefer, including careers in public service and community service" (Schrag, 2001, p.767). Structured like a mortgage-style loan, federal ICLs reflect the expectation that the benefits of

7 See, Milton Friedman and Simon Kuznets (1945). *Income from Independent Professional Practice*, National Bureau of Economic Research, N.Y.

higher education should be paid by individual students. However, by maintaining a loan burden proportionate to income and providing for loan forgiveness for those in low income occupations, ICLs are designed to rely on public subsidies as a debt management tool. Subsequent income contingent programs like President Obama's Pay as You Earn and other income based repayment plans contain similar features. Indeed, one can view the different components of the latest income contingent loan plan in the context of Congress fighting for more public good or more private good features.

The most notable example of a human capital ICL proposal is the Oregon proposal. In July of 2013, Oregon received national attention for its legislation to investigate the feasibility of a human capital-type income contingent college tuition plan for all its public university students. Today, no fewer than sixteen states have passed or are considering similar legislation (Moreto, 2014). Called "Pay It Forward," Oregon's plan is based upon a Washington state proposal of the same name that is designed to improve access to higher education for students from low and middle income households and to give students the freedom to make post-graduate career decisions based upon their skills and interests rather than salary. Crafted much like Friedman's proposal from the 1950's, the Pay it Forward plan would require all students to pledge a portion of their post-graduation salary for a contracted number of years. Since no student has a fixed loan amount to repay, everyone pays a low percent of their income for the same number of years. In this way, the highest income graduates repay more in absolute dollars than those with lower incomes. The system gives graduates the freedom to make career choices based upon their interests and passions rather than upon the need to make a high salary to pay off loans.

Authors of the study also claim their ICL program "preserves higher education as a public good" (Peek & Burbank 2012, p. 6). Indeed, high public subsidies keep tuition and therefore loan amounts low. Unlike Friedman, who wants ICL's to replace public subsidies, the Pay It Forward proposal calls on the state of Washington to fund about two-thirds of the total cost of higher education, a higher percent than its current funding level but lower than previous levels. Pay It Forward, "cannot replace existing public support from the state legislature" (id) and in fact, if the state were to reduce its expenditures to zero, the proposal would become more expensive than current financing. Clearly, ICL programs can be consistent with higher education conceived as either a public or private good. We argue below that the best income contingent loan design will incorporate elements of both.

## NEGOTIATING A FUNDAMENTAL TENSION

In order to capture the benefits of both its public and private good qualities, higher education must be funded in a manner that combines elements of shared responsibility and personal accountability. If designed carefully, income contingent lending can address two pressing issues facing today's college student: access to higher education and reasonable debt management. Unfortunately, our current ICL programs fall short in

providing the necessary checks and balances to manage, much less, overcome these challenges.

The most recent student lending bill introduced in the Senate on January 7, 2015, the Repay Act of 2015, contains an income contingent option for new borrowers and an income-based option for borrowers who can claim a partial financial hardship. Generally speaking, the income contingent plan will result in larger payments for new borrowers.<sup>8</sup> Overall, the bill simplifies loan options and requires more transparent consumer disclosures from loan servicers.

Missing from our federal loan system are minimal expectations for state funding levels for public schools and standards regarding the degree to which private-for-profit schools can rely on publicly funded loan revenue.<sup>9</sup> Congress can impose eligibility requirements on institutions whose students request federal student loan assistance. A good starting point would be to require public schools to receive two-thirds of their operating revenue from the state before their students can be federal loan eligible<sup>10</sup>. Schools should also demonstrate low cohort default rates, an issue that has recently received some oversight. All federal grant eligible schools could be required to accept Pell grant students such that they comprise at least 20% of their student body. Based on 2011-12 data from the Project on Student Debt, this would affect nearly half of public schools in Virginia and about ten percent of private, non profit schools (CollegelnSight 2013)<sup>11</sup>. Similar to the public school eligibility requirement, private, for profit schools could be required to receive two-thirds of their operating budget from private sources. These are all baseline, negotiating positions that may require phase-in but would benefit both students and taxpayers and serve as a counterbalance to the current system which places most of its emphasis on student obligations.

Without target expectations for state funding of higher education, the introduction of income contingent lending with its seemingly infinite repayment period risks transferring all higher education expenses to students, thereby converting higher education into a purely private good. Furthermore, ignoring the uniqueness of the for-profit education industry which represents only 12% of the college population but 31% of all student loans and 44% of loan defaults threatens the sustainability of federal lending generally (The Institute, 2014, p.1).

## CONCLUSION

Higher education funding is at a crossroads with some calling for increased public support while others argue for more pri-

8 Since July 1, 2014, income-driven plans required 10% of discretionary income. Under this plan, borrowers pay 10% of their discretionary income up to \$25,000 plus 15% of discretionary income over \$25,000 for not more than 20-25 years depending upon eligibility.

9 Given the stats quoted earlier in this article, we believe the 90/10 rule requiring for-profit educational corporations to acquire at least 10% of their funding from non-public sources is wholly inadequate.

10 This is an outrageously high number for today's standards that puts us back to 1980's funding levels.

11 Currently, Virginia private, non-profit schools are doing more proportionally to educate our students from the lowest income households. This ought to be recognized and rewarded in some way.

vate funding and responsible borrowing. Given increasing loan demand, market imperfections, and cost advantages, there is reason to look toward the federal government for innovative funding options. Surely, more feasibility studies of different ICL plans are necessary and not just at the state and federal level. Hensly has shown the viability of a Pay It Forward human capital-type program at a small public university in Virginia using data from the graduating class of 2014 (Hensly 2014). As more institutions undertake such studies, focus can turn from the feasibility of human capital ICL to their design and implementation.

Finally, reduced state support for higher education relative to revenues and the necessity for more need-based aid did not occur in a vacuum. Indeed, the challenges of higher education are intimately related to broader societal trends of continuous tax cuts that have drained the public coffers and stagnating real wages for 60% of American households. Redesigning higher education financing must be part of a larger project of establishing shared prosperity. America needs a new social contract. A twenty-first century Economic Bill of Rights designed to re-build the middle class and engineered such that our institutions serve the needs of all people, particularly those on Main Street.

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# The Transition from High School to College: Parents' and Students' Perceptions of Parents' Helpfulness

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**ABSTRACT** Based on a quantitative study of students at a mid-size public university in the Southeastern United States and their parents and informed by Astin's input-environment-outcome model, this paper explores how students and parents perceive the transition from high school to college. Statistical analyses show large gaps between students' and parents' reports about the number of times parents' helped their children and the effectiveness of their help during the transition from high school to college. Neither fathers' nor mothers' activities had any significant correlation with college grade point average (GPA). The role fathers play in their children's college education is more complicated than it first appears.

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## INTRODUCTION

Educators worldwide are interested in students' transition experiences from high school to college. Weidman (1989) recognizes the role precollege and college factors play in the socialization experience of college students. Impact models, such as Weidman's (1989) model of undergraduate socialization, focus on social structure and study the influence of institutional characteristics, student experiences, and student interactions on the transition experience (Feldman and Newcomb 1969; Pascarella and Terenzini 2005; Hurtado 2007). While academic intensity and the quality of one's high school curriculum are crucial for academic success and making a smooth transition to college (Adelman 2002), other factors such as parents, friends, high school teachers and guidance counselors, college professors, academic advisors, college orientation programs, and first-year seminars facilitate students' transition from high school to college (Attinasi 1989; Cabrera and La Nasa 2000; Hossler, Schmit, and Vesper 1999; Hurtado 2007; Hurtado, Carter, and Spuler 1996; Keup and Barefoot 2005; Saunders and Serna 2004; Smith and Zhang 2008, 2010; Tierney, Corwin, and Colyar 2005; Zhang and Smith 2011). For example, Hurtado et al. (1996, p. 153) found that college academic advisors are very helpful in the transition process and "that students' in-college experiences affect their adjustment more than student background characteristics." Keup and Barefoot (2005) concluded that participation in first-year seminars produces positive effects for most students and assists them in making a smoother transition to college. Students who reported more interactions with their college professors earned higher GPAs and were more satisfied with college (Fischer 2007).

The role of parents in their children's transition to college is often overlooked (Agliata and Renk 2008). Weidman's (1989) model emphasized that parents play an important role in students' lives prior to, during, and after the transition to college.

Hossler, Schmit, and Vesper (1999, p. 27) identified parental encouragement as the strongest factor predicting students' planning for college. In a now classic study, Sewell and Shah (1968, p. 208) found that "Both father's and mother's educational achievements are positively and significantly related to perceived parental encouragement, college plans, college attendance, and college graduation..." Davies and Kandel (1981) determined that parental influence on adolescents' educational plans is more important than peers influence and has long lasting effects. Kim and Schneider (2005) revealed that parental support, which is viewed as a form of social capital, eases the transition to college.

Students' social relationships with their parents and others result in a series of obligations and expectations or social norms which influence their attitudes and behaviors about college (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988). Agliata and Renk (2008) noted that when parents' expectations exceeded children's expectations students experienced lower levels of self-worth and adjustment to college. D'Allegro and Kerns (2010) concluded that parents who have advanced degrees may have educational expectations for their children that negatively impact their transition to college. Chang, Heckhausen, Greenberger, and Chen (2010) found that Asian American students experienced lower levels of college adjustment than European American students due to less parental support and accommodation and more interference. Ceballo (2004) determined that Latino college graduates whose parents emphasized the importance of education, who were supportive of their son's or daughter's autonomy, and who used various unspoken behaviors such as a hug were more likely to have had a successful transition to college. Smith and Zhang (2008) concluded that even though students reported that their parents provided more help than others (high school teachers and guidance counselors; college professors; etc.) in their transition to college, mothers' and fathers' help did not impact college GPA thus students' percep-

tions of their parents' level of helpfulness may be exaggerated.

Other research on parents and their role in the transition to college indicated that parents' social class, parenting practices, and educational expectations were positively associated with academic achievement (Roksa and Potter 2011). Hickman, Bartholomae, and McKenry (2000) found that an authoritative rather than an authoritarian or permissive parenting style contributed positively to the transition experience. Silva, Dorso, Azhar, and Renk (2007) suggested that students who experience a difficult transition to college may benefit from an intervention that investigates students' perceptions of the relationship they have with their parents and the type of parenting they experienced. Grigsby (2009) noted that college students valued their relationships with their parents but one-third of the students expressed that they wanted more autonomy from them, slightly less than one-half were comfortable in their relationship with their parents, and about one out of five wanted them to be more understanding of their lives as college students.

Astin's (1991) input-environment-outcome (I-E-O) model of student change is a useful framework for assessing the transition experience from high school to college. This model acknowledges the important role that academic and social opportunities have on student change and development as well as the role that students play in their transition experience. Input includes demographic characteristics, family backgrounds, and students' prior academic and social experiences. Environment consists of the people, programs, policies, cultures, and experiences provided by colleges. Outcome includes students' characteristics, knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors as they leave college (Pascarella and Terenzini 2005). The scope of this study is limited to only the first element of Astin's model since the focus is on parents' influence.

There is a growing body of literature about students' transition to college (Mounts, Valentiner, Anderson, and Boswell 2006; Goldrick-Rab, Carter, and Wagner 2007) and the role that parents play in the transition experiences of their children. One area of this research that has been understudied is how students perceive factors that influence their transition experience (Clark 2005; Mounts, et al. 2006). Based on Astin's model and Clark's concern about how students perceive key factors, this paper will examine the perceptions parents and children have on the helpfulness of parents and the number of times parents assisted or helped students in certain activities in their transition to college.

## **METHOD**

We studied students at a mid-size public institution in the Southeast and their parents. The university is a Carnegie doctoral-research university with an enrollment of 20,000 of which 48.7% were female, 51.3% were male, and 32.2% were minorities. A survey was administered in class during the second week of the 2012 spring semester to students enrolled in six sections of Introduction to Sociology. This course contained a cross-section of students and constitutes a convenience sample. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved this study (Protocol H12193). Six hundred and eighty-two students com-

pleted the survey and 594 students provided contact information for their parents. Two hundred and fifty students provided a parent's e-mail address (55 e-mail addresses for fathers and 195 e-mail addresses for mothers), 230 students provided both their parent's e-mail addresses, and for those whose parents did not have an e-mail address 114 students provided either a post office box number or a street address for one of their parents. Due to budget limitations only one survey was sent to a postal address. Students were instructed to designate one parent to complete the survey and the envelope was addressed accordingly. One hundred and ninety e-mail messages were undeliverable and were bounced back and nine envelopes were undeliverable and returned by the U.S. Post Office. Students who did not provide parental contact information or students whose parents did not participate were removed from the study.

The student survey was four pages and contained thirty-seven questions including those that measured basic demographic information, parents' expectations for students' education, the specific activities parents did to assist students in their transition to college, and how helpful parents were regarding these activities, the quality of students' relationships with their parents, and students' psychological well-being. In addition to these questions, students were asked to list in the space provided on the survey their name and e-mail address and the name(s) of their parent(s) or guardian(s) and their contact information (e-mail addresses and for those without internet access their complete home address). In the cover letter which accompanied the survey students were informed that by providing us with their parents' contact information they had given us permission to contact their parents. Students were informed that their parents would be notified they had granted us their consent for them to participate in the project.

The parent survey was three pages and contained twenty-seven questions (the online version available at [surveymonkey.com](http://surveymonkey.com) contained twenty-nine questions) including those that measured basic demographic information, parents' expectations for their child's education, the quality of their relationship with their son or daughter, and their perception of how active and helpful their spouse (if one was present) was in their child's transition to college. The parent survey included identical questions about the specific activities they did to assist their child in his or her transition to college, and how helpful they were regarding these activities in order to compare parents and student perceptions of these activities. In addition to these questions, parents were asked to list in the space provided on the survey their child's name for data matching purpose.

In order to reach as many parents as possible the survey was available online and copies were mailed through the U.S. Postal System to parents who did not use e-mails or whose e-mail addresses were not provided. Seven hundred and ten parents were sent an e-mail which contained a brief greeting and links to a cover letter and the survey which was available at [surveymonkey.com](http://surveymonkey.com). One hundred and fourteen parents were sent a cover letter, survey, and business reply envelope. Parents were sent three follow-up e-mail messages encouraging them complete and submit the online survey. Parents who received

a mailed copy of the survey were sent one follow-up letter encouraging them to complete and return the survey in the business reply envelope. By the end of April 2012, one hundred and forty-eight parents submitted a completed online survey for a response rate of 28% and thirty-five parents completed and returned the survey by mail for a response rate of 33%. The overall response rate for parents was 31%.

## RESULTS

### Parental Help and Helpfulness

There are large gaps between students' and parents' reports about both the numbers of times parents helped their children on multiple items and the effectiveness of the help. In general, parents reported higher frequencies of help and higher effectiveness of their help than what the students perceived. Although fathers reported comparable amounts of help and helpfulness, students and particularly mothers in general perceived fathers as providing much less help with significantly lower effectiveness. Panels (1) and (2) of Table 1 provide T-Test results of student reports about their parents' help and helpfulness. Panel (1) shows that the numbers of times their parents helped them as reported by students were dramatically lower than the numbers reported by their parents. The numbers of times female students received help from their parents tend to be slightly higher than male students except for "Father helped with non-academic, goal/life-related issues" as reported by male students ( $\bar{x} = 16.2$ ) compared with female students ( $\bar{x} = 14.2$ , difference not significant). On the corresponding item "Mother helped with non-academic, goal/life-related issues,"

the mean for female students ( $\bar{x} = 17.5$ ) is significantly ( $p < .10$ ) higher than for male students ( $\bar{x} = 14.8$ ). It is clear that male students received more help from their fathers and female students received more help from their mothers.

Female students received more help with "school-related problems and obstacles" from both mothers and fathers than male students, but both female and male students received more help from mothers ( $\bar{x} = 15.9$  for females,  $\bar{x} = 13.4$  for males,  $p < 0.10$ ) than fathers ( $\bar{x} = 12.2$  for females,  $\bar{x} = 9.5$  for males,  $p < 0.10$ ) on this item. Female students also reported more "Mother discussing useful information to be a successful college student" ( $\bar{x} = 14.8$ ) than male students ( $\bar{x} = 12.0$ ,  $p < 0.10$ ). Female students reported more times of parents "taking them on visits to college campuses," but both female and male students were taken to campuses more by their mothers ( $\bar{x} = 4.8$  for females,  $\bar{x} = 2.3$  for males,  $p < 0.05$ ) than their fathers ( $\bar{x} = 3.9$  for females,  $\bar{x} = 2.2$  for males, difference not significant).

Although students tended to report less help from their fathers, fathers did not seem to underreport their own contributions. Panel (3) of Table 1 shows that fathers and mothers who completed the questionnaire reported almost identical amounts of help they provided. Panel (4) provides information about spouses as described by the reporting parent. It is interesting that according to Panel (4) fathers who completed the questionnaire not only rated themselves high in providing various types of help, they rated their spouses equally high on those measures. However, mothers who completed the questionnaire rated their spouses dramatically lower than fathers who rated their spouses on all the items. The means for

Table 1: T-Tests of Times of Parental Help Reported by Students and Parents by Gender

	(1) FATHER HELPED		(2) MOTHER HELPED		(3) REPORTING PARENT		(4) SPOUSE	
	<i>Male Stud.</i>	<i>Fem. Stud.</i>	<i>Male Stud.</i>	<i>Fem. Stud.</i>	<i>Father</i>	<i>Mother</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>
<b>Discussed preparing for and gaining access to college</b>	12.3	12.5	14.8	15.6	19	20.6	19.4***	13.6***
	8.7	9.9	9.4	9.7	12.2	11.8	12.5	11.8
	63	89	67	93	55	124	53	114
<b>Encouraged rigorous course work and academic achievement</b>	11.9	13.5	13.6	15.4	19.7	19.2	19.6***	13.5***
	8.9	9.8	9.6	9.7	11.1	11.7	12	11.6
	64	85	67	93	56	124	53	116
<b>Discussed useful info. to be a successful college student</b>	9.8	12.1	12.0*	14.8*	18.3	19.9	18.1**	13.4**
	8.6	9.4	9.2	9.9	11.2	11.6	12.4	11.7
	63	84	67	91	56	122	53	115
<b>Helped deal with school-related problems and obstacles</b>	9.5*	12.2*	13.4*	15.9*	16.8	16.7	17.7***	10.9***
	8.1	9.5	9.1	9	12.1	11.3	13.4	10.7
	61	87	67	96	56	124	53	114
<b>Assisted with non-academic, goal/life-related issues</b>	16.2	14.2	14.8*	17.5*	20.9	19.7	19.9***	13.3***
	9.2	9.8	9.5	8.8	11.1	11.8	11.8	11.8
	60	88	66	96	55	122	53	116
<b>Took child on visits to college campuses</b>	2.2	3.9	2.3**	4.8**	3.7	4.2	7.3***	2.8***
	4.4	7.1	4.5	8.1	4.6	5.1	9.6	4.7
	57	66	56	84	56	122	53	113

Notes: Means, standard deviations in italics and frequency in each cell respectively. Times were originally measured as an ordinal variable for convenience of data collection: 0, <1-2, 3-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-30, and 30+. Statistics are based on restored frequencies obtained by taking the midpoints of the categories with 30+ imputed as 35.

male spouses as reported by mothers are significantly lower than the means for female spouses as reported by fathers on “Discussed about preparing for and gaining access to college” ( $\bar{x}$  = 13.6 for male spouses,  $\bar{x}$  = 19.4 for female spouses,  $p < 0.01$ ), “Encouraged rigorous course work and academic achievement” ( $\bar{x}$  = 13.5 for male spouses,  $\bar{x}$  = 19.6 for female spouses,  $p < 0.01$ ), “Discussed useful information to be a successful college student” ( $\bar{x}$  = 13.4 for male spouses,  $\bar{x}$  = 18.1 for female spouses,  $p < 0.01$ ), “Helped deal with school-related problems and obstacles” ( $\bar{x}$  = 10.9 for male spouses,  $\bar{x}$  = 17.7 for female spouses,  $p < 0.01$ ), “Assisted with non-academic, goal/life-related issues” ( $\bar{x}$  = 13.3 for male spouses,  $\bar{x}$  = 19.9 for female spouses,  $p < 0.01$ ), and “Took child on visits to college campuses” ( $\bar{x}$  = 2.8 for male spouses,  $\bar{x}$  = 7.3 for female spouses,  $p < 0.01$ ).

Table 2 provides information about the helpfulness of parent activities as reported by both students and parents. Mothers’ activities were perceived to be more helpful than fathers’ activities by both male and female students. While the helpfulness of fathers’ activities was perceived as about the same by both male and female students, the helpfulness of mothers’ activities was perceived to be greater by female students than male students. Female students perceived mother “discussing about preparing for and gaining access to college” more helpful than male students ( $\bar{x}$  = 3.5 for females,  $\bar{x}$  = 3.2 for males,  $p < 0.10$ ). Female students also perceived mother “encouraging rigorous course work and academic achievement” ( $\bar{x}$  = 3.4 for females,  $\bar{x}$  = 3.1 for males,  $p < 0.05$ ), mother “discussing useful information to be a successful college student” ( $\bar{x}$  = 3.3 for females,  $\bar{x}$  = 3.0 for males,  $p < 0.05$ ), mother “helping deal with school-related problems and obstacles” ( $\bar{x}$  = 3.5 for females,  $\bar{x}$  = 2.9 for males,

$p < 0.01$ ), and mother “assisting with non-academic, goal/life-related issues” ( $\bar{x}$  = 3.6 for females,  $\bar{x}$  = 3.1 for males,  $p < 0.01$ ) more helpful than male students. In Panel (3) of Table 2, both fathers and mothers who completed the questionnaire reported the helpfulness of their own activities similarly. Again, fathers perceived the activities of their spouses as equally helpful. And again, mothers perceived the activities of their spouses as significantly less helpful than their own.

### Correlations with College GPA

The above comparisons of means show that mothers did more activities than fathers and their activities were more helpful than those of fathers. Female students, to a larger extent than male students, reported more activities done by mothers and perceived mothers’ activities as more helpful. However, an examination of linear correlations between student college GPA and parents’ activities as well as the perceived helpfulness of the activities shows a different picture. One striking finding for female students is that neither the father’s nor the mother’s activities had any significant correlation with college GPA. GPA is correlated to one measure of father’s activities (“Encouraged rigorous course work and academic achievement”:  $\rho = 0.267$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) and three measures of mother’s activities (“Discussed about preparing for and gaining access to college”:  $\rho = 0.363$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ; “Encouraged rigorous course work and academic achievement”:  $\rho = 0.372$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ; and “Discussed useful information to be a successful college student”:  $\rho = 0.241$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) for male students only. Another striking finding is that neither the activities nor their helpfulness as perceived by parents are related to students GPA, except for “Took child on visits to

Table 2: T-Tests of Helpfulness of Parents Reported by Students and Parents by Gender

	(1) FATHER HELPFUL		(2) MOTHER HELPFUL		(3) REPORTING PARENT		(4) SPOUSE	
	<i>Male Stud.</i>	<i>Fem. Stud.</i>	<i>Male Stud.</i>	<i>Fem. Stud.</i>	<i>Father</i>	<i>Mother</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>
<b>Discussing about preparing for and gaining access to college</b>	3	3	3.2*	3.5*	3.5	3.4	3.5***	2.9***
	1.3	1.2	1	0.9	0.6	0.8	0.8	1
	70	98	71	99	56	125	52	115
<b>Encouraging rigorous course work and academic achievement</b>	2.9	3	3.1**	3.4**	3.5	3.5	3.5***	3.0***
	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	1
	70	98	70	99	56	126	51	115
<b>Discussing useful information to be a successful college student</b>	2.8	2.9	3.0**	3.3**	3.5	3.4	3.6***	2.9***
	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.1	0.6	0.7	0.7	1.1
	71	98	71	99	56	125	51	114
<b>Helping deal with school-related problems and obstacles</b>	2.6	2.8	2.9***	3.5***	3.4	3.5	3.5***	2.7***
	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.8	1
	71	97	70	99	54	126	49	115
<b>Assisting with non-academic, goal/life-related issues</b>	2.9	3	3.1***	3.6***	3.5	3.5	3.6***	2.9***
	1.4	1.2	1	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.7	1
	71	98	71	99	56	125	52	116
<b>Starting a college savings fund</b>	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.9	2.5
	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.2
	71	98	71	98	53	115	48	105

Notes: Means, standard deviations in italics and frequency in each cell respectively. Helpfulness was measured as an ordinal variable for convenience of data collection: 1=not at all, 2=somewhat helpful, 3=helpful, 4=very helpful. Statistics are based on the 1 through 4 scale.

Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients between College GPA and Times of Parental Help by Gender

	(1) MALE STUDENT		(2) FEMALE STUDENT		(3) REPORTING PARENT		(4) SPOUSE	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Female	Male
<b>Discussed about preparing for and gaining access to college</b>	0.062	.363***	0.052	0.064	0.169	-0.003	0.224	-0.012
	0.631	0.003	0.625	0.543	0.226	0.977	0.114	0.906
	63	67	89	93	53	114	51	104
<b>Encouraged rigorous course work and academic achievement</b>	.267**	.372***	0.158	0.112	0.03	-0.085	0.104	0.041
	0.033	0.002	0.148	0.286	0.832	0.369	0.468	0.676
	64	67	85	93	54	114	51	106
<b>Discussed useful information to be a successful college student</b>	-0.026	.241**	0.086	-0.036	0.064	-0.079	0.212	0.022
	0.837	0.049	0.436	0.735	0.647	0.407	0.135	0.823
	63	67	84	91	54	112	51	105
<b>Helped deal with school-related problems and obstacles</b>	-0.069	0.054	0.156	0.03	0.061	-0.09	0.122	-0.041
	0.596	0.667	0.148	0.772	0.661	0.338	0.392	0.679
	61	67	87	96	54	115	51	104
<b>Assisted with non-academic, goal/life-related issues</b>	0.109	0.108	0.094	0.003	0.071	-0.046	0.129	0.008
	0.406	0.387	0.382	0.978	0.612	0.631	0.369	0.935
	60	66	88	96	54	112	51	106
<b>Took child on visits to college campuses</b>	0.011	0.144	-0.065	0.028	-0.129	-.247***	-0.077	-.170*
	0.938	0.29	0.605	0.799	0.354	0.009	0.59	0.086
	57	56	66	84	54	112	51	103

Notes: Correlation coefficient, p-value in italics and frequency in each cell respectively. Times were originally measured as an ordinal variable for convenience of data collection: 0, <1-2, 3-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-30, and 30+. Statistics are based on restored frequencies obtained by taking the midpoints of the categories with 30+ imputed as 35. \*  $p < 0.10$  (2-tailed). \*\*  $p < 0.05$  (2-tailed). \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$  (2-tailed).

college campuses.” The negative correlation suggests that students whose parents took them on more college campus visits tend to be those who have lower than average GPAs.

Table 4 reports correlations between GPA and the perceived helpfulness of parental activities. The picture seems to tilt toward the father, particularly for male students. Panel (1) shows that none of the measures for the perceived helpfulness of activities by mothers are correlated with student GPA for male students. In contrast, all of the measures of the perceived helpfulness of activities by fathers are correlated with GPA. Three items reached high correlation at high significance levels (“Discussing about preparing for and gaining access to college”:  $\rho = 0.396$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ; “Discussing useful information to be a successful college student”:  $\rho = 0.339$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ; and “Assisting with non-academic, goal/life-related issues”:  $\rho = 0.331$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). The other three items reached lower correlations and significance levels (“Encouraging rigorous course work and academic achievement”:  $\rho = 0.239$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ; “Helping deal with school-related problems and obstacles”:  $\rho = 0.221$ ,  $p < 0.10$ ; and “Starting a college savings fund”:  $\rho = 0.223$ ,  $p < 0.10$ ). These findings indicate that it is not the amount of parental activities, but the helpfulness “perceived” or “felt” by the student that are related to GPA. Male students who felt strongly about their father’s, rather than their mother’s, helpfulness tended to have better GPAs. The felt helpfulness may or may not be related to the amount of activities.

Female students, on the other hand, seemed to be equally influenced by their parents’ activities. Again, the amount of parental activities may or may not be a factor as indicated by the

comparable sizes of the correlation between GPA and father’s helpfulness and the correlation between GPA and mother’s helpfulness. The highest correlation coefficients for female students are between GPA and “Discussing useful information to be a successful college student” with the father ( $\rho = 0.253$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) and with the mother ( $\rho = 0.200$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), followed by “Discussing about preparing for and gaining access to college” with the father ( $\rho = 0.180$ ,  $p < 0.10$ ) and with the mother ( $\rho = 0.141$ ,  $p < 0.10$ ), “Helping deal with school-related problems and obstacles” by the father ( $\rho = 0.173$ ,  $p < 0.10$ ) and by the mother ( $\rho = 0.176$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ), and “Assisting with non-academic, goal/life-related issues” by the mother only ( $\rho = 0.162$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). The levels of helpfulness of parental activities as perceived by parents are not related to GPA, consistent to the finding that parental report of activities was not related to GPA.

### OLS Regression

To assess whether student-reported and parent-reported parental activities had an impact on student performance, an OLS regression with GPA as the dependent variable was tried. As none of the parent-reported activities was correlated to GPA, these measures were not used in the OLS regression. The items that showed significant correlations to GPA were all entered as independent variables, along with a list of control variables such as high school GPA, honors in high school, gender, race, family income, parents’ marital status, and parents’ education. A few variables measuring students’ relationships with their parents were also included in the control variables. Several variables significantly correlated to GPA were dropped because of high correlations with other independent variables. Panels

Table 4: Pearson Correlation Coefficients between College GPA and Perceived Effectiveness of Parental Help by Gender

	(1) MALE STUDENT		(2) FEMALE STUDENT		(3) REPORTING PARENT		(4) SPOUSE	
	<i>Father</i>	<i>Mother</i>	<i>Father</i>	<i>Mother</i>	<i>Father</i>	<i>Mother</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>
<b>Discussing about preparing for and gaining access to college</b>	.396***	0.037	.180*	.141*	0.057	-0.082	0	-0.028
	0.001	0.761	0.076	0.067	0.682	0.386	1	0.775
	70	71	98	170	54	115	50	105
<b>Encouraging rigorous course work and academic achievement</b>	.239**	0.156	0.165	0.125	0.035	-0.02	0.076	-0.034
	0.046	0.197	0.105	0.105	0.801	0.834	0.603	0.729
	70	70	98	169	54	116	49	105
<b>Discussing useful information to be a successful college student</b>	.339***	0.196	.253**	.200***	-0.07	-0.126	-0.103	-0.015
	0.004	0.101	0.012	0.009	0.615	0.178	0.481	0.877
	71	71	98	170	54	115	49	104
<b>Helping deal with school-related problems and obstacles</b>	.221*	0.052	.173*	.176**	-0.05	0.102	-0.012	-0.05
	0.064	0.667	0.09	0.022	0.726	0.276	0.934	0.611
	71	70	97	169	52	116	47	105
<b>Assisting with non-academic, goal/life-related issues</b>	.331***	0.102	0.129	.162**	-0.029	0.022	-0.049	-0.071
	0.005	0.399	0.204	0.034	0.833	0.817	0.734	0.469
	71	71	98	170	54	115	50	106
<b>Starting a college savings fund</b>	.223*	0.105	0.121	0.029	0.005	-0.114	-0.017	-0.088
	0.062	0.383	0.234	0.704	0.974	0.246	0.908	0.394
	71	71	98	169	52	106	47	96

Notes: Correlation coefficient, p-value in italics and frequency in each cell respectively. Helpfulness was measured as an ordinal variable for convenience of data collection: 1=not at all, 2=somewhat helpful, 3=helpful, 4=very helpful. Statistics are based on the 1 through 4 scale. \* p < 0.10 (2-tailed). \*\* p < 0.05 (2-tailed). \*\*\* p < 0.01 (2-tailed).

1 and 2 of Table 5 respectively provide the OLS result with all independent variables that showed correlation with GPA and the result after some variables have been dropped.

Although college GPA is strongly correlated with several measures of student-reported parental activities and the perceived helpfulness of these activities, regression analysis shows that only mothers' encouraging rigorous work and academic achievement reached a low statistical significance level ( $p < .10$ ). The high statistical significance levels of the correlation coefficients and the overall lack of statistical significance of regression coefficients may indicate that in general students who feel that they received more help from their parents are likely to perform better in college, but the relationship between parental help and academic performance is not robust. The general lack of statistical significance of the impact of parental help on college students' GPA may be a result of the small sample size ( $n = 183$ ). As this study required data from students and their parents, developing a more desirable sample posed a major challenge. As the focus of the present study is a comparison of students' and parents' reports on the help and helpfulness of parental activities, the impact of the independent variables on GPA is less of a concern. A previous study (Smith and Zhang 2010) using a larger sample ( $n = 574$ ) found statistical significance for at least one measure of almost all key factors (father, mother, high school teachers, high school counselors, friends, college professors, college academic advisors, and college orientation programs).

It is interesting to note that students' relationships with their fathers appeared to have a significant positive impact on

GPA. The measure "I love my father very much" stood out as a significant item ( $p < .05$ ) and the significance level remained stable with different controls. This finding suggests more if it is juxtaposed to the pronounced higher correlation between GPA and the "perceived" or "felt" helpfulness of fathers by male students (Panel (1) of Table 4). It does not lend direct support to Smith and Zhang's (2010) finding that college students whose fathers had college degrees appeared to have higher GPA than the other three groups – neither parent had a college degree, only mother had a college degrees, and both parents had college degrees. Attention should be paid to another finding in the Smith and Zhang (2010) regression analysis that although most key factors included an item or two that significantly affected GPA, none of the items that measured fathers' activities were significantly related to GPA. Together, these findings suggest that the role fathers play in their children's college education may not be as straightforward as the presence or absence of a statistical relationship between the frequency of paternal help and students' college performance. Regarding fathers' impact on students' academic performance in college, more attention should be paid to a potential difference between the measurable "amount" of parental activities and the less measurable "depth" of parental impact.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This paper advances our understanding of how students and parents perceive the role that parents have in students' transition experiences (Goldrick-Rab, Carter, and Wagner 2007) and investigates the significance of one aspect of an input component (parents' influence) of Astin's (1991) model of student

change. This study provides further evidence that students and parents have different perceptions regarding the role parents' play in their children's transition from high school to college. While the role of parents in their children's transition from high school to college is often ignored (Agliata and Renk 2008), parental encouragement and parental support have been identified as crucial components in a successful transition experience (Weidman 1989; Hossler, Schmit, and Vesper 1999; Davies and Kandel 1981; Kim and Schneider 2005). The present study found large gaps between student and parent reports about the number of times parents' helped students and the effectiveness of the help during the students' transition from high school to college. Parents reported higher frequencies of help and higher effectiveness of their help than what the students perceived, but neither the frequencies of help or the effectiveness as reported by parents were correlated to student GPA. Students reported that mothers did more activities than fathers and that their activities were more helpful than those of fathers, but the helpfulness of fathers emerged not in the frequency of help or the perceived helpfulness, but in the more pronounced correlations between student GPA and the perceived helpfulness of fathers and in the outstanding significance of "I love my father very much" in the regression analysis.

The surprising association between fathers' helpfulness and GPA appears incongruous to the low frequency of fathers' help and the low helpfulness reported by students. This discrepancy indicates that in particular more studies should be conducted on the role fathers play in the transition to college and that in general attention should be paid to the depth of relationship the students have with their parents. These findings also indicate a lack of communication between parents and students about the level of parental encouragement and support students expect and the level of encouragement and support parents feel obliged to provide their children. In a similar yet different study, Agliata and Renk (2008) studied expectation discrepancies and communication reciprocity between parents and college students. This study was unique because it investigated the role communication reciprocity played in students' adjustment to college life. Agliata and Renk (2008, p. 980) concluded that, "it may not be the actual level of communication reciprocity that is important to college students' adjustment, but rather college students' perceptions of the communication reciprocity that they have with their parents that is important." The present study suggests

Table 5: OLS Regression Results of GPA

Variable	(1)		(2)	
	<i>b</i>	<i>Std. err.</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Std. err.</i>
Constant	0.83	0.651	0.814	0.626
Father encouraged rigorous course work and academic achievement	0.005	0.007	0.002	0.007
Mother encouraged rigorous course work and academic achievement	.014*	0.007	.012*	0.007
Helpfulness of father discussing useful information to be a successful college student	0.065	0.068	0.07	0.057
Helpfulness of father assisting with non-academic, life/goal-related issues	-0.042	0.064		
Helpfulness of mother discussing about preparing for and gaining access to college	-0.166	0.107	-0.077	0.081
Helpfulness of mother helping deal with school-related problems and obstacles	0.131	0.088		
Helpfulness of mother assisting with non-academic, life/goal-related issues	-0.116	0.093		
Helpfulness of mother starting a college savings fund	-0.042	0.038	-0.06	0.038
Relationship- I communicate with my mother about virtually everything	.069*	0.041	0.044	0.035
Relationship- I love my father very much	.280**	0.123	.297**	0.104
Relationship- I love my mother very much	-0.206	0.149	-.244*	0.125
Relationship- I get along with my father very well	0.037	0.045		
Relationship- I get along with my mother very well	-0.057	0.061		
High school GPA	.222***	0.053	.212***	0.054
Honors	0.095	0.101	0.079	0.101
Female	.332***	0.105	.315**	0.103
White	.323**	0.159	0.229	0.153
Other races	.466**	0.234	0.359	0.23
Family income	-0.023	0.03	-0.025	0.029
Parents married	-0.113	0.147	-0.086	0.142
Father's education	-0.024	0.034	-0.016	0.032
Mother's education	0.049	0.033	0.042	0.033
n	137		140	
r <sup>2</sup>	.43, .32 (adjusted)		.38, .29 (adjusted)	

Notes: \* p < 0.10 (1-tailed). \*\* p < 0.05 (1-tailed). \*\*\* p < 0.01 (1-tailed).

that students' perceptions may also fail to reflect the quality of help their parents provide.

Readers should be reminded that one major limitation of the present study is that it uses a convenience sample. While the students who participated in this project might adequately reflect students at this particular institution who enroll in Introduction to Sociology, the sample itself is not representative of students who are enrolled in college and university Introduction to Sociology classes across the country or representative of college students as a whole.

Future research should address Agliata and Renk's point that perceptions are often more important and revealing than reality. There may be a qualitative dimension in the student-parent relationship beyond the perception of students that plays a role

in the transition to college. Why might this be the case? More research is needed regarding the role that fathers have in their children's transition experiences and the quality or depth of student-parent relationships. Qualitative studies are needed to probe deeper into the relationship between the number or measurable amount of parental activities and the less measurable depth of parental impact.

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# “Redlining”: Teaching About Racial Residential Segregation

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**ABSTRACT** Though significant process in civil rights has been made over the last half-century, there are still substantial barriers to racial equality in the U.S. One of these is the issue of racial residential segregation, the systematic exclusion of millions of African-Americans from meaningful opportunity and participation in American civic life. Given the physical and conceptual separation between ethnic groups, it is often difficult for students to grasp the complexity of the problem and the efficacy of possible solutions. This article describes the use of “redlining” maps, a tool used by realtors, lenders, and urban planners to effect residential segregation, as a pedagogical strategy to help students understand the nature of this phenomenon in American urban life.

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## INTRODUCTION

U.S. race relations have progressed so much over the last fifty years that it would be natural to presume it was inevitable. Today, with the acceptance of the civil rights movement’s landmark achievements as bedrock foundations of American social and political life, it is perhaps understandable to assume that the movement’s major goals have been achieved. The students starting school this year are among the most racially and ethnically diverse in the nation’s history—among those ages 13-29, almost 20 percent are Hispanic, and over 14 percent are white, while just under 60 percent (a record low) are white (Keeter & Taylor, 2009). This coming year, most American public schools are now projected to be “majority-minority,” with whites making up just less than 50 percent of the population of more than 50 million public school students (Krogstad & Fry, 2014).

Despite this diversity, a significant number of Americans view the state of racial relations in America as an issue of concern. A 2015 Gallup poll indicated that over 60% of respondents were either somewhat or very dissatisfied with the state of race relations in America (2015). According to an *NBC News/Wall Street Journal* poll in late 2014, 57% of Americans characterized race relations in the U.S. as “bad,” the most pessimistic such description in almost twenty years (Dann, 2014). This indicates that, despite the gains of the civil rights movement, our nation has not yet achieved the equality of opportunity and treatment all citizens deserve. The difficulty for social studies teachers in about this state of inequality lies in addressing both its historical roots and contemporary manifestations. It can hardly be surprising that a large majority of white Americans think their communities’ racial harmony is beyond question, since even today, fifty years after some of the nation’s most important legislative achievements on race relations, we still live in a largely segregated society. A 2014 *New York Times* poll described above

also indicates how rare it is that Americans of different races actually interact with each other—when asked “about how many of the people you regularly come in contact with are black—none, a few, about half, or almost all?,” white respondents answered “none” or “a few” 75 percent of the time, where blacks answered the same way 53 percent of the time (2014).

This conceptual separation is also a physical reality; in America today, most citizens of different races live distinct and unconnected lives. Almost a third of the African-American population of this country lives in residential areas that are more than 90 percent black, while over half the white population resides in areas that are over 90 percent white (Quinn & Pasawarat, 2003). How, then, to teach American students about the nature of this separation, when the very fact of it makes racial and ethnic sensitivity so hard to foster?

One possibility lies in helping students investigate how racial residential segregation became a stratified feature of American social life over the past one hundred years. This article describes the historical roots of residential segregation and one of the tools used to create it, a process known as “redlining.” It also describes a series of pedagogical approaches which can assist teachers and students in exploring the reality of modern American segregation, and possible remedies for it.

## WHAT IS RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION?

When social studies teachers approach the subject of race relations in America, they often focus on hopeful messages of integration (Brown, 2013), the topics of racial diversity and equality (Parinni, 2008), or the emotive experience of racism and the violence that sometimes ensued (Hughes, 2011; Chiodo, 2013). What is more difficult to teach—and thus by extension, harder for our students to understand—is the daily experience of living in a segregated society, one in which social mobility and politi-

cal representation are generally haphazard and limited. This is particularly challenging in that many Americans believe that, as segregation “ended” in 1955 with the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, further remedies are unnecessary.

To wit: in 2012, the Manhattan Institute released a study that painted a relatively rosy picture of the state of segregation in the U.S. According to the report, “American cities are now more integrated than they’ve been since 1910.” Segregation, the authors claimed, had become the norm with the waves of African-American migration after the Civil War and through the mid-twentieth century; but since the 1960s, rapid integration had rapidly “erased” the rise in segregationist practices (Glaeser & Vigdor, 2012).

This outlook is mildly deceptive; while the *rise* in segregation has faltered, the reality of a racial divide in the U.S. is still very real. Historically, American social life has been distinguished by the presence of what Yee (1996) calls “ethnic enclaves,” neighborhoods made up of a common ethnic group (typically established by an initial population, later joined by migrants of a similar background). The familiarity of these enclaves for new arrivals make them attractive destinations; and their role in the history of U.S. immigration makes the concept of ethnic enclaves something admirable, even definitional to the American sense of identity. These “ethnic enclaves” are not representative of how many minorities live in the U.S. today. Instead, millions of African-Americans exist today in environments created by systemic pressures and policies, leading to what Massey and Denton (1993) termed “American apartheid.”

Segregated communities can develop for several different reasons: the most benign, and the one most similar to Yee’s concept of “ethnic enclaves,” is what Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) referred to as “self-segregation,” in which African-Americans may choose to live near others of the same ethnic background. In the years after the Civil War, as African-Americans migrated north in search of economic opportunity, this form of self-segregation was common; but as their population increased (especially into northeastern industrial communities), cities began to adopt policies which helped to create what Seitles (1998) terms the modern “urban ghetto.”

As blacks filtered in, whites began to leave, a phenomenon often termed “white flight”—but this was not the result of intentional policy decisions. What was just as common was the sort of “collective action” often employed to both prevent black residents from moving into white neighborhoods and to ghettoize African-Americans into particular areas of a city or region. As Seitles (1998), puts it, “the emergence of the black ghetto did not happen by chance, but was result of the deliberate housing policies of the federal, state, and local governments and the intentional actions of individual American citizens.”

These tools of “collective action” included the *restrictive covenant*, which in most instances was simply a clause in a house’s deed that forbade the property’s sale to anyone outside the owner’s race (Coates, 2014; Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor, 1999;

Seitles, 1998). The impact of such covenants can be highlighted by a metric called a “dissimilarity index,” which measures the degree of segregation for a specified area. A score of 0 would indicate total and equal integration, while 1 would represent 100 percent segregation. Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) calculated dissimilarity indexes for sixty U.S. metropolitan areas from 1890 to 1990, and found that for the first fifty years of that time frame, the average level went from 0.49 to 0.68. After World War II, as the process of ghettoization increased, the dissimilarity index rose, peaking at an average of 0.70 in 1970 (Boustan, 2013). Today, racial residential segregation is found most often in the largest urban areas, with populations of 1 million or more—primarily as a result of housing discrimination (Iceland, Weinberg, & Steinmetz, 2002, p. 59; Smith, 2012).

Restrictive covenants have been made explicitly illegal today; but this should not be construed to mean that similar tactics don’t exist. In 1988, *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution* ran an investigation which found that banks and federal saving and loans gave five times as many home loans to white applicants as to African-Americans (Dedman, 1988, p. 1). In 2002, the U.S. Census reported that “residential segregation was still higher for African-Americans than for [other minority] groups across all measures” (Iceland, Weinberg, & Steinmetz, 2002, p. 2). In general, metropolitan areas in the south and west exhibited greater declines in residential segregation than was the case with northeastern cities, where such separation was more historic and pronounced (Burch, 2014; Quinn & Pasawarat, 2003). For instance, a 2005 report by the Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair Housing Council found that the use of “exclusionary zoning,” which prevented low-income housing in certain areas, was a major cause of residential segregation (Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair Housing Council, 2005). Such zoning also has the effect of driving up housing costs in non-excluded areas, making the problem of racial segregation even more difficult to overcome (Seitles, 1998).

Overt discrimination also plays a role in residential segregation. Sharkey (2012) found that “discrimination remains prevalent in America’s residential markets and that it affects every aspect of individuals’ search for housing (p. 18). A 2000 Housing Discrimination Study conducted by the federal government found that, in up to 25% of cases studies, African-Americans and Latinos were “consistently” treated unfavorably when compared to white Americans, which meant that whites “were more likely to find out about available houses and apartments, more likely to be given the opportunity to inspect these units, more likely to be offered favorable financial terms, more likely to be steered toward homes for sale in predominantly white neighborhoods, and more likely to receive assistance and encouragement in their housing search” (Turner and Ross, 2005, p. 86).

The impact of racial residential segregation is both difficult to overstate and, ironically, to observe. Areas with high African-American populations have lower-performing schools, less access to adequate health care, more health risks in general, worse public infrastructure, lower standards of community safety, and increased barriers to social and political mobili-

ty (Coates, 2014; Seitles, 1998; Sharkey, 2012). Burch (2012) explored the impact of racial residential segregation on mass imprisonment, concluding that poor African-American areas have the highest percentage of incarceration in the U.S. And the most insidious aspect of segregation is its generational nature; Sharkey (2012) found that over 70 percent of African-Americans who live in the most racially segregated areas in the nation are from the same families that lived there forty years ago, leading to the conclusion that “the American ghetto appears to be inherited” (Sharkey, 2013; Parry, 2012). More generically, but no less disturbingly, members of a given neighborhood in racially segregated areas tend to know very little about other neighborhoods, even those that are only a few blocks away (Sharkey, 2012, p. 18; Krysan & Bader, 2009). The process of residential segregation has led to dozens of neighborhoods (and millions of Americans) excluded from the general benefits of living in the world’s richest nation.

What is most striking for social studies teachers—and most useful in the classroom—is an examination of where these “excluded” zones are, and how they came to be so labeled. Historically, of course, it is impossible to point to one event or one figure that caused residential segregation to spring into being. Instead, it was the outcome of decades of policy, abuse, neglect, and shortsightedness. It is not surprising, in stories of residential segregation, to see comments like those from Frank Burke, an executive officer of Bank South in 1988, who, when confronted with concrete evidence of disparities in lending between black and white citizens, said, “It’s not a willful thing... If somebody walks in and applies, they’ll get fair treatment” (Dedman, 1988, p.2). Despite the myopia of the figures involved, there is one facet of this topic which not only gives students insight into how racial residential segregation occurs, but also provides a platform for meaningful historical/critical analysis of the process involved. These are “redlined” maps of America’s cities.

### WHAT IS “REDLINING?”

W.D. Hosford, Jr., president of DeKalb Federal Savings and Loan in 1988, denied the existence of redlining: “I’ve never known of anybody redlining areas... I believe that any qualified borrower can get a loan today.” So, too, did Jim Graham, vice-president of SunTrust: “It’s a myth that banks have a map with a red line on it... we don’t avoid any area” (Dedman, 1988, p. 2). Though clearly some may dispute the current practice of redlining, the historical role of this practice in creating and perpetuating residential segregation is hard to deny.

*Redlining* is a now-generic term derived from an actual practice that began, at least in part, with the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). In the 1930s, real estate agents, urban planners, and banks were focused on neighborhood risk ratings, trying to determine what Coates (2014) describes as a given area’s “perceived stability,” in order to avoid losses similar to what they had endured in the Great Depression. Banks were reluctant to provide loans in certain urban areas, claiming they were too high-risk. As a result, a vicious cycle began: no loans were

available, which led to a decrease in a property’s value, which led to an increase in absentee landlordism, which contributed inexorably to the area’s decline. “Ignoring their importance as centers of African American business, religion, politics, and culture, whole neighborhoods were deemed ‘blighted,’” and through this process of residential segregation, the label became reality (Johnson, 2012, p. 19-20).

In specific terms, then, redlining meant the use of maps which demarked which areas of a given city were considered worthy of financial investment by banks and lenders; generically, “redlining” refers to “lending (or insurance) discrimination that bases credit decisions on the location of a property to the exclusion of characteristics of the borrower or property” (Hiller, 2003, p. 395). Overwhelmingly, loans were extended to the top two categories of the grading system, which included areas that were “new, homogeneous, and in demand in good times and bad” (Massey & Denton, 1993, p. 51). In practice, this meant a denial of housing assistance to African-Americans. Seitles (1998) highlights the fact that, between 1930 and 1950, the FHA financed two-thirds of all home purchases in the U.S.; yet “less than two percent of the FHA loans were made to non-white home buyers” (Seitles, 1998).

Since the mid-1970s, the practice of redlining maps has been illegal, thanks to federal laws like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Home Discrimination Act. The practice was common, though, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, and such maps were produced regularly by banks, real estate agents, and even the government, through the FHA and the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, or HOLC (Coates, 2014; Hiller, 2003, p. 394). As recently as 1950, the National Association of Real Estate Boards’ code of ethics instructed realtors that they should avoid “introducing... any race or nationality or any individuals whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values” (Coates, 2014). Though the practice of redlining is now technically illegal, the impact of its practice is still felt throughout the U.S.—for example, in black versus white unemployment (Zenou, 2000) and in retail pricing (Myers, et al., 2011). It is difficult to observe in racial residential segregation, and its slow development over decades; and thus it can be difficult to prove its existence and highlight its detrimental effects. The tendency among many Americans to presume that racism is largely a function of individual bigotry—and that elimination of such bigotry spells the effective end of discrimination in American society—ignores the historical reality of segregation has led “dynamically to structural discrimination” (Dymski, 1995, p. 59). This reality becomes more apparent when observing the maps used by those who implicitly determined where African-Americans would be allowed to live.

### TEACHING WITH REDLINED MAPS


Bednarz, Acheson, and Bednarz (2006) point to the value of mapping tools to help students explore not only the geographic scope of a place, but also the impact of policies which have caused that place to develop as it has—in other words, to try and answer “why did particular events happen at particular

locations? Who controls these spaces? How are they represented and experienced?” (Mitchell & Elwood, 2012, p. 141) The use of redlined maps can help students to uncover what Marino and Crocco (2012) refer to as “hidden history” that has been “suppressed, ignored, or deemed insignificant” (p. 233).

Below is a redlined map of Philadelphia, from 1937. Such maps were widely disseminated, as their utility in the real estate industry was duplicated in other areas and for other groups (Hiller, 2003, p. 407). The areas marked green were usually designated as “in demand,” which were excellent risks for insurance or mortgage lending. Areas marked red were identified as high-risk by the map’s designers, and were often the location of high percentages of minorities, especially African-Americans. Overwhelming, FHA loans (see Figure 1):


Many of these maps, produced by local real estate firms or agents, were patterned on maps drawn from the FHA or the HOLC—though there is intense debate among historians about the degree to which, if any, federal agencies like the HOLC were complicit in redlining practices (Hiller, 2003). Figure 2 is a residential map of Baltimore from 1937, while Figure 3 is a similar map from 1939 Chicago, featuring all four “zones” of development:

**Figure 1: A “redlined” map of Philadelphia, 1937**  
Source: “Research Projects: Digital HOLC Maps”



**Figure 2: A “redlined” map of Baltimore, 1937**

Source: <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/32621>




These maps, while fascinating, are largely inferential tools; students may be able to look at a map of their own city, and may be capable of inferring, from their own experience, evidence of residential segregation, but that analysis would be unsupported by the maps (and not replicable for students outside that urban area). What is necessary, then, is a pedagogical tool for contrast, so students may evaluate the nature of segregationist practice both historically and contemporaneously.

One potential approach is to use redlined maps in conjunction with other modern mapping tools. In 2010, the U.S. Census completed its decennial survey of the American population, after which the *New York Times* debuted a useful online platform for viewing the data (<http://projects.nytimes.com/census/2010/map>). This platform features a wide variety of mapping data, including demographic information and visualizations of both occupied and unoccupied dwellings across urban areas. Teachers may ask students to examine a historical redlined map from a given urban area and then compare it with the mapping tool based on current census data. Teachers may ask students to analyze the degree to which racial residential segregation is still evident in a given urban area. For instance, Figure 4, below, is a comparative look at a 1935 redlined map of Richmond, Virginia and data drawn from the 2010 U.S. Census:

Students will quickly see parallels between the Richmond of seventy years ago and the Richmond of today, particularly

Figure 3: A “redlined” map of Chicago, 1939

Source: <http://thosewhocansee.blogspot.com/2014/08/reparations-for-red-lining.html>





in the correlation of zones graded “D”, or “fourth grade,” on the first map and the dense African-American population in the same neighborhoods today. Teachers should also draw attention to the surprisingly short distance between segregated populations; in the U.S. Census map, students can examine separate neighborhoods (labelled “tracts”) and will find that some areas with over 90% African-American population are, quite literally, across the street from neighborhoods that are majority white neighborhoods. Even more arresting is the evidence in changes in population—one neighborhood in southwest Richmond, near the center of town (Census Tract 208) has seen 49% growth in white residence from 2000 to 2010, while the black population has dropped by 57% over the same time frame. Such rapid changes, indicative of the impact of gentrification, are also evidence of modern residential segregation, as housing prices in metropolitan centers have risen and effectively forced out lower-income (often minority) residents (Seitles, 1998; Sharkey, 2012).

For a more in-depth approach specific to Richmond, teachers

may turn to the project designed by the Digital Scholarship Lab at the University of Richmond, under the direction of Robert K. Nelson (<http://dsl.richmond.edu/holc/pages/home>). This project analyzes the HOLC maps used by local lenders and realtors to identify “infiltration of a lower grade population” (by which they meant African Americans, Jews, and immigrants)” (Digital Scholarship Lab, n.d.). The scholars behind this project have superimposed data from the 1935 redlined map of Richmond onto a modern Google map of the same terrain. Students may use this map to visit and examine individual tracts of the original map, identifying the factors for which the HOLC collected data, including “favorable influences” (the presence of parks, scenery, transportation), “detrimental influence” (e.g., distance from schools, traffic conditions, fire hazards), and descriptions of a given tract’s inhabitants, including the presence of “foreign-born” and “Negro” residents.

A similar pedagogical online tool is available to teachers, this time focusing on the presence of residential segregation in the Midwest. “Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the American City”

Figure 4: A comparison of a “redlined” map of Richmond, VA, 1935, and a map of Richmond based on 2010 U.S. Census data  
Source: <http://dsl.richmond.edu/holc/pages/home>, <http://projects.nytimes.com/census/2010/map>



(<http://worldmap.harvard.edu/maps/866>) is an interactive map that accompanies the book *Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City* (Gordon, 2009). This highly layered and interactive site allows users to examine a series of maps, ranging from the early 1920s to the 2000s, highlighting the roles of race and zoning in the development of a major American metropolis. Through this platform, students can examine the evolving nature of racial residential segregation, over the course of decades, and how zoning ordinances and municipal policy was used to create a complex system of generational poverty (see Figure 5):

For teachers who want their students to calculate the impact and nature of residential segregation in more quantitative terms, the Population Studies Center from the University of Michigan (<http://enceladus.isr.umich.edu/race/racestart.asp>) has created a database for “all states, for all counties, for all metropolitan areas and for all cities of 100,000 or more using information from the Census of 2000.” Students may use this database to generate a series of “segregation indexes,” which provide dissimilarity index scores for practically any area, urban or otherwise, in the U.S. These scores measure the evenness with which two groups are distributed across a given geographic area (the standard unit contains, on average, around 4,000 residents. The scores range from 0 (absolutely equal integration) to 100 (total racial separation). These scores indicate the degree to which neighborhood segregation mirrors the demographic mix of a larger area, like a city (Boustan, 2013). Most interestingly, this site allows users to view not only “white-to-black” segregation indexes, but also comparisons


across a variety of ethnic groups, including Asian, Hispanic, and Indian. ). Teachers can help students select from a spectrum of regions to compile measurements of residential segregation, in any part of the United States.

Finally, teachers may wish to incorporate a more emotive element to their lessons, especially in light of the fact that the approaches described above rely on more clinical analysis of data, whether geographic or numerical. Students may be drawn to the stories associated with racial residential segregation, to understand how a culture of “redlining” had impacted Americans’ lives. Johnson (2012), for instance, describes the pedagogical use of “role-play” to illustrate the continuing impact of redlining, “to combat the idea that racial residential segregation is a thing of the past,” to prevent students from believing that “racism died when the last ‘whites only’ sign came down” (p. 19). In her activities, elementary-age students play one of six roles—an African-American homeowner, an African-American renter, a white homeowner, a white banker, a white real estate agent, and a white mayor, so students can contrast the goals, motives, and perspectives of those who operate within a structurally constrained social system.

McDonnell (2002) describes how case studies can help students recognize and evaluate facts, formulate and understand arguments, and make judgments—and just as importantly, such scenarios can “capture students’ attention, drawing them into the real-life concerns” (p. 68). One case study that can serve as an effective scenario, from which to explore different perspectives about redlining and residential discrimination, is the story of Bill and Daisy Myers.

*Figure 5: A screenshot of “Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the American City,” showing the HOLC “residential security map” of St. Louis 1937*

Source: <http://worldmap.harvard.edu/maps/866>



In the summer of 1957, Bill and Daisy Myers bought a new house in Levittown, Pennsylvania. They had outgrown the two-bedroom home they had owned in nearby Bristol, so they put up a \$2,000 down payment on a pink-sided house on Deepgreen Lane. Because Bill was a veteran, the G.I. Bill covered the rest. Almost immediately upon moving in, the Myers were the subject of controversy, since they were the first African-Americans to purchase a home in Levittown.

Levittown, Pennsylvania was modeled after its namesake in New York, one of four large housing developments built by William Levitt and aimed primarily at returning veterans of World War II. Starting in 1951, Levitt’s houses—built cheaply, but quickly and solidly—proliferated in the empty spaces near Route 1 in eastern Pennsylvania. It took only \$100 to make a down payment, a cost available to nearly everyone; and to those who had trouble

making ends meet, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) would provide low-interest loans. Levitt was proud of his accomplishments—“we believe,” he said in one of his promotional films, “that every family in the United States is entitled to decent shelter” (Blackwell, 2007).

The greeting Bill and Daisy Myers received in Levittown was hardly in the spirit hinted at by Levitt. Within hours of their arrival, a group of angry neighbors had arrived; some spat on the lawn (Mullane, 2011). Racial slurs abounded, as did threats of violence (causing the Myers to flee the house twice). Several white Levittowners took possession of a house across the street on Deepgreen Lane and flew a Confederate flag outside, in plain view; they called their establishment “the Dogwood Hollow Social Club,” or “The Confederate House” (Kushner, 2009). Another neighbor arrived with a black dog he had acquired and proceeded to regularly walk it, in front of the Myers’ home, calling it by its new name—a racial slur.

Not all of the Myers’ neighbors were opposed to their residence—local religious and community groups, including Jewish and Quaker residents, came to their aid, helping to babysit for the Myers’ children and to organize a daily citizens’ patrol (Kushner, 2009). Ultimately, the latent threat of violence grew to the point that the governor of Pennsylvania got involved; a court injunction was issued to shut down “the Confederate House,” and the presence of protesters subsided. The Myers, though, had had enough; in 1961 they moved to Harrisburg, and ultimately to New York. Daisy Myers, who died in 2009, said later that she “never forgot what happened...I describe it as a wound that never really healed. You can stay angry and bitter, or you move along. It’s not like you can accept an apology and it’s over. You have to work at it, sometimes a long time, maybe the rest of your life” (Mullane, 2011).

The Myers’ presence in Levittown did raise attention to the fact that William Levitt, it seemed, only sold homes to whites. Levitt claimed he was perfectly willing to sell to a black applicant, but that the white residents were unwilling to allow it: he had “come to know that if we sell one house to a Negro family, then 90 to 95 percent of our white customers will not buy into the community. That is their attitude, not ours” (Sokolove, 2008).

Students, most likely, will initially empathize with the Myers and against Levitt, especially given prevailing views on race and

Figure 6: A data set compiled by the Population Studies Center on the dissimilarity indexes for Richmond, VA

Races Segregated	Tract	Block Group	Block
white_black	56.7	61	69.1
white_indian	38.6	43.8	75
white_asian	36.2	40.2	59.7
white_hispanic	40.2	44.4	61.6
white_blackwhite	35.9	44.5	76.6
white_asianwhite	25.8	37	75.9
white_indianwhite	27.6	36.9	77.9
black_indian	47.7	52.3	77.4
black_asian	63.5	66	77.4
black_hispanic	46.6	50.3	65
black_blackwhite	36.5	42.7	72.3
black_asianwhite	59.3	64.6	87.1
black_indianwhite	49.8	55.9	83.9
asian_asian	52.3	57.8	80.5
asian_hispan	39.8	46.6	75.7
asian_blackwhite	35.5	46.9	78.9
asian_asianwhite	46.1	55.5	85.2
asian_indianwhite	33.7	44.6	80
hispanic_hispanic	39.2	43.5	63.8
hispanic_blackwhite	45.2	51.3	76.4
hispanic_asianwhite	29.7	37.9	68.2
hispanic_indianwhite	46.5	53.2	80.7
blackwhite_blackwhite	29.1	39.4	70
blackwhite_asianwhite	40.3	49.1	78.8
blackwhite_indianwhite	38.8	47.2	78.9
asianwhite_asianwhite	39.6	50.5	78.7
asianwhite_indianwhite	33.1	43.8	78.5
indianwhite_indianwhite	36.9	48.6	81.2

discrimination. But an effective case-study requires competing perspectives, and Levitt’s point of view on the nature of race relations is worth considering:

*“The plain fact is that most whites prefer not to live in mixed communities. This attitude may be wrong morally, and someday it may change. I hope it will. But as matters now stand, it is unfair to charge an individual for creating this attitude or saddle him with the sole responsibility for correcting it. The responsibility is society’s. So far society has not been willing to cope with it. Until it does, it is not reasonable to expect that any one builder should or could undertake to absorb the entire risk and burden of conducting such a vast social experiment”* (Kushner, 2009, p. 75-76).

A neighbor of the Myers’ was more succinct: “[Bill Myers is] probably a nice guy, but every time I look at him I see \$2,000 drop off the value of my house” (Coates, 2014). The argument made by those responsible for redlining would be, without doubt, practically identical—the fault is not any single individual’s, but instead the result of a collective judgment, the type of which would be beyond a single person to reject or

reverse. Students may consider the following dilemma: if residential segregation was not *always* the result of nefarious, overt racism, what should be done? Is it fair to ask Bill Levitt (or others in similar positions) to fight against what was certainly a prevailing view on race relations? The case of Bill and Daisy Myers, and the housing policy of Bill Levitt, can give a richer, more nuanced perspective to the issue of residential segregation, adding to the power of redlined maps as an educational resource.

## **SOLUTIONS AND THE VALUE OF TEACHING ABOUT RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION**

There is little point to any form of critical inquiry into social ills without considering the possibility of solutions. Teachers should make certain that in any of the above pedagogical approaches they include an overt query: “what can be done, if anything?” Such a question is likely to cause some degree of despair, when faced with the depth of the problem. Coates (2014) described, in powerful terms, how far a neighborhood in Chicago, North Lawndale, had fallen in the grips of segregationist policies:

*North Lawndale is now on the wrong end of virtually every socioeconomic indicator. In 1930 its population was 112,000. Today it is 36,000. The halcyon talk of “interracial living” is dead. The neighborhood is 92 percent black. Its homicide rate is 45 per 100,000—triple the rate of the city as a whole. The infant-mortality rate is 14 per 1,000—more than twice the national average. Forty-three percent of the people in North Lawndale live below the poverty line—double Chicago’s overall rate. Forty-five percent of all households are on food stamps—nearly three times the rate of the city at large. Sears, Roebuck left the neighborhood in 1987, taking 1,800 jobs with it (Coates, 2014).*

In light of these dismaying statistics, it would be easy to label residential segregation as practically unsolvable. However, while it is a thorny and generational issue, there are potential remedies.

Boustan (2013) asserts there are two basic approaches to addressing residential segregation: “place-based” policies, that seek to improve segregated communities through improvements to schools and local infrastructure, or by reducing negative factors such as the crime rate, in order to encourage integration; and “people-based” policies, which aim to help home buyers or renters “gain access to existing neighborhoods” (p. 334). This includes stronger enforcement of fair housing regulations, financial assistance, or streamlining access to home loans (exactly what redlining practices tend to inhibit). There are also more indirect yet no less valuable strategies that a city might use; for instance, improving transportation to and from segregated communities, to help residents (often who do not privately own cars) get to and from jobs outside their neighborhoods. Though this combats the consequences, rather than the causes, of residential segregation, such a policy both offers aid to those in need and endorses the entire community’s role in combating the issue.

Zenou (2000) describes how some European nations have created “enterprise zone programs,” which provide incentives to businesses to develop depressed areas. If a firm sets up locations, outlets, or facilities in such areas, it can operate tax-free, though there is a stipulation that 20% of the firm’s employees must be made up of local workers (p. 283). This type of open-market incentivization can help to combat traditional urban blight, as well as potentially reducing a redlined area’s endemic unemployment (Papke, 1994).

From a teacher’s standpoint, these propositions also contain elements of striking, incisive critical inquiry. Students may consider: is it the role of the government to address these issues? If residential segregation is the result of specific and intentional policies, taken over decades, students may initially support a more activist government role to ameliorate the circumstances. But when faced with real and often painful choices (should, for instance, suburban citizens’ taxes be used to subsidize automobile purchases for inner-city residents, to support mobility to and from work?), the discussions that follow will be decidedly more complex, and thus more valuable.

One issue that teachers need to consider is the value of this topic. Social studies educators spend a great deal of time in most of their classes discussing the impact of race, racism, and discrimination in U.S. history. Often, though, those discussions are limited by the tendency to approach the topic as either something historical (e.g., the *Brown* decision) or biographical (as in the life and work of Martin Luther King, Jr.). Working with issues of generational racism, like residential segregation, is both challenging and provocative, in that its study rests on an uncomfortable premise—the ills of this phenomenon are still with us, every day.

It is vital, though, that social studies teachers recognize the impact they may have on a topic such as this. According to the Pew Research Center, white households in the U.S. worth approximately twenty times as much as black households (Coates, 2014). But this statistic doesn’t indicate how, seemingly every day, there is more evidence of how residential segregation impacts Americans’ lives. According to a recent *New York Times* study (conducted in the wake of the August 2014 police shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri), black voters are severely and habitually underrepresented in local government; among 340 cities where more than 20 percent of the population is African-American, 238 either slightly or severely underrepresent the black voter population. This is due, experts agree, at least partially due to the fact that black voters—often working lower-paying, more demanding jobs—both have limited time to participate in the political system and less vested commitment, given the lack of visible evidence of government intervention in their neighborhoods (Fausset, R., 2014, September 28). In a study by *The Tampa Bay Times*, black residents were more than six times as likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than white voters (nationwide, African-Americans were almost four times as likely to be arrested for any crime than whites), in large part because the neighborhoods in which

they live are habitually plagued by crime (Nohlgren & Stanley, 2014).

“One consequence of racism and segregation,” says Alice Forman, “is that many American whites know little or nothing about the daily lives of African-Americans...[their] neighborhoods are not far away, but they might as well be on the moon” (Forman, 2014). What may be most distressing about this fact is that racial residential segregation, by its very nature, renders its victims largely invisible to the rest of the body politic, especially when there is no special motive to investigate. Social studies teachers, in this regard, have both a tremendous opportunity and obligation to help students confront this issue. Seitles (1998) points out that the “freedom associated with choosing a home should apply to all without limits based upon skin color.” Fifty years after the many triumphs of the civil rights movement, most Americans would agree with this statement and consider its central tenet realized. Social studies teachers, through a critical analysis of redlining practices, can help students grasp how far we have come, and how far yet we have to go.

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# The Hunger-Poverty Nexus and Local Food Solutions: Case Study of Lynchburg, Virginia

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**ABSTRACT** Lynchburg, Virginia has a hunger and poverty problem. This paper quantifies the extent to which this problem exists and examines the role that food can play in addressing it. It is argued that the absence of food is only the proximate cause of hunger. In a modern industrial economy such as the United States, poverty is the likely driving force of that hunger; the ultimate cause. So, rather than viewing food as something simply to be given away to alleviate the immediate hunger problem, it is suggested that creative food solutions should focus on addressing the factors that might help to alleviate poverty; things like economic development and education. The paper argues that a movement in the direction of greater local food sustainability will help revitalize the Lynchburg economy, thus making poverty and hunger reduction an easier task.

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## INTRODUCTION

Where there is hunger the natural inclination is to offer food to the suffering. Food donations address the proximate cause of the hunger: lack of food. However, a primary driver of hunger, i.e., an ultimate cause, is poverty. Giving people food without addressing the reasons behind their hunger has the potential to set up a cycle of dependency in which the underlying ultimate causal factors are left in place.

Lynchburg, Virginia has a hunger and a poverty problem. Statistics suggest that Lynchburg's problem is, for the most part, worse than the surrounding counties, the state of Virginia, and the US overall. For example, there are 13,600 food insecure people (18 percent) in Lynchburg (2012). In comparison, the state of Virginia has only 12 percent food insecure people. Lynchburg's poverty rate is 22.6 percent (2013), having risen nearly every year since 1999 (when it was 15 percent). Virginia's poverty rate has also risen over this period, but is only half that of Lynchburg. These are sobering statistics and merit further investigation.

With a lack of food being the proximate and most visible cause of hunger, an entire industry involving the public sector (for example, SNAP/EBT, WIC, nationally) and charitable private sector (for example, Lynchburg Daily Bread, Salvation Army, Parkview Mission, and Lynchburg Area Food Bank, locally) has arisen over the years with the basic goal of making food available to the hungry. Federal food programs begun in the Great Depression were cut back in the 1980s resulting in "pressure to feed a rising tide of hungry people." This responsibility "fell increasingly to local communities and especially to nonprofit organizations and faith-based institutions" (Winne, 2008, p. 25). While charitable food giving takes care of the immediate cause

of hunger, it does not necessarily address the ultimate cause: poverty.

The goals of this project are a) to quantify and explain the extent of the hunger-poverty nexus in Lynchburg, and b) to identify creative ways in which food can be a solution to the poverty problem. Lynchburg's hunger and poverty problem is quantified in sufficient detail that the results should be beneficial to policy makers trying to get a handle on the scope of the problem. Food as a solution to poverty (as opposed to simply alleviating hunger) has received little attention in studies of the Lynchburg area, and, has only recently begun receiving attention at the national level. Comment on the word food: When I refer to a lack of food as a proximate cause of hunger, that is clear enough. When I speak of ways in which food can be a solution to the problem of poverty, suddenly the simple word *food* becomes a metaphor for a host of complexities. Much of the focus in this paper will be on local food systems; assessing the possibility of developing and expanding the local food shed to solve local problems. This will entail expanding the nascent farm to table movement, creating food hubs, expanding urban sources of food, encouraging neighborhood friendly grocery stores, expanding food-related education in the school system and through the existing farmers market, and more.

The analysis is organized as follows: Data are presented that highlight the extent of Lynchburg's hunger and poverty problem vis-à-vis an expanded MSA region, the state of Virginia, and the nation. Drivers of hunger and poverty at the census tract level are then identified. Food as a solution to the problem of poverty is then discussed. Finally, food solutions are examined in the context of Lynchburg's demographics, institutions, and economy.

## EVIDENCE OF LYNCHBURG’S HUNGER AND POVERTY PROBLEM

Lynchburg is one of Virginia’s oldest cities; it received its charter in 1786. Its community market—the third oldest continually operating farmers market in the country—actually predates (by three years) the founding of the city itself. The city (population 78,000) is located in Central Virginia, nestled against the eastern edge of the Blue Ridge Mountains. The James River forms its northeastern border. The city is orderly, well-managed, and attractive; trash gets picked up on schedule, potholes get filled, rush-hour is nothing like what one is used to in larger cities, housing is relatively affordable. Parks and Recreation, in addition to operating the farmers market, maintains an expansive recreational trail system, several parks, playgrounds, community centers, and sports complexes. The fact remains though that Lynchburg has a hunger and poverty problem.


### Hunger

In the aftermath of the Great Recession disturbing reports began appearing in the local news: Every weekend “18,000 children will not have enough food to eat” (Trent 2010). “22 percent of children under age 18 are at risk for hunger” (Compton 2011). “Hunger... strikes 1 in 10 people..., four in 10 of them are children”. In 2006, the Lynchburg Area Food Bank served about 10,500 people each month. Now, it serves about 17,500 people monthly (Trent 2010). The food bank numbers continued to grow, peaking in 2012 at 20,000 people served monthly before settling in 2013 at 17,400 per month (Blue Ridge Area Food Bank). Numbers served at other local charitable food organizations behaved similarly.

Lynchburg was, of course, a microcosm of what was happening around the rest of the country. Words like *alarming* and *epidemic* were used to describe the fact that in 2009 35 million Americans did not have secure access to food on a regular basis, a 14 year high. Unfortunately, things got worse. By 2012 the number of food-insecure households had grown to 49.0 million, (USDA, ERS). SNAP/EBT (Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program/Electronic Benefit Transfer) participation increased by 81 percent from the start of the recession in 2008 until its 2013 peak (47.6 million) (USDA FNS).

Figure 1: Food Insecurity (2012)

Source: FeedingAmerica.org




Lynchburg’s hunger and poverty problem is assessed in the context of the Lynchburg Area Food Bank’s catchment region: the Lynchburg MSA (Amherst, Appomattox, Bedford, and Campbell counties, and Lynchburg and Bedford Cities) plus Nelson County. Where appropriate, other Virginia localities are compared, along with the state of Virginia and the nation as a whole. Hunger is not a condition easily measured; in this analysis it is represented by the following proxies: food insecurity, SNAP recipients, student eligibility for free or reduced price lunches, and a measure reported by County Health Rankings called “limited access to healthy foods.”

*Food insecurity* refers to the uncertainty of families “having... enough food to meet the needs of all their members because they have insufficient money or other resources for food” (USDA ERS, Food security). Feeding America provides data on food insecurity: Figure 1 indicates that 18 percent of Lynchburg’s population (13,600 individuals) are food insecure as of 2012 <sup>1</sup>; 58 percent fall below the SNAP threshold of 130 percent of the poverty rate (Feeding America: Gunderson, Engelhard, Satoh, Waxman, 2014).<sup>2</sup> Lynchburg’s rate exceeds that of the expanded MSA region, the state, and the nation as a whole. Lynchburg, however, is not the most food insecure location in Virginia. Out of 134 reporting localities, Lynchburg ranks 119<sup>th</sup>, with Emporia City ranked at the bottom at 26.0 percent.<sup>3</sup>

According to the VA Department of Social Services, USDA (FNS), and US Census data in Figure 2, the SNAP participation rate in Lynchburg (2013) is 18 percent, exceeded in the expanded MSA

Figure 2: SNAP Participation Rate (2013)

Source: VA Dept of Social Services, USDA (FNS), US Census State and County Quick-facts



1 Feeding America also tracks child food insecurity rates. For Lynchburg, this number is even higher (20.1 percent) than overall food insecurity, a not surprising outcome given that “households with children have almost twice the rate of food insecurity as households without children” (National Coalition for the Homeless, 2011).


2 The poverty rate for an individual in 2013 is \$11,888; \$23,834 for a family of four. 130 percent of these poverty thresholds are \$15,454.40 and \$30,984.20, respectively. (US Census, Historical Poverty Tables).

3 Food insecurity data span 2009-12. Lynchburg’s rate increased from 17.1 to 18 percent during that time.

region only by Bedford City at 19 percent.<sup>45</sup> Lynchburg's participation rate exceeds both the state and national averages. As with the food insecurity rates, a SNAP rate of 18 percent means that nearly one in five Lynchburg residents is supplementing his or her diet with federal food assistance dollars. Several localities have far worse SNAP participation rates than Lynchburg, though, with numbers as high as 39 percent in Emporia City.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 3, which compares SNAP participation rates for Lynchburg, the state of Virginia, and the U.S. from 2001 - 2013 indicates that Lynchburg's high SNAP participation rate (2013) was not just a one-off outcome, a result of the recent recession, but rather has been on the rise for over a decade, with only a slight pause in growth in 2006-7. Lynchburg's participation rate is consistently higher than both Virginia and the US. The spread between Lynchburg and the state of Virginia widened from 4.8 percentage points in 2001 to 7.1 percentage points in 2013. In a hopeful sign, Lynchburg saw its SNAP participation rate decline slightly in 2013, the first decline since 2007.

Figure 3: SNAP/EBT Participation Rates, Lynchburg, VA (2001-2013)  
Sources: SNAP (VA Dept of Social Services, USDA (FNS)); Population (US Census)



Another indicator yet of the extent to which hunger is a problem in Lynchburg is the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunches<sup>7</sup>. Figure 4 indicates that in Lynchburg 61.5 percent of children in the city are eligible for free or reduced price lunches (2014-15) (VA Dept. of Education, Office of School Nutritional Programs). This percentage far exceeds any of the expanded MSA, the state, or the nation. Again, Lynchburg does not have the worst statistic in the state. Out of 135 reporting cities or counties, Lynchburg ranks 102. Percentages in other locations are even more disturbing, ranging into the 70s, 80s and even 90s for many areas: Richmond City public schools

4 SNAP eligibility is determined on the basis of a number of resource and income tests. Gross household income may not exceed 130 percent of federal poverty guidelines. See <http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility>.

5 SNAP numbers for localities and Virginia are December numbers (The US is an annual average). SNAP numbers are divided by US Census population estimates to generate a SNAP participation rate. 2014 city and county population data are not yet available.

6 From 2001-13, SNAP participation rates increased across the expanded MSA. Lynchburg's increase: 132 percent.


7 A child is eligible for a reduced price lunch if family income (of 4) is 185% of the federal poverty guideline. A child is eligible for a free lunch if family income (of 4) is 130% of the federal poverty guideline (USDA FNS, Inc. Elig. Guidelines).

have 97.6 percent eligibility and Petersburg City public schools has 100% eligibility.

As with SNAP eligibility rates, the 2014-15 free or reduced price lunch eligibility rate of 61.5 percent was not a one-off outcome.

Figure 4: Students Eligible for Free or Reduced Price Lunch (2014-2015)

Source: VA Dept of Education, Office of School Nutrition Programs and Statistic Brain



Lynchburg's eligibility rate had risen every single year since 2002-03, peaking in 2013-14 at 62.6 percent. That increase was substantial; rising nearly 16 percentage points, far outpacing the state (whose increase was just under 10 percentage points).

Figure 5 captures the distribution across city schools of the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunches. The Lynchburg average of 61.5 percent is an average across all schools, ranging from Bedford Hills Elementary at 39.8 percent eligibility to William M. Bass Elementary at 90.1 percent eligibility (VA Dept. of Education, Office of School Nutritional Programs). Not surprisingly, Bedford Hills is in census tract 2.01 with the city's highest median family income of \$79,946. William M. Bass is located in census tract 19 with a median household income of \$22,239. Census tract 19 is not Lynchburg's poorest, but \$22,239 is nearly \$1600 below the poverty rate (\$23,834 for a family of four in 2013) according to the US Census (US Census 2009-13 ACS 5 yr estimates, Table S1903,

Figure 5: Lynchburg Students Eligible for Free or Reduced Price Lunch, By School (2014-2015)

Source: VA Dept of Education, Office of School Nutrition Programs




Table S1701, and Hist. Poverty Tables).

Another remarkable observation about this distribution is that all but three schools are above the 50 percent threshold; in addition to Bedford Hills, there is E.C. Glass High School at 45.3 percent and Paul Munro at 46.0 percent. Five schools are above the 70 percent threshold, two are above 80 percent, and then there is William M. Bass at 90.1 percent. This distribution suggests that you could take a walk in nearly any neighborhood in Lynchburg (more than 80 percent of them), and of every ten children you observe, it could reasonably be assumed that at least half of them are eligible for free or reduced price lunches.


Perhaps part of the cause of hunger is an access problem, or, at least, lack of access might represent a proximate cause of hunger. Previous research has identified downtown Lynchburg as a “food desert” (Abell, et al., 2011). Food deserts are defined as “urban neighborhoods and rural towns without ready access to fresh, healthy, and affordable food” (USDA Agricultural Marketing Service). In fact, the downtown census tracts (4, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 19) are all low income census tracts, with an average median household income of \$22,390 (2009-13 US Census ACS 5-yr estimates), a drop, by the way, of nearly \$1300 from the previous year. Also, in these census tracts grocery stores are approximately two miles away. Life in a food desert can result in a couple of predictable outcomes: With low income and limited access to transportation, people either eat less and/or they choose to stretch the few dollars they have over as many calories as possible, no matter how unhealthy the food choices. More on this point in a moment...

County Health Rankings (2014) has a “Limited access to healthy foods” measure: “the percent of population who are low-income and do not live close to a grocery store.” Figure 6 indicates that for the most recent year available, 2010, 12 percent of Lynchburg’s population falls into that category, a higher percentage than the expanded MSA, the state, or the nation. In a state where 16 cities or counties have 100 percent access (zero percent low income and limited access), and where 90 cities or counties have 95 percent access (only five percent low income and low access), 12 percent limited access is noteworthy. However, there are eleven cities or counties that have even less access, with Buena Vista having the least access at 41 percent. For more on food deserts in Virginia, including the city of Lynchburg, see Grant, et al. (2014).<sup>8</sup>

Hunger and obesity tend to be clumped together in poor communities with low access to food; County Health Rankings 2014, using data from the most recent year, 2010, reports that Lynchburg’s adult obesity rate of 33 percent is higher than any of the localities in the expanded MSA (ranging from 26 percent Bedford County to 32 percent Campbell County) or the state of

Figure 6: Limited Access to Healthy Foods (2010)

Source: County Health Rankings, USDA



Virginia (28 percent). The Journal of the American Medical Association, using more recent data (2011-12) reports a national adult obesity rate of 34.9 percent (Ogden, C., Carroll, M., Kit, B., and Flegal, K., 2014). Lynchburg’s rate has steadily increased (from 29 percent to 33 percent) over the five years County Health Rankings has been reporting obesity rates.

So, what may be concluded about Lynchburg’s hunger problem? It is by no means the worst in the state. However, Lynchburg has hunger indicators that are worse than the expanded MSA, the state of Virginia, and the nation as a whole. The 61.5 percent eligibility rate for free or reduced price lunches is especially troubling, as well as its distribution over the various schools. The fact that hunger indicators such as SNAP participation or students eligible for free or reduced price lunches have been growing for at least a decade is a matter of additional concern. On the other hand, the fact the eligibility rate for free or reduced price lunches is slightly lower in 2014-15 than in 2013-14 is an encouraging sign. It is also good that Lynchburg’s charitable food agencies have proven flexible enough to meet peak needs of the hungry during a downturn as severe as the Great Recession. But the question remains as to why the hunger problem exists, and why it has been growing worse.

## Poverty

Research across a number of disciplines identifies poverty as a primary driver of hunger. Bickel, Nord, Price, Hamilton, and Cook (2000) argue that “the presence of hunger in American households due to insufficient resources to obtain food has been a long-standing challenge to U.S. health, nutrition, and social policy” (p.1). London and Scott (2005) indicate that a “vast majority” of the food insecure are also poor, and that a lack of economic resources contributes to food insecurity for low-income urban women (p. 2). Iceland and Bauman (2007) find that “income poverty is strongly associated with food insecurity” (p. 1). Ziliak, Gunderson, and Haist (2008, p. ii) find that seniors living below the poverty line were more likely to be at-risk of hunger than those above it. Berg (2010) notes that hunger and poverty are interrelated problems. Ending hunger by 2015, a goal of the Obama administration and USDA, is “criti-

<sup>8</sup> County Health Rankings (2014) has created a new measure it calls the Food Environment Index that combines (equally weights) food insecurity, reported in Figure 1 and the limited-access-to-healthy-foods measure in Figure 6. The index ranges from 0 (worst) to 10 (best). Lynchburg ranks 6, tied with 11 localities near the bottom. Only four other Virginia localities have lower rankings.

cal to cutting poverty in half” he states (p.1). On the other hand, “limiting poverty will reduce hunger” and furthermore, “make it far less expensive for the nation to end hunger entirely” (p. 1). Economic geographer Amy Glasmeier in an NPR interview identifies a “geography of poverty” in the U.S. Families living in the poorest regions such as Appalachia, or the Mississippi Delta face a deficit of healthy food choices and are also forced to make uncomfortable choices between needs such as food and health care (Valentine, 2005). As census tract data will reveal, Lynchburg appears also to have a geography of poverty.

There is no shortage of evidence that poverty is the primary cause of hunger in the popular press and among international agencies. Bread for the World probably puts it most eloquently:

*In the United States, hunger is not caused by a scarcity of food. There is more than enough food to feed everyone. We have the infrastructure to deliver it. There is a network of interstate highways and a trucking industry ready to move mountains of food daily wherever it needs to go. The supermarket store shelves are stocked to the ceiling. But none of this matters if customers have no money in their pockets. Poverty spoils every meal. (Bread for the World, Causes of Hunger in the U.S.).*


That said, it is worth noting that Amartya Sen (1999, p. 3) reminds us that the ultimate barometer of human well-being is not simply the absence of (income-based) poverty, but rather the presence of a variety of freedoms and the capabilities to pursue those freedoms, including the freedom that a decent income might bring. In the absence of a more robust measure of well-being at the county or census tract level such as the UN’s Human Development Index, efforts will be made to assess evidence of poverty in Lynchburg by appeal to a number of metrics. Comparisons will be made to the expanded MSA counties, the state of Virginia and the nation as a whole by examining (income-based) poverty rates, median household income, and income inequality. At the census tract level, the following drivers of poverty will be considered: education, family composition, race, and labor market conditions. While these various relationships may be well established at the national or international levels, they have not been previously examined for Lynchburg.

US Census data in Figure 7 indicate that Lynchburg’s overall poverty rate of 22.6 percent exceeds that of the expanded MSA, the state of Virginia, and the nation as a whole (US Census, Small area income and poverty estimates).<sup>9</sup> As with data on hunger, Lynchburg does not have the worst poverty numbers in the state. Out of 134 reporting locations, there are twenty (twelve cities, eight counties) that have higher poverty rates, with Radford (31.3 percent) at the bottom of the list. 22.6 percent is a rather sobering number, though; more than one out of every five persons on the streets of the city is poor on average. Moreover, as will be shown, Lynchburg’s poverty is not distrib-

9 US Census Small area income and poverty estimates are based on 1 yr. estimates. In the analysis at the census tract level to follow, only 5 yr estimates are used. Using US Census 2009-13 ACS 5 yr estimates, Lynchburg’s poverty rate is 24.7 percent.

Figure 7: Poverty Rate (2013)

Source: US Census, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates




uted equally.

Figure 8 presents times series data on poverty from 1993 – 2013 (US Census, Small area income and poverty estimates). One might be tempted to blame Lynchburg’s high poverty rate (22.6 percent in 2013) on the recent economic downturn, but the data suggest otherwise. While poverty rates for Virginia and the US began to rise in 2007 on the cusp of the Great Recession, Lynchburg’s poverty rate had been on the rise for over a decade. It has increased nearly eight percentage points since 1999. During this time, the spread between Lynchburg’s and Virginia’s poverty rates nearly doubled from six percentage points to eleven.<sup>10</sup>

As official poverty designations are based on the percent of the

Figure 8: Poverty Rate, Lynchburg vs. VA and US (1993–2013)

Source: US Census, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates




population below various income levels, a logical place to start an examination of poverty in Lynchburg is with income. Figure 9 indicates that Lynchburg’s median household income of \$39,918 is lower than the expanded MSA region (except Bedford City), the state of Virginia, and the nation as a whole (US Census, Small area income and poverty estimates). As has been the case with other statistics, Lynchburg’s income is not the

10 Lynchburg’s child poverty rate, 30.0 percent (2013), exceeds its overall rate, and has also been on the rise since 2001 (US Census: Small area income and poverty estimates).

Figure 9: Median Household Income (2013)

Source: US Census, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates



lowest in the state. Danville has a median household income of only \$30,940.

Figure 10 presents nominal and real median household income for Lynchburg from 1997-2013.<sup>11</sup> In nominal terms, Lynchburg's median household income grew 37.2 percent over this 16 year period (2 percent/year). In constant 1997 dollars, however, Lynchburg's median household income actually *declined* by 3.8 percent (-0.24 percent/year). Over this period, the expanded MSA region except Nelson County (1.4 percent overall growth) experienced similar downturns. Virginia's real median household income, on the other hand, grew by 7.5 percent (.5 percent/year). The nation as a whole experienced a 3.3 percent drop (-.2 percent/year). In the most recent period (2012 to 13) Lynchburg experienced strong nominal median household income growth (6.7 percent); when coupled with moderate inflation this resulted in the first real growth (5.1 percent) in five years.<sup>12</sup>


According to Lynchburg City Manager Kimball Payne (2009), Lynchburg's high poverty and low median income relative to the expanded MSA could be explained, in part, because of Virginia's unique city-county separation arrangement and the moratorium on annexation. According to Payne, core cities such as Lynchburg experience a number of problems: slow job growth, lower incomes, an increased percentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunches, higher rates of poverty, school budgets squeezed to make room for the provision of human services, public safety, and infrastructure, and higher crime rates as state funding for police protection has followed the expansion of the population into the counties (p. 9). Mr. Payne also reminds us that Lynchburg's college student population—a demographic category that in general has extremely low incomes—has the potential, to the extent that students are

11 Nominal median household income (US Census: Small income and poverty estimates) was deflated using BLS CPI data for a mid-size southern city. Source of BLS data: www. Economagic.com.

12 Using US Census 2009-13 ACS 5 yr estimates, Lynchburg's median household income was only 38,138 and only grew by 0.96 percent, rather than 6.7 percent.

Figure 10: Lynchburg Median Household Income, Nominal vs. Real (1993-2013)

Source: US Census, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, BLS CPI Data




included in census income surveys, to skew Lynchburg's overall income and poverty numbers. In referring to "core" cities, Payne is referencing *Virginia's First Cities*, a "state advocacy coalition comprised of 13 of the state's oldest and most historic cities." Lynchburg is squarely in the middle of this group of cities (ranked seventh)<sup>13</sup> in terms of both median income and poverty. Its median household income of \$39,918 (2013) is just below the core city average of \$40,552. Its poverty rate of 22.6 percent (2013) is just above the core city average of 21.4 percent. Whether Lynchburg's college student population make a significant contribution to its *relatively* low income and *relative*-ly high poverty rate is not clear: all but one of the comparison core cities (Hopewell) have colleges immediately nearby.

A comparison beyond the core cities is instructive: across all 134 cities and counties in Virginia (VA median household income: \$62,745), Lynchburg's median household income ranks 93; across all 39 cities (average median income: \$48,533) it ranks 23. Across those same 39 cities, it ranks 26 in terms of poverty. The poverty rate across the 39 cities averages 18.1 percent. vs. Lynchburg's 22.6 percent. Lynchburg's relatively low income and relatively high poverty rate notwithstanding, Mr. Payne's point is important enough to warrant further investigation. According to US Census data, the median household income averaged across all of Virginia's cities is \$48,533; the county average is \$52,941. A difference of means test, however, indicates that this difference between city and county median household incomes is not statistically significant ( $z = 1.24$  vs. critical  $z(.05) = 1.96$ ). Poverty rates across Virginia's cities average 18.1 percent; for counties, the average is 14.0 percent (US Census, Small area income and poverty estimates). This difference is statistically significant ( $z = 3.18$  vs. critical  $z(.05) = 1.96$ ). These mixed statistical results suggest that Virginia cities, in general, appear to be disadvantaged relative to counties in terms of poverty but *not* income. That suggests that it is important to take a deeper look at how that income is distributed. In fact, according to Sen (1999, esp. Ch. 4) a low income would

13 On the basis of 2012 median household income, Lynchburg was ranked eleventh out of the 13 core cities.

Figure 11: Income Inequality (Gini Index) (2009–2013)

Source: US Census, 2009-2013 ACS 5yr Estimates: Gini Index of Inequality, Table B19083




not necessarily be such a bad thing if it was distributed somewhat equitably leaving citizens with necessary freedoms and capabilities. While the economic literature is mixed on the relationship between income inequality and economic well-being (see, for example, World Bank, Poverty Net), most of the analyses have focused on nation states and are temporal in nature. Economists have had relatively little to say about this relationship at the city and county level. An exception, though, is Glaeser, E., Resseger, M. and Tobio, K. (2009). They point out that the greater density of population in cities is associated with greater inequality. The greater inequality, in turn, is associated with higher crime rates, less happiness, and slower income as well as population growth.

Using Gini coefficients as a measure of income inequality, with 0 indicating perfect equality and 1 indicating perfect inequality), US Census data (2009-13 ACS 5yr estimates, Table B19083) indicate that, in fact, there is greater inequality in Virginia's cities (Gini average: .45) than in the counties (Gini average:.42). This difference is statistically significant ( $z = 3.81$  vs. critical  $z(.05) = 1.96$ ). So, how does Lynchburg compare? Figure 11 indicates that Lynchburg's Gini coefficient of .50 is the highest by far of any of the localities in the expanded MSA region, the state, and the US. In fact, according to the US Census, there are only ten Virginia localities with higher Gini coefficients (Northampton County has the highest at 0.54). Such a result merits a closer look at the city level to see what is going on.

What does poverty and income look like at the city level? Short of door-to-door surveys, census tract data offers us the most convenient way to assess the distribution of economic benefits across the city. Lynchburg has 19 census tracts. Appendix A indicates the neighborhoods connected to each tract and reports tract-level data. Appendix B maps median household income levels by census tract. Tracts 2.03 and 14 are heavily dominated by the student populations of Lynchburg College and Liberty University, respectively, with the result that income measures especially, are biased downward (due to low student incomes)

Figure 12: Lynchburg Poverty Rate vs. Median Household Income by Census Tract (2009–2013)

Source: US Census, 2009-2013 ACS 5yr Estimates: Tables S1903 and S1701



and are also quite volatile year to year.<sup>14</sup> For these reasons, they are left out of the analysis.

Frequent reference will be made to the “downtown-oriented” census tracts 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 19, where, in general, poverty is highest, and incomes are lowest. These census tracts form an approximate triangle running from tract 4 (Daniel’s Hill, Rivermont) through the downtown business district (tract 5) southeast along the James River to tract 19 (Fairview Heights, Tyreanna, White Rock Hill, Winston Ridge), and then extending southwest through tracts 6 (College Hill, Garland Hill, and Tinbridge Hill) and 11 (Diamond Hill) to tract 7 (Dearington, Miller Park).

Census tract-level data on poverty and median household income are reported in Appendix A. The scatterplot in Figure 12 provides a clear picture of how poverty and income are distributed across Lynchburg’s census tracts. In general the downtown-oriented census tracts are associated with both higher poverty rates and lower levels of median household income. For example, census tract 5 (Downtown) has a poverty rate of 43.1 percent and a median household income of only \$14,118. Conversely, Lynchburg’s highest income census tract 2.01 (Boonsboro west and others) with a median household income of \$79,946 has a poverty rate of only 8.9 percent (US Census, 2009-13 ACS 5 yr estimates, Tables S1903 and S1701). A correlation coefficient of -0.75 ( $n = 17$ ,  $t = -4.4$ ) suggests that this inverse relationship holds rather strongly across all census tracts.

There are six census tracts with median household incomes less than \$30,000; all are downtown-oriented. Three of them, tracts 5, 6, and 19, are below the poverty threshold (\$23,834 for a family of four). It is instructive to note that across the downtown-oriented census tracts (4, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 19), 18.7 percent

14 The issue of Liberty University student population aside, tract 14 also contains the Montview neighborhood. In the absence of block-level data on income or poverty, assessed home values are a reasonable proxy for economic well-being. In the Montview neighborhood, the typical home value appears to be in the \$60,000 range (City Assessors Office).

of households (1,286 households) have income and benefits less than \$10,000. In tract 5 (Downtown), already noted as having the lowest income (\$14,118), 40.4 percent of its households have income and benefits less than \$10,000 (US Census, 2009-13 ACS 5 yr estimates, Table DP03). Unless one were experiencing it directly, I suspect that most of us would have difficulty relating to life in a household with income and benefits less than \$10,000.

A careful look at Figure 12, as well as the census map in Appendix B, indicates that there are only four census tracts with median household incomes above \$40,000. Tract 8.02 (Perrymont and Walden Pond) is alone in the \$40,000-49,999 range. Tracts 17 (Beverly Hills and others) and 1 (Boonsboro east and others) are in the \$50,000-59,999 range. There are no tracts in the \$60,000-69,999 range, and then there is tract 2.01 (Boonsboro west and others) at the top with a median household income of \$79,946. Seven tracts (3, 8.01, 9, 16, 18, 10, 2.02) are in the \$30,000-39,999 range, clustered around Lynchburg's median household income of \$38,138 (based on comparable US Census ACS 2009-13 5 yr estimates).

Regarding poverty, the six downtown-oriented census tracts, along with tracts 2.02, 8.01, 9, and 16, are either at or above Lynchburg's overall poverty rate of 24.7 percent (based on US Census 2009-13 ACS 5 yr estimates).<sup>15</sup> While poverty appears to be grounded in the downtown area, it clearly isn't limited to just there.

Census tracts are not groupings of homogenous households, rather, "census tracts are small, relatively permanent statistical subdivisions" [of a city, in this case], whose primary purpose "is to provide a stable set of geographic units for the presentation of statistical data" (US Census, Geography). With this in mind, it is instructive to take a deeper look at the nature of Lynchburg's poverty.

Consider the three *non*-downtown-oriented census tracts with above average poverty (2.02, 8.01, 16). US Census statistics reveal the lack of homogeneity. While census tract 2.02 (with a poverty rate of 25.6 percent) has 338 households with income and benefits greater than \$100,000, it also has 410 households with income and benefits *less than* \$10,000. In census tract 8.01 (with a poverty rate of 32 percent), there are 32 households with income and benefits greater than \$100,000, but it also has 154 households with income and benefits *less than* \$10,000. Finally, census tract 16 (with a poverty rate of 40.7 percent, the second highest in the city) has 419 households with income and benefits greater than \$100,000, but it also has 453 households with income and benefits *less than* \$10,000. Many of census tract 16's low income households may be students. 40 percent of Liberty University resident students (12,600) live off campus. 40 percent represents 5,040 off-campus students, many of whom, like most students, are likely to be low income (Personal communication with Lynchburg City Manager Kimball Payne).

<sup>15</sup> Tract 4 (Daniels Hill, Rivermont) is just slightly below Lynchburg's average at 24.3 percent.

To the extent that many have chosen to live close to campus across Wards Road in the many apartments located in the eastern portion of tract 16, they may contribute to the above average poverty rates in that tract.

Few census tracts in the city are more complex and heterogeneous than the downtown-oriented tracts 6 and 11. Census tract 6, with a poverty rate of 34.5 percent and a median household income of \$21,575, consists of the following (historical) neighborhoods: College Hill, Garland Hill, and Tinbridge Hill. Without supporting evidence from block-level census data, one can only assume that the inclusion of Garland Hill puts downward pressure on an already high poverty rate, and puts upward pressure on an already low median household income. Indirect evidence of the potentially vast differences in poverty and income among the three neighborhoods comes from assessed property values of single family homes. In Garland Hill there is an upscale four block stretch of homes (1<sup>st</sup> to 5<sup>th</sup> Streets) along Madison Street with an average assessed value of \$288,744 (values range from \$113,600 to \$673,800). No homes in Tinbridge Hill begin to approach the lower end of the Garland Hill range; some are below \$10,000. Many are in the \$30,000 - \$50,000 range. A handful of homes in College Hill are above \$100,000, but most are valued similarly to Tinbridge Hill (Lynchburg City Assessor).

Census tract 11, Diamond Hill, has a poverty rate of 29.4 percent and a median household income of only \$25,197. The impact of the upscale Washington Street corridor on the economic well-being of Diamond Hill is similar to that of the impact of the Madison St. corridor of Garland Hill on census tract 6. In the three block stretch of Washington Street (south of Church St.) the average assessed home value is \$288,744 (values range from \$117,700 to \$631,500). Homes on either side of Washington Street (Clay St., Madison St., Pearl St., Harrison St.) have an average assessed value of \$170,771 (values range from \$43,600 to \$504,300). For homes south of Harrison Street, though, values drop off precipitously. Three blocks away, homes with assessed values of under \$10,000 are not uncommon (Lynchburg City Assessor).

I offer brief comment on inequality at the census tract level. Gini coefficients exist at the tract level, but for Lynchburg they offer only statistically inconclusive evidence on well-being. While the census tracts with the highest poverty rates and lowest median household incomes are all clustered in the upper half of the Gini distribution (those with Gini indexes 0.44 and above), leading one to conclude that greater inequality at the census tract level is associated with greater poverty and lower income, there are also anomalies. The two highest income census tracts (1 and 2.01) are also in this upper half of the Gini distribution. Conversely, the third highest income census tract, tract 17, has a Gini coefficient of only 0.35, the second lowest. The correlation of Gini with median household income is only -0.281 (N = 17, t = -1.13). The correlation of Gini with poverty is only slightly stronger at 0.40 (N = 17, t = 1.69).

## Drivers of Poverty

So, where does Lynchburg's relative poverty and/or low income come from? The following factors are considered: education, single-parent vs. married households, race, and labor market conditions. Where possible, these factors will be examined at the census tract level.

Research across the board indicates that the higher the level of education in the U.S., the higher income one can expect. For example, data from the US Department of Education suggest that (in 2009) a high school dropout will earn only \$19,540 per year on average, a high school graduate will earn \$27,380, and a college graduate will earn \$46,930 (Alliance, 2011). Education Counts reports earnings "24 percent higher for those with a tertiary education compared to those with only upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education" (Education Counts, 2013). The relationship between education and poverty is complex. A recent study reported in *Education Week* (Sparks, October 22, 2013) indicates rising numbers of public school students (nearly half) living in poverty. A summary analysis of this study and another from the National Student Clearinghouse Research Center (indicating that poverty is the best predictor of college attendance and completion) in *USA Today* suggests that the "list of solutions is strikingly short. Other than picking a kid's parents, it amounts to giving all children access to a high quality education." It indicates that there is a "catch-22" at work: "While the only long-term solution to poverty might be a good education, a good education is seldom available to children living in poverty" (Thomas, December 10, 2013).

Lynchburg has an on-time high school graduation rate of 81.2 percent. It lags behind the expanded MSA localities (88.3 percent average not including Lynchburg) and the state of Virginia (89.9 percent). On-time high school graduation rates range across the state from a low of 75.5 percent in Danville to 100 percent in Clarke County. Conversely, Lynchburg's drop-out rate of 8.8 percent is higher than any of the expanded MSA localities (5 percent average not including Lynchburg), and also the state of Virginia (5.4 percent). Drop-out rates range across the state from a high of 14.9 percent in Rockbridge County to 0.0 percent in both West Point and Clarke County (Virginia Department of Education, Virginia Cohort Reports).


Using high school graduation at the census tract level as a proxy for educational attainment is quite revealing, as it correlates strongly with both poverty and income. Tract-level high school graduation rate data is reported in Appendix A (US Census, 2009-13 ACS 5 yr estimates, Table DP02). Figure 13 presents a scatterplot of the percentage of the population 25 years and over with a high school degree or higher and poverty across Lynchburg's census tracts. There is a wide dispersion of the high school graduation rate numbers, with all of the downtown-oriented census tracts situated in the upper left of the scatterplot (with high school graduation percentages ranging only from 62.1 to 79.7 percent) and the higher income/lower poverty tracts such as 1, 2.01, and 17 situated in the lower right (with graduation percentages ranging from 97.3 to 94.8 percent). The correlation coefficient between the percentage of the

population 25 years and over with a high school degree or higher and poverty across Lynchburg's census tracts is  $-0.66$  ( $n = 17$ ,  $t = -3.41$ )<sup>16</sup> Recall that census tract 16 has the second highest poverty rate in the city (40.7 percent), yet it is most likely home to a sizeable percentage of university students. To the extent this is the case, it is therefore not surprising that it has one of the higher high school graduation percentages in the city (92.4 percent). If it is left out of the calculations, the correlation coefficient increases to  $-0.81$  ( $n = 17$ ,  $t = -5.42$ ).

Family composition matters when it comes to poverty and

*Figure 13: Lynchburg High School Degree Holders vs. Poverty Rate, By Census Tract (2009-2013)*

Source: US Census, 2009-2013 ACS 5yr Estimates: Tables DP02 and S1701



income. Single mothers with dependent children have the highest poverty rate across all demographics. 60 percent of children in mother-only families are impoverished vs. 11 percent in two-parent families (Kirby 1995). See also Lerman (2002, p.1). According to Casey and Maldonado (2012) single-parent families fare worse than married families:

*They have the highest poverty rate. They have the highest rate of no health care coverage. They face the stingiest income support system. They lack the paid-time-off-from-work entitlements that in comparison countries make it easier for single parents to balance caregiving and jobholding. They must wait longer than single parents in comparison countries for early childhood education to begin. They have a low rate of child support receipt (p.1).*

Figure 14 provides evidence on this. Nationwide, the median income gap between married-couple families and female family householders (no husband present) is \$46,500 (40.3 percent female relative to married). For Virginia, the gap is \$54,584 (40.3 percent). For Lynchburg, while the actual dollar gap is smaller: \$43,558, the percentage difference is far smaller: 33.3 percent. In the highest income census tract, 2.01 (Boonsboro west and others), on a dollar basis, the gap is extremely wide: \$72,902 (35.4 percent). Of all Lynchburg's census tracts, tract 11 (Diamond Hill), has the most extreme gap. Female family house-


<sup>16</sup> The correlation coefficient between the percentage of the adult population with a high school degree or higher and median household income is 0.83 ( $n = 17$ ,  $t = 5.71$ ).

holders (no husband present) only earn \$9,489, a gap of 17.3% (or \$45,136) relative to married-couple families. Of Lynchburg's 16,060 families, 68.5 percent are married couple families and 24.8 percent are headed by female householders (no husband present).<sup>17</sup> In tract 11, however, only 49.1 percent of families are married-couple families, while 39.6 percent are headed by female householders (no husband present).<sup>18</sup> Interestingly, there are three tracts where the percentages of families headed by female householders (no husband present) are higher: tract 5 (59.4 percent), tract 6 (55.2 percent) and tract 19 (50.6 percent), but the income gaps are not as extreme as tract 11<sup>19</sup> (US Census, 2009-13 ACS 5 yr estimates, Table S1903). Tract-level data on female family householder (with no husband present) is reported in Appendix A.

The scatterplot below (Figure 15) illustrates that family compo-

**Figure 14: Median Income, Married Couple Families vs. Female Family Householder, No Husband Present (2009–2013)**

Source: US Census, 2009-2013 ACS 5yr Estimates: Table S1903



sition makes a substantial difference in terms of poverty across Lynchburg's census tracts. The census tracts with the largest percentages of female family householders with no husband present are all clustered in the downtown area (tracts 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 19). The percentages across the city range from a high of 59.4 percent in tract 5 (Downtown) to a low of only 6.7 percent in tract 2.01 (Boonsboro west and others). The correlation coefficient of female householder with no husband present and poverty indicates a significantly strong positive correlation: 0.84 (n = 17, t = 5.99).<sup>20</sup>

Like family composition, there are a number of studies suggesting that race matters when it comes to poverty and income (Gilman, 2011, Turner, 2013, and Weller, Ajinka and Farrell, 2012). According to the US Census, in Lynchburg, the percentage of blacks<sup>21</sup> relative to the total population, 28.5 percent, is higher

17 Lynchburg: 6.7 percent of families are headed by male householders.

18 Tract 11: 11.3 percent of families are headed by male householders.


19 In census tract 5 median income is not broken down between married families and female family householders.

20 The correlation coefficient of female householder with no husband present and median household income indicates a significantly strong negative correlation: -0.88 (n = 17, t = -7.06).

21 US Census publications use the expressions black and African American interchangeably.

**Figure 15: Female Family Householder vs. Poverty Rate, By Census Tract (2009–2013)**

Source: US Census, 2009-2013 ACS 5yr Estimates: Tables S1903 and S1701




than the expanded MSA region (ranging from Bedford County at only 5.8 percent to Bedford City at 23 percent), the state (18.6 percent), and the nation (12 percent). On the other hand, as Figure 16 shows, black median household income in Lynchburg as a percent of white median household income, at 55% percent (\$24,609 black vs. \$44,684 white), is lower than the expanded MSA region with the exception of Bedford City (42 percent),<sup>22</sup> the state (64 percent: \$43,885 black vs. \$68,977 white), or the nation as a whole (63 percent: \$35,415 black vs. \$56,300 white). The other MSA localities range from Amherst at 60 percent to Nelson County at 97 percent. As with other statistics, Lynchburg does not have the worst black median household income numbers: there are 17 reporting cities or counties with lower black median household incomes, with Buchanan County having the lowest at \$8,229 (US Census, 2009-13, ACS 5 yr estimates, Table S1903).

In terms of absolute poverty numbers in Lynchburg, according to the US Census the numbers of whites and blacks who are

**Figure 15: Median Household Income, White vs. Black (2009–2013)**


Source: US Census, 2009-2013 ACS 5yr Estimates: Table S1903



22 Bedford City's income numbers aggregated by race are apparently quite volatile. Using Census 2008-12 ACS data, the ratio of black to white income was 61 percent. For the ratio to have fallen by nearly 20 percentage points can be understood only by recognizing that the margin of error for black income of +/- 17,150 is actually greater than the reported income itself (\$16,694).

Figure 17: Lynchburg, Black Percentage of Population vs. Poverty Rate, By Census Tract (2009–2013)

Source: US Census, 2009–2013 ACS 5yr Estimates: Tables S1903 and S1701



below the poverty level are not dramatically different: Blacks: 6,964, Whites: 8,037. The differences are starker when expressed as percentages: Lynchburg’s black poverty rate is 34.7 percent; its white poverty rate is 19.0 percent (US Census, 2009–13 ACS 5 yr estimates, Table S1701).


At the census tract level, US Census data suggests that race does matter when it comes to poverty. Across Lynchburg’s census tracts white poverty rates exceed Lynchburg’s average poverty rate of 24.6 percent in only five tracts (5, 7, 8.01, 16, and 19). Black poverty rates exceed Lynchburg’s average poverty rate in *all but* four tracts (2.01, 8.02, 17, and 18), with census tract 8.01 having the highest black poverty rate of 50.4 percent, another reminder that poverty in Lynchburg is not limited to the downtown area. In terms of absolute poverty, in all of the downtown census tracts absolute black poverty exceeds that of absolute white poverty. Across the downtown census tracts (4, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 19), the population of blacks classified as poor totals 3,769; the population of whites totals 1,539, a 2.4 to 1 ratio (US Census, 2009–13 ACS 5 yr estimates, Table S1701).

Data on the black percentage of the population at the census tract level is reported in Appendix A. The numbers range from tract 6 (College Hill, Garland Hill, Tinbridge Hill) with 84.4 percent to tract 1 (Boonsboro east and others) with only 6.0 percent. Figure 17 indicates a significantly positive correlation of the black percent of the census tract population with poverty (Correlation coefficient = 0.59,  $n = 17$ ,  $t = 2.85$ ).<sup>23</sup> The plot makes it clear that the census tracts with the highest black population percentages are clustered in the downtown area (in the upper right portion of the scatterplot), coinciding approximately with the highest poverty rates. The census tracts with the highest incomes (1, 2.01, and 17) also have the lowest percentages of blacks and (with one exception, tract 18) the lowest poverty rates. They are located at the lower left portion of the scatterplot.

<sup>23</sup> There is a significantly negative correlation of the black percent of the census tract population with median household income (Correlation coefficient = -0.75,  $n = 17$ ,  $t = 4.34$ ). Also, if tract 16, with its probable large college student population, is left out of the poverty correlation calculation, the correlation coefficient rises to .72 ( $n = 17$ ,  $t = 4.05$ ).

Figure 18: Lynchburg Unemployment Rate and Employment (2001–2013)

Source: Kids Count Data Center, BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics, BLS QCEW State and County Map



In the six downtown-oriented census tracts (4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 19), black median household income averages just \$20,852, with income in tract 5 only \$9,401. Blacks living outside the downtown area tend to fare better, however, there are only three census tracts (8.02, 16, and 17) in which black median household income exceeds Lynchburg’s overall median household income of \$38,138 (US Census 2009–13 ACS 5 yr estimates, Table S1903).

The final driver of poverty to be considered is the labor market. Nichols and Callan (2013) point out the seemingly obvious, “Poverty is higher among the unemployed.” UC Davis’ Center for Poverty research notes that reforms of our welfare system in 1996 and the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit have made employment the “cornerstone of American anti-poverty policy.” A study for the Urban Institute indicates that job losses, loss of overtime pay, limited wage growth, or pay cuts during a recession affect the most basic measure of family well-being: income (Acs 2008, p. 2).

Figure 18 examines employment and unemployment rate (annual average) data for Lynchburg from 2001 through 2013 (most recent year available for annual employment data) (BLS QCEW State and County Map, BLS Local area unemployment statistics, and Kids Count). During this period, the nation and the city of Lynchburg both experienced two economic downturns, the first being the milder downturn of 2001, and the second, the Great Recession of 2008–9. From 2001 to 2003, Lynchburg lost 3,295 jobs and the unemployment rate, which had been close to its long-term average of 5.2 percent, increased to over 6 percent. In the recovery that followed, employment experienced steady increases, adding over 5800 jobs from the trough to the 2008 peak, while the unemployment rate fell to below 4 percent. Thereafter, the bottom fell out of the job market in Lynchburg as more than 5100 jobs were lost in just two years. The annual unemployment rate soared to 8.5 percent in 2010 (after first spiking in June 2009 at 9.5 percent) and had only fallen to 7.1 percent through 2013. Job recovery has been slow. From the trough in 2010, only 521 jobs had been created through 2013.

To put this in perspective, over a period (2001 – 2013) when Lynchburg’s population grew by nearly 20 percent, there was

a net employment loss of 2,118 jobs. At the time of writing, according to the latest data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve, Lynchburg's unemployment rate has continued to decline from its June 2009 high of 9.5 percent and stood in December 2014 at 5.5 percent, slightly above its long term average of 5.2 percent. (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research. FRED). Improving labor conditions should help with general economic well-being. For example, statistically significant correlation coefficients for the temporal relationships between the unemployment rate and real median household income (-0.79,  $n = 17$ ,  $t = 4.99$ ), and employment and real median household income (0.50,  $n = 17$ ,  $t = 2.24$ ), suggest that this should be the case.


The latest US Census ACS 5-year estimates (2009-13) begin one year into the start of the Great Recession and extend through the slow recovery period. Tract-level unemployment rates reported in Appendix A indicate that unemployment is not experienced equally across Lynchburg's census tracts. 12 of 19 tracts (or 10 of 17 if we leave out tracts 2.03 and 14) experienced unemployment rates greater than 9 percent. This includes all of the downtown oriented census tracts. Three tracts (6, 7, and 19) experienced unemployment rates greater than 20 percent, while three other tracts (1, 8.01, and 17) had unemployment rates of less than 5 percent, with a rate of only 2.1 percent in tract 17 (US Census, 2009-13, ACS 5 yr estimates, Table DP03).

Finally, Figure 19 indicates a significantly positive correlation between the unemployment rate and poverty (Correlation coefficient = 0.59,  $n = 17$ ,  $t = 2.80$ ).<sup>24</sup> The plot reveals a by now familiar story whereby unemployment and poverty are concentrated for the most part in the downtown oriented census tracts (though not limited to just this part of the city) while higher income tracts such as 1, 2.01, and 17 have low unemployment and low poverty.

Reflecting back over all the many statistics on hunger and poverty in Lynchburg, we're forced to conclude the following:

*Figure 19: Lynchburg, Unemployment vs. Poverty Rate, By Census Tract (2009-2013)*

Source: US Census, 2009-2013 ACS 5yr Estimates: Tables DP03 and S1701



<sup>24</sup> There is a significantly negative correlation between the unemployment rate and median household income (Correlation coefficient = -0.59,  $n = 17$ ,  $t = -2.84$ ).

If someone is, in fact, hungry and poor in Lynchburg, then the odds are great that that person is likely to live in the downtown area; they might even be among the 18.7 percent of the households in the six downtown-oriented census tracts with annual income and benefits less than \$10,000. The odds are better for people living downtown, relative to the suburbs, that they would have, at most, a high school degree, that they might be black, and that they might be an unmarried female head of household. The odds are also better for those living in the downtown area that they might find themselves unemployed. The low income would conspire to make it difficult to have easy access to affordable and nutritious food on a regular basis, thus reinforcing the problem of hunger and poverty.

## FOOD SOLUTIONS

So, how do we transition from sobering statistics on hunger and poverty in Lynchburg to solutions? For starters, it is useful to recognize that when one is hungry in the U.S., it is generally not from a lack of food. As noted, a lack of food is only the proximate cause of the hunger. Poverty is likely to be the ultimate cause. Creative solutions need to address this ultimate causal problem. Which brings us to food...

Thinking about food as a solution to poverty (as opposed to hunger) is a relatively new concept. Public conversations about food in the past (regarding hunger or poverty), were generally focused on charity: Bread lines in the 1930s, soup kitchens and food pantries in the 1980s. The conversation shifted in the 2000s with the publication of books like *Fast Food Nation* (2001) and *Omnivore's Dilemma* (2006). They exposed new concerns: tainted food, consumer health, worker safety, animal welfare, organic production, and sustainability. The conversation continues to evolve. There is now concern over food deserts, food access, community food systems, local sourcing, and more (Abell et al. 2011; Cornell; Treuhaft and Karpyn 2010). Much less attention, though, has been focused on food as a direct solution to the problem of poverty. Food retail in low-income neighborhoods is one possible source of poverty reduction through its employment multiplier impacts, but, as Treuhaft and Karpyn (2010) note, this "is an area of relatively limited research" (p. 19).

In the context of studies indicating the importance of local economies for restoring the environment and community well-being (Berry 2001; McKibben 2007), local food as the centerpiece of sustainable economic development is receiving more and more attention. Meter (2008) suggests "local foods may be the best path for promoting community economic development." According to Schwartz and Zimmler (2013), when neighborhoods lack access to healthy food, "it is an indication of "lagging economic and community development." In *The 25% Shift*, Masi, Schaller, and Shuman (2010) suggest that a shift of that magnitude in the direction of local food sustainability (i.e., 25 percent) is a "powerful economic development strategy" that offers the following benefits: "stronger community economies, ecological sustainability, better nutrition and health, and more civic engagement" (pp. 1-2).

In our highly specialized, supply-chain/logistics-driven, global world, a localized food economy seems quaint. We are told of the economic efficiency and logic of free trade; that being able to eat strawberries and asparagus year round, regardless of where those foods come from, or at what cost to the environment, is a desirable state of affairs. Masi, Schaller, and Shuman remind us, though, of the obvious: “Every loaf of bread unnecessarily imported means the leakage of bread dollars outside the local economy and the loss of local bread business that could contribute to the regional prosperity” (p. 1). They suggest that the case for a locally-oriented food economy is compelling:

*Locally owned businesses spend more of their money regionally than do comparable non-local businesses. Local businesses tend to have local CEOs, advertise in local media, hire local accountants and attorneys, and reinvest profits in their community. Studies suggest that a dollar spent at a local business yields two to four times the ‘economic multiplier’—the underlying source of income, wealth, and jobs—as an equivalent non-local business (pp. 1-2).*

In making the case for ecological sustainability, they make a strong case for a locally-oriented food economy. “Any community on the planet that cannot sustainably feed itself necessarily places burdens on the ability of other communities seeking to feed themselves” (p. 2). In February (2015), in the dead of a harsh winter, at our local Kroger, kale from Santa Cruz, California (in 5 oz. plastic containers) sold for \$3 (\$9.60/lb). At the Lynchburg Community Market, Goldman Farms was selling kale at \$2.25/lb. Despite recent rains, California, including Santa Cruz County, is suffering through the fourth year of what is classified as a *severe drought*. It is not clear as to why we should purchase over-priced kale that has traveled over 2300 miles in a container made of petroleum-based products from a part of the country that is rapidly depleting its water table, when fresh, local, organic kale is available at the local market. Lynchburg could sustainably feed itself—or, at least move 25 percent closer to that goal—if it took the idea of a local food economy seriously.

Likewise, in making the case for better nutrition and health, Masi, Schaller, and Shuman again make the case for a locally-oriented food economy. They draw upon USDA studies to suggest a) that Americans need to eat healthier foods, but b) “there is presently not enough healthy food grown domestically to meet this need” (p. 3). But, what looks like a roadblock to better health might actually be an opportunity to expand our local food economies. Pollan (2008) suggests that growing more of our own food will require *more* farmers, as opposed to the current trend of using more chemicals and machines. Recall that since 2001 Lynchburg has experienced a net job loss of 2118 jobs. Some of Lynchburg’s census tracts still have unemployment rates over 20 percent. But, how could urban unemployment be part of that opportunity to expand the local food economy?

According to Masi, Schaller, and Shuman, a “local food revolu-

tion” has come to places like Cleveland and Youngstown (the focal cities of their study) in a “major way”. In doing so, it has begun to address the simultaneous problems of unemployment, vacant land, and food deserts. Their unemployment rates were high even before the Great Recession (8 percent), and grew to 12.2 percent and 15.3 percent respectively in 2010. A 25 percent shift could put as many as one in eight unemployed residents back to work (p. 64). At Lynchburg’s scale, one in eight would mean an additional 800 people back on the job.

The local food revolution in Cleveland and Youngstown began with the expansion of community gardens and urban farms in the hopes of creating jobs and putting nutritious food within reach of the disadvantaged. Dozens of programs (e.g., Summer Spout, City Fresh, Cleveland Crops, Cleveland Corner Store Project, Goodness Grows, and Flying High) sprung up over the years. Many of these programs kept the most vulnerable citizens in mind: “Farms are being equipped with all kinds of innovative social service programs, including community mental health treatment, drug and alcohol addiction recovery, youth entrepreneurship, nutritional education, and preventative health care” (pp. 23-4).

Local restaurants have gotten in on the act too. Masi, Schaller, and Shuman indicate that in Cleveland “about 25 independently owned restaurants now feature locally grown ingredients as a major part of their menu” (p. 24). One set of relationships illustrates the possibilities when buying local is taken seriously:

*The Great Lakes Brewing Company operates a restaurant and micro-brewery, buys its beer ingredients from local farms, operates its own Pint Size Farm in the Cuyahoga Valley, and has recently invested in the Ohio City Fresh Food Collaborative’s six-acre farm. A number of local farms also use spent grains from Great Lakes to feed livestock or refurbish soils (p. 24).*

Also in Youngstown, a non-profit community development agency, Common Wealth Inc. recently opened the Common Wealth Kitchen Incubator, a “shared-use commercial kitchen” that aims to “lower the cost of starting or expanding local food businesses,” along with providing aggregation services to local farmers and end users (Business Journal, 2013, and personal communication with Ben Shapiro, incubator manager, March 4, 2014). It is this aggregation service (a food hub) that plays the absolutely critical role of linking together local farmers and local end-users: hospitals, restaurants, and even retail consumers. Without the efficiencies and economies of scale that come with aggregation services, attempts to localize food economies will face the difficulties of higher costs and logistical hurdles.

These examples of creative approaches to local food remind us that the idea of community gardening or urban farming is not just an afterthought to the primary goal of obtaining the services of a grocery store to serve the needs of food desert communities. According to Ben Shapiro, underserved communities oftentimes don’t have the capital to even think about a grocery store. Grocery stores departed long ago because they didn’t view poor communities as good investments. Even if one

were located nearby, there is no guarantee (unless there was strong community and city leadership) that any of the income generated from its operation would stay in the community or that residents would necessarily have better health outcomes. Many of the creative projects noted above in Cleveland and Youngstown came about as survival strategies among individuals and communities for whom the mainstream economy did not serve them well. There may be real wealth in a community, but it isn't necessarily embodied in the form of financial assets. There may be real solutions in a community—gardening, farming, and organization skills—but, they simply need to be valued properly. Trade might take place with hours and effort serving as currency, rather than money.

Nevertheless, in conversations with residents living in a food desert, the thing they say that is missing most in their communities is not a community garden, but rather a grocery store (Sewell 2008). If done right, grocery stores can be local job creators. As Treuhart and Karpyn (2010) point out, "Grocery stores and supermarkets are also economic (high-volume) anchors in a neighborhood—supplying local jobs and creating foot traffic for additional businesses" (p.11). "When new food retailers enter areas that were previously under-retailed, they can bring viability to urban neighborhoods' commercial real estate markets, and can change perceptions that economically distressed urban areas are undesirable places to operate businesses" (p. 20). In Philadelphia it was noted that "the values of homes located within one-quarter to one-half mile of new supermarkets increase by four to seven percent (an average of \$1,500) after the stores open, mitigating the downward trend in real estate values" (p. 20). This outcome was the result of the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative, a statewide public-private effort that led to the development of 78 supermarkets in underserved areas. 4,800 jobs were created, the "vast majority" (75 percent) of which were filled by residents living within three miles of their workplace. Adding in multiplier effects, it was estimated that the opening of a single store led to the eventual creation of 660 (direct and indirect) jobs (p. 20).

The decision to locate a new grocery store in a neighborhood should be carefully thought-out, taking into consideration not only profitability, but externalities such as public health, food waste, and environmental impact. Simply "placing a Wal-Mart or Kroger on every inner-city corner" is not the answer to the issue of food deserts and related public health problems like hunger, obesity, and diabetes (Cook, 2006, p. 24). On this point, the *Los Angeles Times* states that "grocery stores are brimming with choices that are every bit as fattening as fast-food meals" (Hernandez, 2011, July 17). Furthermore, Stuart (2009, esp. Ch. 2) and Bloom (2010, esp. Ch. 7) suggest that supermarkets—extremely powerful players in the global food supply chain—are major contributors to food waste and thus contributors to global warming.

Rebecca Flournoy (2006) points out there are, in fact, viable alternatives to the national grocery chains and their associated problems; stores that can operate as "good neighbors" in former food deserts. She identified a number of cities where

a variety of public-private partnerships have resulted in the provision of "high quality, affordable shopping to formerly distressed communities." San Francisco's Good Neighbor Program, for example, helped to develop criteria that define "good store neighbors":

*including devoting at least 10 percent of inventory to fresh produce and an additional 10 to 20 percent of inventory to other healthy foods, accepting food stamps, limiting tobacco and alcohol promotion and adhering to environmental and health standards. Stores [complying] with these criteria would receive technical assistance and training, energy efficiency upgrades, marketing assistance and grants to make initial purchases of healthy foods and to test how the items sell.*

The discussion so far about urban farming/community gardening, on the one hand, and grocery stores on the other, would suggest that solutions to the food desert problem and to problems of poverty reduction and economic development need to fall into one category or the other. As the following example suggests, multi-faceted approaches exist that bring the best of all those worlds together.

The ReFresh Project in New Orleans addresses multiple community needs (Schwartz and Zimble, 2013). Located in a "historically underserved" neighborhood, it hopes to restore economic health to the community drawing upon food-related infrastructure. The anchor supermarket, Whole Foods, intends to stock its store in part with foods from as many as 75 local producers. As part of its new Whole Cities Foundation, its commitment to the ReFresh Project is educational. It hopes to promote: "Healthy eating, how to shop on a budget, how to cook with limited time, and how to cook with maximum nutritional value" (Sayre, 2014, February 4). The non-profit Liberty's Kitchen has a dual purpose of providing at-risk youth culinary and life-skills training, as well as providing healthy made-from-scratch meals for low-income school children. Tulane University's Centre for Culinary Medicine, offers "a first-of-its kind teaching kitchen for community members, medical students, and practicing professionals. Finally, there is the ReFresh Community Farm Collective; its mission is to create a space "where neighborhood folks can come to learn to grow food and be connected with a space to grow for themselves." (Broad Community Connections).

Beyond the realm of urban farming and retail grocery, DC Central Kitchen (DCCK), for example, offers a glimpse of what is possible when we think of food as a solution to the problem of poverty, rather than just as a solution to the immediate problem of hunger. Although DCCK prepares 5000 meals a day to be served to the poor, it is not a soup kitchen; rather it is a poverty fighting *social enterprise* that uses food as its primary weapon in that fight. "Through job training, healthy food distribution, and local farm partnerships, DCCK offers path-breaking solutions to poverty, hunger, and poor health" (DC Central Kitchen)

DC Central Kitchen's Culinary Job Training Program exists specifically to address the root causes of hunger. As they say,

“solving the immediate problem of hunger is only fighting half of the battle.” Thus, the goal of the program is to “prepare unemployed, underemployed, previously incarcerated persons, and homeless adults for careers in the food service industry.” Since its inception 1000 men and women have graduated from the program. With an 85 percent job placement rate, Culinary Job Training Program graduates are employed all around the DC area in various restaurants.

Another example: Inspiration Corporation’s 13-week food-service training program “provides skill specific training and employment placement in an atmosphere of dignity and respect for people facing barriers to self-sufficiency” (Inspiration Kitchens). Those barriers include problems with alcohol and drug abuse, or criminal backgrounds. Students gain hands-on culinary experience at two social enterprise restaurants—Inspiration Kitchens—in Chicago. For patrons, the dining experience is comparable to other fine Chicago restaurants, but when they pay their tabs they are helping to fund the training experiences of the students (in the kitchen and among the wait staff) working hard to improve their life horizons.

The poor often find themselves caught in the *exacerbatory dynamic of poverty*: “the people in society who face the greatest structural adversity, far from mitigating this by their lifestyles, behave in such ways as to make it worse, even when they are provided with the opportunity to do otherwise” Nettle (2010, p. 1). Unending poverty yields hopelessness, resignation, and a way of life. It takes something significant to break the cycle. Rather than merely providing the poor with information or exhorting behavioral change, “reducing structural inequities will reap a double dividend.” Providing someone caught up in the exacerbatory dynamic of poverty with marketable culinary skills, for example, helps to reduce that structural inequity.

The examples presented so far are heartening; and, there are many more of them fortunately. Bill McKibben might refer to them, as he does in *Deep Economy* (2007) as a series of *points*, each one individually making wonderful contributions to its local community, but still outside of the mainstream. If a food movement consisting of points such as these is to really change our ways of thinking and to lead to sustainable economic development, then the movement will have to “sink significant roots” (p. 142).

Significant roots will be sunk when the community-wide culture comes to truly appreciate food; when it recognizes that there is nothing more important we do for ourselves everyday than make decisions about what we eat and where and how that food comes to us. The existing food culture in the United States, though—based on government-subsidized, factory farmed, processed, low cost, fast foods—results in well-documented health outcomes: obesity, diabetes, hypertension, etc. The alternative, a food culture that appreciates the benefits of produce grown in community gardens, or that supports locally-owned grocery stores that buy locally, sustainably grown and seasonally appropriate food, hires its workforce from the neighborhood, doesn’t carry tobacco products, and so on, will

likely require a lot of education.

Where better to begin that education, if not at home, than in our public schools. Here is what Alice Waters, owner of the famous Chez Panisse restaurant, recommends:

*What we are calling for is a revolution in public education... When the hearts and minds of our children are captured by a school lunch curriculum, enriched with experience in the garden, sustainability will become the lens through which they see the world* (Edible Schoolyard Project).

She helped put that idea to work through her hands-on involvement with Berkeley, California’s Martin Luther King, Jr. Middle School in what has come to be called the Edible Schoolyard Berkeley project:

*The mission...is to teach essential life skills and support academic learning through hands-on classes in a one-acre organic garden and kitchen classroom. The Edible Schoolyard curriculum is fully integrated into the school day and teaches students how their choices about food affect their health, the environment, and their communities* (Edible Schoolyard Project).

A similar integrated curriculum is on the way at Southern Philadelphia High School which has planned a rooftop farm as part of a plan to take the school from “gray to green.” It offers students a chance to “escape the classroom and engage in hands-on learning, while nearby residents will gain access to fresh produce and new green space” (AN Blog). In fact, urban population pressures may someday force us to add the concept of *vertical* to our thinking about food. Eagle Street Rooftop, for example, is a 6,000 square foot organic vegetable farm located on a warehouse rooftop farm in Greenpoint, Brooklyn. It operates a CSA (Community Supported Agriculture) and sells produce to local restaurants. In addition to two owners, it employs four staff members including an educational outreach coordinator. As such it is in a position to offer educational, apprenticeship, and volunteer programs to the community (Eagle Street).

So these many examples indicate that it is, in fact, possible to use food in creative ways to address poverty and economic development around the country. It is finally time to turn our attention to what is going on in Lynchburg. What food solutions are already in place? What more could be done?

## LYNCHBURG

For cities like Cleveland and Youngstown to pursue a 25 percent shift in the direction of local food sustainability seems a logical thing to do given their embrace of local healthy foods<sup>25</sup>, and also the abundance of available urban plots suitable for farming or gardening. Lynchburg, while it experienced urban flight in the 1960s and 1970s for sure, did not experience the emptying out of its core population to the extent Cleveland

25 Cleveland has been ranked #1 in the country for local food and agriculture by the environmental website SustainLane.

and Youngstown did. It, therefore, does not have endless available city parcels or abandoned properties to convert to farms or gardens.<sup>26</sup> There are some though, but they are small and scattered about the city. There exists a single urban farm, Lynchburg Grows, and also a suburban farm, Three Springs Farm. They both make valuable contributions to the local food economy.

The non-profit Lynchburg Grows farms 6.8 acres in mid-town with a mission similar to some of the urban farms in Cleveland and Youngstown. It aspires to “help all disadvantaged persons enjoy the healthy benefits of gardening and have access to such spaces” (Lynchburg Grows). In addition to a CSA, a mobile produce van<sup>27</sup>, community outreach, and programs for school children, it has a vocational training program for disabled and low-income individuals. Finally, it owns a handful of urban parcels suitable for conversion to community gardens. One of those parcels in the Daniel’s Hill neighborhood has, in fact, been successfully transformed into a community garden the residents call *The Veggie Spot*.

At Three Springs Farm, over two acres of land is farmed using pesticide-free pest management techniques, buried-drip irrigation, crop rotation, and cover crop practices. It is among the few farms represented at the Community Market year round. Such attention to detail makes it possible for Lynchburg residents to pursue a diet based on foods that are local, sustainable, and seasonal.

Creating other local farms of such scale is unlikely unless city parks are converted. Community gardens, though, have more upside potential; there exist a number sprinkled about the city ranging from Tinbridge Hill (44,000 sq. ft.) to the more modest-sized Daniel’s Hill garden (1800 sq. ft.). The supply of properties that could be converted to community gardens still exceeds the demand for them. But this status-quo is changing. The Lynchburg Area Food Council recently obtained grant money to fund the development of community gardens. Six community groups (churches, schools, and neighborhood organizations) made successful bids. The city has begun to take seriously its role in facilitating the transfer and use of those public properties that are available for community gardens. Guidelines for proper use are being debated as of the time of this writing. Also, Habitat for Humanity has over 40 parcels designated for home construction, some of which could be redesignated for community gardens.

Beyond community gardens, for Lynchburg to consider seriously a transition to a localized food economy, greater integration with the regional farm economy will be needed. The national “farm-to-table” movement<sup>28</sup> whose goal is to keep as much of the production, transportation, value-added, distribution,

<sup>26</sup> Lynchburg city manager Kimball Payne indicates that there are a number of brownfields sites in Lynchburg, especially in the downtown area, but that they are privately held.

<sup>27</sup> A second mobile produce van service to the city has been recently introduced by Community Market vendor Jeffrey Robey.

<sup>28</sup> The Lynchburg area has a Land and Table networking/advocacy group. <http://landandtable.com/>.

and consumption as possible confined to the local food shed is making inroads in Lynchburg which is surrounded by agricultural-based counties. Farmers who have begun focusing on producing for the local economy—selling their produce at the Community Market, to local restaurants, and to other institutions—have become almost too numerous to mention. Nevertheless, there is still somewhat of a supply-demand disconnect to which economic theory can speak all too well.

There are not yet enough restaurant patrons (or grocery shoppers) demanding and willing to pay a premium for locally sourced, sustainable food to make it profitable for more local farmers to shift their production in that direction. If there were such effective demand, economic theory tells us that the price premium would encourage additional suppliers to enter the market, eventually driving the price down. A lower price, in turn, would then encourage even more consumption, and so on. Lynchburg is just not quite at that point yet. Most restaurateurs are fearful that if they placed local, sustainably raised meat and produce at the centerpiece of their menus, selling at the premium prices such food commands, they would scare away their patrons. As well, there are few local farms with interest in the farm-to-table movement that are of a scale that could regularly meet the needs of an institution even as small as Randolph College (692 students). I posed that question to a local farmer and he told me that he could consider it only with a lot of assistance from other farms. On the other hand, though, Randolph College and the rest of the local area colleges facing tight budgets are not yet providing the demand for such food on a regular basis. Sustainably-raised chicken at \$3.50 or \$4.00/lb. is still a budget buster when commercial chicken at \$1.50/lb. is available.

The question of whether Lynchburg dining and grocery customers are willing to pay the premium prices needed to put local, sustainable food on the menus and shelves of our local food establishments takes us back to the issue of a local food culture and how to sink the “significant roots” necessary to bring about sustainable economic development. Education was the key according to Alice Waters, and the approach taken at the Martin Luther King, Jr. Middle School in Berkeley was to implement an integrated food curriculum. However, if the only food encounter students have during their time in our public schools is in the cafeteria, then the development of a local sustainable food culture will be difficult.

A look at the Lynchburg City Schools March 2014 secondary school cafeteria menu was revealing (Lynchburg City Schools). It featured Chick-fil-A sandwiches four out of every five school days for the entire month. A cheeseburger featuring local beef was offered twice during the month. Pizza and hot dogs were featured prominently, but fortunately were counterbalanced by a daily salad bar and assorted fruits. How well the salad bar competes with the corporate advertising that underpins Chick-fil-A products is not clear. A more recent menu (February 2015) did not feature Chik-fil-A products, but pizza was the most frequently offered food (12 days out of 20), along with chicken tenders, hot dogs, and corn dogs. Fortunately, the daily salad

bar is still offered. Assembling a menu of local, sustainable foods at a lunch price of \$2.25 is likely to be impossible. Is a fully integrated food curriculum possible in Lynchburg City Schools? Maybe... It will take vision, creativity, and most likely a larger budget. There are a small handful of schools that have added school gardens already. The Hutcherson Early Learning center, serving preschoolers with disabilities, was a recipient of one of the aforementioned community garden grants. E.C. Glass high school has two culinary arts classes. These are good beginnings. Virginia “grass farmer” Joel Salatin, of Polyface Farm, argues that sustainable farming can’t be done industrially. It requires more bodies; educated bodies who appreciate the art and craft of an agrarian lifestyle (Polyface Farm). Perhaps our educational system needs to fully embrace all aspects of food into the curriculum. If we need more farmers and food aggregators and such to supply Lynchburg with local, sustainable food— something that will enhance greatly the local economy— then perhaps we should be educating students in our public schools not just to be doctors, scientists, and accountants, but also to participate in all aspects of the local food economy, as well.

The services of a food aggregator (a food hub) would facilitate the transition to a local food economy. Restaurants, for example, operate on thin profit margins; seeking out local, sustainable food options necessitates lots of networking and trips to individual farms, taking valuable time and adding to their costs. It is much easier and less costly to simply arrange for the Sysco truck to pull up at the delivery door every few days (Thompson, 2012). Lynchburg will eventually get its own food hub. The commitment of our local hospital system, Centra Health, to grow part of the food it serves in its cafeteria in its own gardens and to buy as much food as possible from local farmers is the kind of game-changer that will speed along the process (Trent, 2013, April 28).

Luring a grocery store into Lynchburg’s downtown food desert continues to be a daunting task. A full service grocery store that could meet the stringent guidelines of a “good neighbor” grocery store, as in the earlier example, seems quite doubtful at the moment. A Fresh Market recently located in Lynchburg to the delight of many, except that, like the grocery stores that closed and relocated away from the downtown area in the 1960s and 1970s, positioned itself at a prime suburban intersection nearly six miles from downtown (and just over a mile from an existing WalMart). It did nothing to address the food desert problem. Space for a small natural foods grocery store is being developed at 13th and Main St. in the heart of downtown.<sup>th</sup> The target audience is the 30-something urban loft crowd that is beginning to reshape the population of census tract 5. Will a natural foods grocery address the food desert problem; making affordable, healthy food more easily available to Lynchburg’s poorer citizens? That isn’t clear as of this writing.

Convenience stores often are vilified as purveyors of little but alcohol, soda, cigarettes, and processed foods with little nutritional value. A recent effort by the Virginia Department of Health to introduce healthy foods into Lynchburg’s corner

markets was met with resistance. Conducting field research with my students in 2011 on the topic of food deserts, I asked the manager of a corner store that had absolutely no fresh food why that was the case, and he said simply that there was “no demand for it.” Overcoming such resistance (from both suppliers and demanders) could go a long way toward addressing the simultaneous problems of higher prices and poor quality food selection that exist when corner markets are the primary source of food for local residents (Abell, et al., 2011). DC Central Kitchen has had great success in overcoming such resistance in the DC area with its Healthy Corners program. In a city that has experienced a turnaround in its appreciation for healthy food (according to spokeswoman Janell Walker) DCK has strived to address healthy food access at corner stores from the supply side by providing an abundance of fresh, local, healthy foods to stores in underserved neighborhoods. Its impeccable reputation helps to open lots of doors. From the demand side, it has offered lots of education to accompany its food. This has involved primarily on-site cooking demos and tastings, whereby all of the food used in the demos are immediately available in the corner stores.

Lynchburg’s Community Market is the third oldest continually operating farmers market in the country. It is a year-round facility with indoor/outdoor vender stations (Saturday selling primarily, with summer Wednesdays). It sells both locally-sourced farm products and resale foods. Located in the heart of Lynchburg’s downtown at 12<sup>th</sup> and Main St., it has fresh produce and meats for sale even in the dead of winter. Could it be part of the solution to the food desert problem? It certainly has the potential to be so. Its food is competitively priced. In February 2013, my Economics of Food and Sustainability class at Randolph College compared prices of a small market basket of foods that could be purchased either at the Community Market or at the Boonsboro Road Kroger. The difference between the two was negligible. Could the market also be a driver of the local food economy? A city-commissioned study by the Project for Public Spaces (2004) suggested that it could. They referred to it as “job creator, vital social institution, and a catalyst for downtown activity and investment that is beginning to show handsome dividends. It is the anchor for what is becoming one of the most valuable real estate districts in the city” (p. 22).

The Community Market started accepting SNAP/EBT payments in July 2013. An accompanying double-bucks program, funded by the Virginia Department of Health, allowed SNAP users to get \$2 of food for every \$1 of SNAP money. The program was a huge success. In less than a year, all of the \$10,000 double-bucks matching funds were expended, meaning that \$20,000 went into the pockets of local farmers. It also means that \$20,000 of healthy, local food went into the kitchens of people living in Lynchburg’s low-income communities. While the double-bucks program was dependent on outside donors, it played an important educational role; introducing low-income residents to the attractiveness of healthy local foods. Healthier consumers make for more productive citizens. The market was recently awarded an \$82,000 USDA local foods initiative grant that will allow it to expand its outreach to citizens

of all means.

How can Lynchburg reach out to its most vulnerable citizens, and help them acquire the skills that would allow them to actively participate in a localized food economy? The DC Central Kitchen (DCCK) model theoretically is replicable. Lynchburg has over 50 food pantries or soup kitchens in the business of providing food to the poor and disadvantaged. It would make sense that with a bit of vision and creativity, and perhaps initially, additional outside funding, a few of these organizations could add valuable services like culinary skills training and related programs to their existing operations. Perhaps they could even help in opening the doors of local corner stores to healthier food for citizens living in the downtown food desert.

But there are other resources in the community that have the know-how to consider such training and programs. In fact, Alex Richardson has begun a DCCK-like program operating out of his downtown restaurant, RA Bistro. He views restaurant work as offering low-skilled workers a transitional opportunity to learn basic work skills that prepare them to earn more than just a minimum wage. Actually, he suggests that in his type of restaurant, few make as little as the minimum wage. He has been taking on low-skilled workers for some while now and giving them a leg up in his restaurant. Many of them are now out on their own in jobs that have taken them far beyond the

restaurant world.

Rooftop farming in Lynchburg, Virginia? The idea might seem a bit quaint until you use Google Earth and zoom in over Lynchburg's downtown. You quickly realize that there are acres and acres of available flat roof space. For most of the public schools, as well, at least some of their roof space is flat, which, along with lots of available ground level green space, would allow them to pursue the integrated curriculum envisioned at Southern Philadelphia High School or Martin Luther King Jr. Middle School in Berkeley. If Lynchburg wanted to pursue its own 25 percent shift, rooftop gardening offers one option.

In conclusion, there are exciting food solutions being experimented with around the country and even here in Lynchburg. They are going well beyond simply giving away food to the hungry. They are creating the conditions that can lead to genuine economic and human development; providing individuals with the sorts of skills that will allow them to participate actively in the local food economy and helping to lift them out of poverty. Try to image that vibrant local food economy: locally-owned grocery stores, corner markets, and restaurants brimming with sustainably produced foods produced by our area farmers. Food hubs facilitating those connections. Healthier, better educated citizens, gainfully employed, looking for additional ways yet to improve their quality of life. You have to imagine these things. They don't just happen.


#### APPENDIX A

Census Tract	Poverty Rate	Median Household Income	% 25 yrs + HS Grad or higher	% Female Householder	Black % of population	Unemployment Rate	Lynchburg Neighborhoods
1	8.1	\$59,821	97.3	13.4	6	3.4	Boonsboro (east), Peakland, Randolph College, Riverside
2.01	8.9	\$79,946	96	6.7	8.7	6.6	Beacon Hill, Bedford Hills, Bethel estates, Boonsboro (west), Boonsboro Acres, Boxwood, Carters Grove, Citation Run, Irvington Park, Oakwood, Royal Oaks, Waterton, Wildwind
2.02	25.6	\$39,793	87.5	27.6	28.6	12	Blue Ridge Farms, Lakeside, Linkhorne, Panorama Hills
2.03	62.9	\$4,808	86.7	34.2	11.5	13.4	Lynchburg College, Tates Spring (south)
3	18.1	\$30,483	82.2	29.9	26.8	7.5	Tates Spring (north), Woodland
4*	24.3	\$24,415	79.7	31.2	61.6	15	Daniel's Hill, Rivermont
5*	43.1	\$14,118	71.2	59.4	39.5	11.1	Downtown
6*	34.5	\$21,575	62.1	42.2	84.4	28.2	College Hill, Garland Hill, Tinbridge Hill
7*	36.7	\$26,797	77.1	37.8	47	22.4	Dearington, Miller Park
8.01	32	\$37,281	86.7	26	21.1	4.3	Westend
8.02	14.5	\$43,351	93.1	19.6	17.8	6.4	Perrymont, Waldon Pond
9	23.4	\$37,630	85.5	25.3	29.5	9.2	Keystone Forest, New Town, Sandusky, Sheffield, Turtle Creek
10	15.5	\$39,703	88.8	20.8	21.7	13.9	Fort Hill
11*	29.4	\$25,197	68.5	39.6	67.7	9.9	Diamond Hill
14	71.7	\$12,500	70.8	40.6	19.5	20	Montview, Liberty University
16	40.7	\$37,747	92.4	24.3	15.4	9.7	Brookville Village, College Park, Cornerstone, Doral Acres, Goodman, Grandview Village, Lakeland, Oakmont, Oak Meadows, Southland Acres, Vista Acres, Windsor Hills
17	12.4	\$53,708	94.8	9.9	7.7	2.1	Beverly Hills, Cedar Ridge, Heritage Hills, Kenwood Hills, Richland Hills, Roundelay, Seven Oaks, Settlement Estates, Skyview Park, Willow Bend, Wyndhurst
18	10.4	\$39,073	86.2	14.1	16	6.7	Forestdale, Gaddy, Maple Hills, Mayfield, Mill Bridge, Court, Tomahawk Village, Virginia Hills, Westburg
19*	37.5	\$22,239	75	50.6	57.9	26.9	Fairview Heights, Tyreanna, White Rock Hill, Winston Ridge

Note: \* denotes "downtown-oriented" census tracts. All data from US Census: 2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. Tables DP02, S1703, S1903.

APPENDIX B

# Lynchburg Census Tracts (2010 Census)



Note: 2.03 (Lynchburg College), 14 (Liberty University, Montview)  
 Source: US Census 2009-2013 ACS 5yr Estimates: Median Income in the past 12 Months

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# “It Ain’t No Cake Walk”: The Influence of African American Music and Dance on the American Cultural Landscape

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**ABSTRACT** The Cakewalk was one of the largest dance crazes America ever saw. The Charleston of the early 20th century it proved hugely influential on American culture for decades to come. Yet the dance and its rich history is lost to most Americans. Invented on plantations by slaves as a form of passive resistance it grew to be wildly popular across all classes and races. The Cakewalk with its fusion of the West African music tradition with a mockery of European dance influenced the structure of mainstream American music and dance in a way little else would. This article will explore the history of the Cakewalk in depth from the plantation to the minstrel show and further discuss its legacy.

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## INTRODUCTION

It’s not a radical assumption to claim that every single American has heard music influenced by slave song and dance. Blues, rock and roll, country, jazz, folk, if not out right invented by the Black community, were heavily influenced by the musical traditions brought over from Africa by the slaves.<sup>1</sup> Even bluegrass, whose name conjures up images of old white men on porches and the film *Deliverance*<sup>2</sup>, could not exist without the Banjo: a traditional West African instrument. All Americans have been consuming and enjoying slave music and dance since enslaved people were first brought to America.

The Cakewalk is a perfect example of how far reaching the influence of the African American community is. The Cakewalk is many things, a dance, a contest, a popular idiom, a celebration, and a subversion of white control over the enslaved. Picture a Cakewalk, as you might know it now. For modern Americans it is a very simple dance. Not even a dance so much as a game. People walking in a circle and those who land in certain spots receive a cake or prize. The original Cakewalk was much more intricate and required much more skill.

To fully understand how the Cakewalk was invented and how it evolved into what it is today it is important to know *where* it was invented. This source of entertainment provided by the enslaved later evolved into a huge part of the post-emancipation entertainment culture in America. This behavior became so engrained in plantation and white culture it forever affected the way American culture operated.

## CONTROL AND ENTERTAINMENT: PLANTATION CULTURE

As early as the 1700s legal restrictions regarding slave displays on plantations were beginning to be discussed and passed by white lawmakers. In the 1740 South Carolina Slave Code it was passed that slaves may not be caught “using and keeping drums, horns or other loud instruments...”<sup>3</sup> which seemed to be a direct form of suppression in response to the 1739 Stono Rebellion which was the largest slave rebellion in colonial times. There is also a 1755 Georgia law mandating a 30 shillings penalty for any overseer or master that let his slave use instruments.<sup>4</sup> These bans were also probably motivated by several others reasons than just rebellion; music encouraged large gathering of slaves, the foreignness of the sound compared to European music, not just the drums but the whooping and use of their native tongues, and the emotional response the drumming brought out in the Africans caused wariness among the planter class.

However as time passed, celebration and pageantry became a crucial aspect of white Plantation culture and southern white society<sup>5</sup>. Parties and Dances was the best way for white folk to mix, socialize, and show off in the South.<sup>6</sup> Portrayed in hundreds of movies the culture of entertainment among the planter class is easily imagined for modern readers. One can easily draw up mental images of huge-skirted white women and men drinking, dining and dancing in the ‘big house’ while being served by enslaved servants. Enslaved folk often performed the music and dance for the evening’s

1 Collins *West African Pop Roots*, 10-14.

2 *Deliverance*. Directed by John Boorman. (1972; Warner Brother Pictures)

3 South Carolina Assembly, 1740 South Carolina Slave Code, A. 1740 (S.C.). Accessed April 2, 2014.

4 James Johnston, *Georgia Colonial Laws, 17th February 1755-10th May 1770*. Washington DC: Statute Law Book Co, 1932.

5 Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth, *Within the Plantation Household*, (University of North Carolina, 1988), 207.

6 *Ibid.*,

entertainment.<sup>7</sup>

Masters on plantations in the south purposely procured slaves with musical talent or allowed for some training. John Finch wrote on slaves: “In Maryland dancing is fashionable; the slave frequently dance all night. In Virginia musical parties are more frequent: every negro is a musician from birth.” He then goes on to describe how slaves created their own instruments but above all else wished to procure a real violin.<sup>8</sup>

Mel Watkins discusses in her book, *On the Real Side* that “Southern slaveholders often encouraged the slave’s merrymaking. It was a source of entertainment for plantation masters as well as for their Northern American and European guests.” A slave who was busy singing also had a practical advantage, as they didn’t have time to plot against their master.<sup>9</sup>

Europeans and Americans found slave revelry fascinating. Often because of its “exotic” nature. J.H. Ingraham writes on slave dances, “I never enjoyed anything so much! I could fancy myself witnessing some heathen incantation dance in the groves of Africa! The moonlight shining through the trees, the red glare of the torches upon them, their wild movements, their strange and not unmusical cries, as they kept time with their voices to their quick tramping feet, their dark forms, their contortions, and perfect abandon, constituted a tout ensemble that must be witnessed to be appreciated.”<sup>10</sup>

Outside of white entertainment there were times after harvest in which enslaved folk were often allowed to have a night off to celebrate the end of harvesting in which they could dance, drink and play music.<sup>11</sup>

These practices of scheduled breaks were not the same for all plantations. In the Deep South nights off were not as common. The climate and the crops grown there like rice and indigo, have a growing and processing period that goes year round unlike cotton or tobacco. To successfully grow rice, in particular, this meant clearing and reclaiming swamp and tidal areas then draining these areas, creating artificial banks and irrigation systems. These crude agricultural systems required constant upkeep and repair.<sup>12</sup>

For the slaves this was labor-intensive work in the incredible heat and humidity of South Carolina and Georgia. On top of this never ending work year were the malaria, cholera, yellow fever

and myriad of other disease that incubate in swamplands.<sup>13</sup> As a result slaves in the Deep South found that there were little to no breaks in the plantation work schedule and plantation masters found the death rate of their slaves was higher than most anywhere else in the country.<sup>14</sup>

Holiday celebrations were another time for the plantation master to exert psychological control over the slaves. Drinking was a major part of these celebrations. Masters often encouraged this activity as it made the slaves too inebriated to run away and too sick to want to do much else during periods where there was little work to be done on the plantation.<sup>15</sup> Frederick Douglass said in his *Narrative*, “One plan [was] to make bets on their slaves, as to who can drink the most whiskey without getting drunk; and in this way they succeed in getting whole multitudes to drink to excess.”<sup>16</sup> Douglass also said in his other novel *My Bondage and My Freedom*:

*[a]ll the license allowed [during the holidays] appears to have no other object than to disgust the slaves with their temporary freedom, and to make them as glad to return to their work, as they were to leave it.*<sup>17</sup>

It was in a plantation master’s advantage to keep their slaves busy or incapacitated when the holidays came around to minimize fiscal loss. A slave who was busy not only working but also making noise was also one that could not be plotting any mischief or violence against their master.<sup>18</sup>

Some masters dragged their slaves into the big house even when there were no guests to entertain. This tactic was used to scare and exhaust slaves to keep them from running away; if you worked sun up to sun down picking cotton in the Louisiana summer sun and then were forced to provide entertainment for your masters half the night you’d hardly have the energy to run or openly rebel against the whites of the plantations. A Master named Epps in Louisiana was known to force his slaves to dance in the great house until utterly exhausted or face the whip. Solomon Northup recounted in famous narrative “Twelve Years a Slave”:

*“Bent with excessive toil—actually suffering for a little refreshing rest, and feeling rather as if we could cast ourselves upon the earth and weep, many a night in the house of Edwin Epps have his unhappy slaves been made to dance and laugh.”*<sup>19</sup>

This behavior was so violent and terrifying Epps wife often threatened to leave for her father’s plantation during these activities.<sup>20</sup> Humiliation of slaves so served some purpose to keep them from rebelling. Purposeful humiliation dehumanizes

7 Douglass, Frederick, *My Bondage and my Freedom* (New York , 1855), 255.

8 Finch, John, *Travels in the United States of America and Canada* (London, 1833), 237-38.

9 Cowa, Williams Tynes, *The Slave in the Swamp: Disrupting the Plantation Narrative* (2013), 30.

10 Ingraham, JH, *The Sunny South; or a Southern at Home*, (Philadelphia, 1860)

11 John Blassingame, *Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South* (USA: Oxford University Press, 1979) 117.

12 “A Brief History of Rice Culture of the 1870s”, University of South Carolina, 13-14, accessed January 22, 2015.

13 Ibid.,

14 Ibid.,

15 Douglass, Frederick, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass* (Boston, 1845), 75.

16 Ibid.

17 Douglass, Frederick, *My Bondage and my Freedom* (New York , 1855), 255.

18 Cowa, Tyler, *The Slave in the Swamp: Disrupting the Plantation Narrative*, (2005) 30.

19 Solomon Northup, *Twelve Years a Slave* (Auburn: Derby and Miller: 1853)181-182.

20 Solomon Northup, *Twelve Years a Slave* (Auburn: Derby and Miller: 1853)181-182.

and psychologically exhausted any enslaved population.

It's important to understand this climate of control and manipulation on plantations to truly understand the bravery of the passive resistance in the Cakewalk. The Cakewalk was not only a way of imitating the whites but as a way of preserving some of the collective enslaved populations cultural history through the music that accompanied the dances. With this dance slaves risked death and extreme bodily harm in the most terrifying of environments.

### IMITATION IS NOT ALWAYS FLATTERY: THE INVENTION OF THE CAKEWALK

The original Cakewalk, as we know from oral tradition, was a dance that imitated the style of dance slaves saw their masters perform. The dance the slaves imitated was from the early 1800s, known as the Georgian or Regency period. (These names apply more to British historical periodization than American but since English culture influence was still heavy during the 19<sup>th</sup> century it serves to characterize the cultural period as Georgian in this context as well.) The Regency style of dance was stiff and complicated. Anyone who has seen a film based on Jane Austin's writings can easily imagine the dances that happened at the white planter class' parties. The enslaved folk saw these dances when serving at the parties held in the big house. Enslaved folk found the intricate and stiff dancing funny and "high mannered" not at all like their own dances, which involved more personal expression.<sup>21</sup>

Cakewalk dances involved high steps and jumps. Partially due to it being accompanied by enslaved people's music not the Classical music that accompanied the enslaver's dances. And, because it exaggerated the small skips and hops in the white dancing.<sup>22</sup> Whichever participant danced the most like the whites—often phrased as who danced with the most "proudness"—would be declared the winner. The whites began to get in on the dance, delighted that the enslaved folk were learning the "civilized" dances. Often failing to realize that the enslaved folk were not learning out of interest in the white's dance but in mockery of it. Most whites did not catch on to this mockery.<sup>23</sup>

It was extremely common in the Work Progress Administration's slave narratives collected in the 1930s for ex-slaves to mention the Cakewalks and music played on nights and days off.<sup>24</sup> One ex-slave Estella Jones recounts about the Cakewalks held on her Georgia plantation:

*"Cakewalkin' was a lot of fun durin' slavery time. Dey sweep yards real clean and set benches for de party.*

*Banjos wuz used for music makin'. De women's wor long, ruffled dresses wid hoops in 'em and de mens had on high hats, long split-tailed coats, and some of em used walkin' sticks. De couple dat danced best got a prize. Sometimes de slave owners come to dese parties 'cause dey enjoyed watchin' de dance, and dey 'cided who danced de best. Most parties durin' slavery time, wuz give on Saturday night durin' work sessions, but durin' winter dey wuz give on most any night"<sup>25</sup>*

Before the WPA project there was little mention of Cakewalks in published work but it is believed that the Cakewalks started fairly early on plantations.<sup>26</sup> Many Historians believe that there is so little written memory of Cakewalks before the WPA project because most slave narratives written before emancipation were not focused on the few more pleasant memories of the narrator; they were to show the horrors of slavery for Abolition movements. By the 1930s, several decades after the end of slavery, it was not considered as crucial to only relate the more horrifying moments of a slave's life.

Leigh Whipple, too young to have been alive for any true Cakewalks, recounts this story told to him by a former slave he knew as a child:

*"Us slaves watched white folks' parties where the guests danced a minuet and then paraded in a grand march, with the ladies and gentlemen going different ways and then meeting again, arm in arm, and marching down the center together. Then we'd do it, too, but we used to mock em, every step. Sometimes the white folks noticed it, but they seemed to like it; I guess they thought we couldn't dance any better"<sup>27</sup>*

The formerly enslaved woman, who told this to Whipple, even credited this as the reason she was in such good shape at her age, because one her enslavers recognized her talent for the dance and turned into a way for him to make money so she worked less in the field than others.

This way of making money was the Chalkline-Walks. Chalkline-Walks were the Cakewalks turned into a moneymaking enterprise. Enslavers could take their best dancers to a dance where a chalk line was drawn in a square. Couples walked the line with buckets of water on their heads. The couples that spilled the least water from their buckets or on themselves would win their enslaver money for their efforts. This dance was based off the Cakewalks but was a way for enslavers to take something fun and make it a source of production for themselves.

These Chalkline-Walks also demonstrate how much the enslavers did not understand that these dances were a mockery of the whites. It only served to elevate and add incentive for

21 Baldwin, B. "The Cakewalk: A Study in Stereotype and Reality." *Journal of Social History* 15 (1981) 208. Accessed 2/12/14, doi: 10.1353/jsh/15.2.205

22 Due to the limits of paper technology I cannot show any films of Cakewalks but if interested I highly recommended going to the Library of Congress website and viewing the video of a Cakewalk performed by the Katherine Dunham Company in 1934. A full citation will be in the bibliography.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.,

25 Baldwin, B. "The Cakewalk: A Study in Stereotype and Reality." *Journal of Social History* 15 (1981) 208. Accessed 2/12/14, doi: 10.1353/jsh/15.2.205

26 Baldwin, B. "The Cakewalk: A Study in Stereotype and Reality." *Journal of Social History* 15 (1981) 207. Accessed 2/12/14, doi: 10.1353/jsh/15.2.205

27 Baldwin, B. "The Cakewalk" 208.

whites to partake in this invention of Black culture.

This is another reason, Baldwin suggests, we may not see depictions in art or white folks' diaries of Cakewalks before the Civil War. Satiric music and dance were not what whites expected of, in the enslavers mind, their sweet, child-like slaves. "Seemingly innocent spirituals, not songs of satiric and protesting social commentary, were what they believed Black People produced~ thus, they were what they [whites] heard and recorded."<sup>28</sup> Whites enjoyed consumption of Black dance and music before the Civil War but did not have any desire to figure out the meaning behind them. These dances were simply all the same "wild" dance and music. Many Black People enslaved and free, knew better than to sing their most controversial songs in front of white folk.

This is why the Cakewalk is a prime example of the sort of rebellion that took place on most plantations. For enslaved folk it was too dangerous to openly rebel against one's enslavers. While that did happen on occasion, often due to an outburst of rage that could be expected of someone put under those incredible, degrading circumstances, most subversion of the planter class' power was day to day. Not only mockery and mimicry but also purposely messing up orders or failing to learn simple tasks. A slave who tried the latter tactics then begged off from reprimand by playing into the enslaver's wrong belief that the slaves were naturally incapable or unintelligent. These tactics were quite common on plantations every day.<sup>29</sup>

Cakewalks in their original incarnation represented the subversion of the white gaze on the enslaved populations. It was an expression of slave culture, ingenuity, and intelligence. It displayed the hubris of the enslavers. It showed their incredible capacity to consume African American culture and at the same time completely ignore it. The dance would also become a prime example of later White America's ability to do exactly as their forefather's had: simultaneously consume yet insult, and discredit African American culture and its unending contributions to American culture.

### **TURN LEFT AND DO THE CAKEWALK PRANCE: THE INCREDIBLE POPULARITY OF BLACK ENTERTAINMENT**

Madison Square Garden was already in its second incarnation in 1890, Madison Square Garden I had only been opened 10 years before. The arena was the largest in the world at the time. During the sweltering summers and freezing winters as many as 8000 people could fit in the permanent seating. And the regular attraction for the Garden was the dance that had become the rage of nineteenth century Manhattan:<sup>30</sup> the Cakewalk. Madison Square Garden even became the home of the National Cakewalks Championships.<sup>31</sup> The competition was

28 Baldwin, B. "Cakewalks" 209.

29 Berlin, Ira. *Generations of Captivity: A History of African -American Slaves*. (Harvard University Press, 2003) Kindle Edition.

30 Jacqui Malone, *Steppin' on the Blues: the Visible Rhythms of African American Dance*, (University of Illinois Press, Jan 1, 1996), 71-73

31 Ibid.,

incredibly popular and the Cakewalk was a national sensation. The dance craze extended to Europe with shows in Paris and London. European composer Claude Debussy, perhaps best known for the song "Claire de Lune", wrote a song called "Golliwog's Cake-walk". The dance was even performed at Buckingham Palace.<sup>32</sup>

So why was a dance invented by slaves still being performed after the Civil War and why was it so popular? The answer is the Vaudeville or Minstrel shows. Vaudeville was extremely popular travelling variety shows in the late 1800s. The shows could consist of any number of acts and would be called by some "the heart of American show business."<sup>33</sup>

While Vaudeville included a variety of talents, Minstrel shows were by nature much more problematic. Minstrel shows featured black face whether performed by Blacks or whites. Black face was not a new concept in the 1800s or even in America; it is guessed that at least as early as Shakespeare's Othello those in black face played black characters.<sup>34</sup> Dale Cockrell estimates from his research that before 1844 there would have been around *twenty thousand* opportunities for Americans to see black face on stage.<sup>35</sup> These would have ranged from legitimate theater to lowbrow travelling performances.

The minstrel shows became even more exceedingly popular and they showcased every stereotype 19<sup>th</sup> century Americans expected of Black culture. The shows included stock characters and a usual set up of three acts with little variation in form. The mammy, the black soldier, and the provocative young mulatto woman were all common characters in these shows. One character, Jim Crow, was a stereotypical depiction of an African American male. One *Boston Post* article from the period would claim: "The two most popular characters in the world at the present are [Queen] Victoria and Jim Crow."<sup>36</sup>

A minstrel show would often be structured as so: there would be a troupe dance with song and wisecracks as the opening act then a variety of entertainment in the second often including the famous "stump speech" in which a performer would often make fun of the Black Vernacular English. This vernacular is referred to as AAVE by linguists and is considered a dialect of American English and by some a creolization of African languages and Southern American English.<sup>37</sup> These stump speeches were usually filled with puns and malapropisms. It was in this act the performer wore the costumes most associated with the popular images of minstrel shows.

32 Ibid.,

33 S.D. Trav, *No Applause-Just Throw Money: The Book That Made Vaudeville Famous*, (Faber & Faber: 2005)

34 Mel Watkins, *On the real side: laughing, lying, and signifying-- : the underground tradition of African-American humor that transformed American culture, from slaver*, (Simon & Schuster: 1994), 82.

35 Dale Cockrell, *Demons of Disorder: Early Blackface Minstrels and their World*, (Cambridge University Press: 1997), 15.

36 Cockrell, *Demons of Disorder*, 66.

37 William, Stewart, *Non-standard Speech and the Teaching of English* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics: 1964)

Charles Townsend published a pamphlet of advice on how to stage a minstrel show in which he suggests these costumes for a stump speech:

*In delivering a stump speech, let your costume be as comical as possible. If you are tall, wear a tight fitting suit, which will make you appear taller yet. On the contrary, if you are short and stout, emphasize it by wearing very loose clothing. Some stump speakers come on in a ragged suit and damaged "plug" hat, carrying an old-fashioned valise and huge umbrella...*<sup>38</sup>

The third act would usually be a musical slapstick routine often involving a plantation scene and this was when a simplified Cakewalk would be performed to end out the show.<sup>39</sup> The Harrigan and Hart show in 1877 was known for performing a Cakewalk in their sketch called "Walking for Dat cake, an Exquisite Picture of Negro Life and Customs."<sup>40</sup>

A lot of the music and dance portrayed in minstrel shows was debatably African American influenced. Some of the show, particularly the spirituals, was undeniably African American. Blacks did occasionally perform in these minstrel shows by having troupes of their own. They still did black face to exaggerate their features and wore the costumes made popular by white troupes.<sup>41</sup> Black troupes often emphasized they were the only true purveyors of actual Black song and dance. These troupes often faced racism in the South and did not last long.<sup>42</sup> These all-Black troupes were disdained by educated African Americans for taking part in perpetuating stereotypes to whites. But these performers were also able to get in subtle jokes and poke fun at white society. In one song the lyrics read that heaven is "where de white folks must let the darkeys be."<sup>43</sup>

Despite this disdain African Americans were often the largest part of the audience to see these black minstrels. In some cases the venues these shows took place had to relax the rules for where Blacks could sit so that the audience could fit.<sup>44</sup> There seems to be little primary documentation from the perspective of African Americans who viewed these shows but their popularity could be for several reasons: perhaps it was fun to take a joke and make it an "in-joke" or perhaps they wanted to support some of the only African American actors in America who could perform on a major scale. These shows were the first real opportunity for Blacks to get into American show business.<sup>45</sup>

As for why minstrel shows became so popular in post Civil War White America there is some debate. Some historians like to posit that because of the huge interest in these shows by white

audience that on some level, working class white Americans were genuinely interested in Black culture. Some theorize that it was a way of reconciling a cognitive dissonance between ingrained democratic principles and the undemocratic way they treated such a large portion of the population. The audiences could trick themselves into believing Racism was like it was on stage: harmless and funny.<sup>46</sup> This is too kind and not an explanation of the popularity in Europe where institutional racism was never as widespread. And even some segregationists hated minstrel shows thinking it subverted social norms and undermined southerners.<sup>47</sup> It's not to be argued some whites were probably interested in Black culture. Though it is hard to argue that by any standards the majority of white America was interested in anything but the racist stereotype of Black culture.

It's no coincidence that with the rise of American Nativism – the movement to favor Americans over immigrants – was also the same time period as the rise of the Minstrel show.<sup>48</sup> Remember this was a time when working class men and women, largely the much-maligned Irish and Polish, were considered as a different race than white Anglo-Saxon Americans themselves.<sup>49</sup> The working class most likely wished to consume comedy that reminded them of a simpler time before the Civil War. And on a subconscious level remind them that there is a group of people worse off than them.

After the Civil War and into the 20<sup>th</sup> century Cakewalks and minstrels were still popular, but the Cakewalk was becoming more of a dance craze than something directly associated with Blacks. *Clordiny – The Origin of the Cakewalk* was one of the most popular Broadway musicals in 1898.<sup>50</sup> Not only was it about the Cakewalk and featured black performers but also it was created by Will Marion Cook, an African American who had studied music in Europe. It would be adapted for the white stage by George Lederer where it experienced just as much success.<sup>51</sup> The extremely famous pioneer of film the French George Melies would even produced a short-film in 1903 called *Le Cake-Walk Infernal*. Malone claims that for the early nineteen-aughts it was as popular as the Charleston was for the twenties<sup>52</sup> and from the ample evidence of its popularity it's hard to argue with this claim.

But that was not the end of the Cakewalk. The Cakewalk's music would mutate and evolve into Ragtime music, which would then influence every major music movement of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Ragtime, is by definition, "ragged" because of it's syncopated,

38 Charles Townsend, *Negro Minstrels*, 1891

39 Strausburgh, *Black like You: Blackface, Whiteface, Insult & Imitation in American Popular Culture*, (Penguin: 2007), 105.

40 Fletcher, Tom, *100 Years of the Negro in Show Business!* (De Capo Press: 1984), 103.

41 Robert Toll, *Black Up: the Minstrel Show in Nineteen Century America*, (Oxford Press: 1974), 220-223.

42 Watkins, *On the Real Side*, 109.

43 Toll, *Blacking Up*, 239-240.

44 Toll, *Blacking Up*, 227.

45 Watkins, *On the Real Side*, 112.

46 Rachel Sussman, "The Carnavalizing of Race" (Columbia University: 2001), 79.

47 Sweet, *A History of the Minstrel Show*.

48 Strausbaugh, *Black Like You*, 76..

49 David Roediger, *Working Towards Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs*, (Basic Books: 2005)

50 Malone, *Steppin' on the Blues*, 71.

51 Ibid.,

52 Malone, *Steppin' on the Blues*, 72.

jumping rhythm.<sup>53</sup> Ragtime is directly correlated to the Cakewalk for several reasons: ragtime closely resembles the structure of a march but with the added addition of the African influenced polyrhythm, it came into full popularity after emancipation, in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, and “Cakewalk” was an acceptable synonym to label what is now considered Ragtime jazz.<sup>54</sup> Largely Black musicians pioneered ragtime like the extremely well known Scott Joplin, the lesser-known Ernest Hogan, and Tom Fletcher, and many more some of who have been lost to history.

Vaudeville proved the best vehicle for ragtime with ragtime theaters opening in most major cities and catering to mainly Black audiences during the early nineteen-aughts and through the twenties.<sup>55</sup> Many musicians who went into the jazz scene in the 1920s had started on the Vaudeville scene.<sup>56</sup> The jazz heard in these shows was considered “Novelty music” often incorporating strange sounds made on instruments or including street noises.<sup>57</sup> Vaudeville would lose popularity after the stock market crash and the invention of movies. Many musicians and performers from the Vaudeville business would move into other realms of entertainment.<sup>58</sup> After World War I and the rise of popularity in Jazz it seemed that finally Americans were truly creating their own music but it seemed the origin of the first true “All-American” music was already being forgotten. Carl Wittke says in his history on minstrelsy: *...without Negro slavery, the United States would have been deprived of perhaps the only and, certainly, the most considerable body of song sprung from the soil, which can properly be called American folk music. And without the large Negro population of the Southern states, the one purely native form of entertainment and the only distinctively American contribution to the theatre - the Negro Minstrel show - would have been equally impossible.*<sup>59</sup>

By all evidence this is true. Jazz would go on to influence “jump” music in the 1940s, a predecessor of Rock and Roll, which has “dominated American popular music since.”<sup>60</sup> Jump is characterized by its high-energy style meant to foster dancing. As seen again and again this has been the music style in the African American community since African roots of slave music in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century.

Rock and Roll would become the most popular music of the next several decades and become dominated by mainly white artists and Black artists would begin move on to other genres. Usually pioneering them before they came into popular culture.

53 Edward, Berlin. *The Grove Music Dictionary*. (Oxford University Press), “Ragtime”.  
 54 Ingeborg Harer, “Defining Ragtime Music Historical and Typological Research” *Studia Musicologica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*: 410.  
 55 William Kenney, “The Influence of Black Vaudeville on Early Jazz.” *The Black Perspective in Music*, 234.  
 56 Ibid.,  
 57 Ibid.,  
 58 Kenney, “The Influence of Black Vaudeville.”, 246.  
 59 Carl Wittke, *Tambo and Bones*. (New York, Greenwood Press: 1968), 3.  
 60 Ibid.,

By doing so these musicians carried the roots of the first truly American music that had been invented in the South despite all odds and in the face of incredible persecution. Rock and Roll, Hip Hop, Folk and Rhythm and Blues can trace its musical roots back to the Cakewalk and the slaves who invented it.

### CONCLUSION: “HISTORY WAS ALREADY BEING REWRITTEN”

The Cakewalk is somewhat lost to the modern times. “It’ll be a Cakewalk” is a popular idiom in the South and Midwest to describe when something will be extremely easy. A slightly insulting phrase considering how much skill the original Cakewalk required. School fundraisers, carnivals and fairs in the South are still known to have the odd cakewalk but most people aren’t familiar with the concept anymore.

The Cakewalk is largely forgotten despite the Cakewalks creating Ragtime, which influenced all American music of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. But the Cakewalk is only one of many cultural contributions forgotten by mainstream America. Gayle F. Wald discovered the same thing when researching pioneer of Rock music, Sister Rosetta Tharpe:

*One of the most amazing things that I discovered when I was doing my research was a review of a performance of hers in England in 1970 comparing her to a blacked-up Elvis in drag. And what’s so astonishing to me was the fact that history was already being rewritten - when in fact Rosetta Tharpe had been influential to Elvis Presley. **The way that we remember or forget is not just about the natural passage of time, it’s also a social process.** And forgetting takes place through discrete repeated acts of forgetting, [and] that process happens especially to black women performers in the musical world.*<sup>61</sup>

As Wald points out, it’s a social process. Whenever African Americans contributed to something the white communities reaction was to label it as simple, “novelty” like Jazz or using it as a way to make money like Chalk-line walks. This wasn’t a new process in the 1970s and it isn’t a process that has stopped. Look at white America’s reaction to rap, hip hop and dance trends like “twerking”. The reaction is often an aggressive and visceral. Music produced by the Black community is often described as “thuggish” or “ghetto”. This is largely true of media produced by all perceived “outside” of “American Culture”.

American culture is an Imperial Western culture and thus influenced by many other cultures; primarily those have come to America through colonization and immigration. When the first generations of slaves tried to practice traditional song and dance these cultural expressions were banned as they were seen as potentially physically threatening. Later as slaves mixed traditional with European culture it became a fascination and *culturally* non-threatening to experience slave music as long as it was on white terms. It was inconceivable to whites that slave

61 Gayle Wald, *Shout Sister Shout!: The Untold Story of Rock-And-Roll Trailblazer Sister Rosetta Tharpe*, (Beacon Press: 2008):

culture would have any affect on America and thus they did not mind consuming it.

Cakewalks were invented as a way for slaves to rebel against their captors. It was mimicry and a mockery. It was a way to get a modified version of their dance and music allowed on the plantation. In many ways the Cakewalk is an incredible example of survival and ingenuity of enslaved populations. Even in the worst circumstances possible people were able to preserve their culture and also mold the culture of a burgeoning society.

One of many messages extracted from the story of the Cakewalk is that American culture, so often automatically assumed as *white* culture is in no way such a thing. American culture is not even European. All the music, dance and art we think of as inherently American was most influenced by African roots. America's forgetting of the Cakewalk is a social process. One that is ingrained into the national conscious. Next time when consuming and critiquing American media we must actively question how much is valid critique and how much is just an ingrained reaction by white American culture to devalue media produced by people of color.

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# Virginia Voters and Governmental Power: Evaluations of Federal and State Performance

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**ABSTRACT** An analysis using a 2013 survey of 1,004 Virginia residents reveals that one's overall feelings about the federal government are tied closely to assessments of President Obama and Governor McDonnell with pro-Obama and anti-McDonnell respondents notably less critical of Washington. The reverse pattern applies to assessments of the state government. Partisanship and ideology are also factors, with Democrats favoring Washington over Richmond and the Republicans preferring Richmond. The Virginia findings are consistent with national research regarding the key role that partisan identification and assessments of top political figures play in citizen assessments of national and state government authority.

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## INTRODUCTION

In the United States, the federal government and the state governments experience periods of increasing and decreasing influence over policymaking as well as times of waxing and waning citizen affections. Over the past two decades, conditions seem to have been improving for state governments on both counts. Leaders of both political parties have treated citizen feelings about state governments as a significant force in national politics.

For the Republicans, a revived federalism movement started with Newt Gingrich's "Contract with America," and its focus on decentralized governmental authority. That initiative helped the G.O.P. take over both the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate in the 1994 midterm elections (Gingrich 1995; Jacobson 1997). In 1996, Bob Dole frequently cited the Tenth Amendment and promoted its "reserved" state powers clause during his presidential campaign (Harris 1997). The election of Barack Obama in 2008 triggered a revived hostility to the national government among many Republicans, a perspective that intensified as the new president sought to pass a major health care initiative (Barstow 2010; Urbina 2009). More recently, conservative Republicans responded with the Tea Party movement, an organization committed to reducing the national government's authority over citizens (Armev and Kibbe 2010; Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

Republicans have not been the only voices for a more modest national government. Even Democratic President Bill Clinton, who once proposed the government run a comprehensive national health-care program, sought to seal his reelection in 1996 by accepting Republican plans to turn over to the states much of the control over the nation's welfare policy (Skocpol

1997; Weissert and Schram 1996). Obama's Affordable Care Act likewise involved a significant amount of authority for state governments, both in creation of health insurance exchanges by state governments and the expansion of Medicaid programs at the state level (Sinclair 2012).

Favoring federalism appears to be a prudent political strategy, because public opinion polls and in-depth interviews with citizens have long shown considerable public enthusiasm for state governments and discontent with the federal government (Craig 1993; Farnsworth 1999a, 1999b; Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992; Roeder 1994). In addition, state capitals are often seen as the means to constrain excesses in Washington (Soroka 2014; Weingast 1995). But, politically speaking, Republicans seemed to gain more from this approach than do Democrats, whose bona fides as advocates for a smaller national government are highly suspect, to say the least (Campbell 2012; Farnsworth 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

This study will examine the citizen frustration with both the national and state governments. It does so through the use of a telephone survey of 1,004 Virginians designed to focus on feelings relating to federalism. The paper seeks to determine what factors best explain public views in Virginia concerning the federal government and the state government.

## PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS

The considerable public dissatisfaction with the government in Washington has long been a staple of political science research (Citrin, 1996; Craig 1996; Easton and Dennis 1969; Farnsworth 2001, 2002, 2003a; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Mann and Ornstein 2012). In fact, policymakers continue to debate

the issue of reducing national government authority in the discussion of federal policies like health care (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

Academics who have studied state governments have focused on two areas of comparison between the federal government and the state governments: efficiency and responsiveness. Linda Bennett and Stephen Bennett (1990) wrote that increasing the power of state governments is a natural path for a federal government to follow when Washington is being criticized for poor performance. In addition, increasing the power of state government for some programs may be a more efficient use of resources because states are closer to the points of service delivery (Herbers 1987; Rivlin 1992). The presence of citizen initiative in roughly half the states also creates at least the perception of greater state responsiveness in those jurisdictions, particular in comparison to more distant federal authorities (Arceneaux 2002). But critics doubt that state governments, which they are seen as more parochial, are more capable than federal authorities, particularly given term limits affecting some state legislatures (Kaase and Newton 1995; Kousser 2005; Wallin 1996). Along these same lines, recent research has revealed that state government performance suffers from a “democratic deficit” where policy outcomes frequently are not congruent with public preferences (Lax and Phillips 2012).

Of course, as V.O. Key (1949) once observed, one’s feelings about one’s own state government may depend on factors that vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Affinity for the different governments, in other words, may take quite different forms and have different impacts in different states. A general pattern of state policy responsiveness can be found in a variety of issue areas, including abortion, civil rights, civic culture, economic policy, and welfare (Arceneaux 2002; Berry and Berry 1992, 1994; Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993; Hill 1994; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012; Rice and Sumberg 1997; Wetstein and Albritton 1995). In addition, examinations of state voting patterns suggest a decoupling of federal and state political evaluations in many elections over the years (Atkeson and Partin 1995; Niemi, Stanley and Vogel 1995; Rozell 2014; Stein 1990).

Federalism and its consequences for public opinion are important areas for academic inquiry in large part because of the emphasis politicians have long placed on the idea of reducing the power of Washington. The large Republican electoral surge of 2010 and the Tea Party movement’s continued prominence into Obama’s second term suggest the need to reexamine feelings about state power and their consequences for public opinion in the current context.

Similar questions to those used here have been asked in some years of the American National Election Studies. In 1996, for example, 48 percent of respondents said they had the least faith and confidence in the federal government, as compared to 34 percent who selected the local level and 19 percent who objected most to state government. The lack of enthusiasm for the federal government in that survey was roughly comparable

to that of the mid-1970s, when trust fell greatly in the wake of the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal (Farnsworth 1999b).

The idea of enhancing state governmental authority found a ready audience among the ANES respondents in 1996, the last time (prior to the contemporary Tea Party movement) when a substantial anti-national government wave emerged in the US. When citizens were asked about where they placed the greatest confidence in the 1996 survey, the states finished first with 37 percent, as compared to 33 percent for local governments and 30 percent for the federal government. The state governments were much more highly regarded in 1996 than they had been two decades earlier, as the controversial “states’ rights” legacy of racial discrimination faded from public consciousness for many with the passage of time. In addition, the increasing accountability and professionalization of state governments since the Jim Crow era may have triggered changing--though not always positive--feelings about state government (Beyle 1993; Jewell 1982; Squire 1993).

Unfortunately, the questions are not routinely asked in the ANES, so a contemporary national comparison with the 2013 Virginia results is not available.

Virginia has long been a particularly strong voice for state prerogatives vis-à-vis the national government (cf., Atkinson 2006; Skocpol and Williamson 2012), and is therefore an idea place from which to examine public opinion regarding a revived federalism. Indeed, the recent volatility in the state’s politics – the state went from reliably red in presidential elections as recently as 2004 to a bluish shade of purple in 2008 and 2012 – only emphasizes the utility of study focusing of political views of national and state power in the Old Dominion (Rozell 2014).

So how might these apparent public feelings of federal frustration and state satisfaction translate into citizen orientations? Partisanship and ideology are often keys to public opinion formation, as are one’s age, race, income, education, political trust, political efficacy, and views about the government’s perceived competence (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). All are considered in the analysis below.

## HYPOTHESES

Three hypotheses are presented here:

H1: Higher levels of political efficacy, perceived governmental competence, liberalism, and Democratic partisanship will lead to more positive evaluations of the federal government.

H2: Lower levels of perceived national governmental competence, efficacy, liberalism, and Democratic partisanship concerning the federal government will lead to more positive evaluations of one’s state government.

H3: Lower levels of perceived state governmental competence will lead to lower evaluations of one state’s government.

Taken together, these hypotheses propose that support for

the federal government and one's own state government can be explained largely through two key avenues: individual background measures and evaluations of the federal and state governments.

## DATA AND MEASURES

At the center of this analysis are two questions asked of 1,004 adult Virginia residents in March 2013 that mirror the federalism questions asked in the 1996 ANES. The first of these questions asked the interviewees to identify the level of government in which they have the most faith and confidence; the second question asked the respondent to say which level inspires the least faith and confidence. The survey was conducted March 20-24, 2013 by Princeton Survey Research Associates International using landlines (502 respondents) and cellphone (502 respondents). The survey was sponsored by the University of Mary Washington's Center for Leadership and Media Studies. The margin of sampling error for the complete set of weighted data is plus/minus 3.5 percentage points. Statistical results of the survey were weighted to correct for known demographic discrepancies, and the results in this paper are based on the weighted results. Question wordings are found in the Appendix.

As expected, the federal government fares poorly in comparison with the state and local governments. As shown in Table 1, Virginia respondents said they had the most faith and confidence in their local governments, with 46 percent selecting this option. State government was ranked highest by 28 percent, with 26 percent selecting the national government. The survey was conducted shortly before the *Washington Post* reported about widespread ethical problems involving Gov. Bob McDonnell (R), his wife and other members of his family. Federal prosecutors subsequently charged McDonnell and his wife with corruption, doing so shortly after the governor left office in January 2014 (Leonnig and Helderman 2014). Had the allegations been released before the survey was conducted, the results might have been different.

By an overwhelming margin, Virginia respondents were most critical of the national government, with 63 percent saying

**Table 1: Evaluations of Levels of Government: Most and Least Faith and Confidence**

### MOST

We find that people differ in how much faith and confidence they have in various levels of government in this country... Do you have the most faith and confidence in [RANDOMIZE: (the national government), (the government of this state), or in (the local government around here)]?

Federal	26%
State	28%
Local	46%

### LEAST

In which of those levels of government do you have the LEAST faith and confidence? [IF NECESSARY, READ AND RANDOMIZE IN SAME ORDER AS PREVIOUS QUESTION: (the national government), (the government of this state), or in (the local government around here)?]

Federal	63%
State	20%
Local	18%

Source: UMW Survey of Virginians, March 2013 (N=1004)

Note: Percentages may not all add up to 100 because of rounding.

they had the least faith and confidence in Washington. Twenty percent said that they had the least confidence in the state government, and 18 percent viewed the local government as the least reliable.

## RESULTS

Table 2 demonstrates that there are distinct racial differences in feelings about the different levels of government in Virginia. White respondents were far more critical of the government in Washington, with 70.5 percent saying that they were most critical of the federal government. In contrast 42.7 percent of African Americans and 38.8 percent of Latinos said they were most troubled by the national government. For African Americans, the national government was the most negatively reviewed, while for Latinos one's local government was seen as the most problematic. The fact that the state government was not the most negatively view level of government by African Americans speaks volumes about the changing nature of Virginia politics since the days of "massive resistance" (cf., Rozell 2014). The high level of antipathy for the local governments among Latino residents may stem from the controversial policies in some jurisdictions – most notably those of immigrant-rich Prince William County -- regarding heightened police scrutiny of Latino residents (Constable and Bahrampour 2013). The differences in government evaluations among these groups are statistically significant.

**Table 2: Cross Tabs: Race/Ethnicity and Least Favored Level of Government (in percentages)**

	FEDERAL	STATE	LOCAL
<b>White</b>	70.5	17	12.5
<b>African American</b>	42.7	30.4	26.9
<b>Latino</b>	38.8	17.9	43.3
<b>Total Percent</b>	62.2	19.8	17.9

N = 837

Chi-square significance = .000

Cramer's V = .214 (significance < .001)

Source: UMW Survey of Virginians, March 2013 (N=1004)

Note: Percentages may not all add up to 100 because of rounding.

Table 3 examines feelings about the different levels of government using the traditional seven-point party identification scale. As expected, all three Republican categories were overwhelmingly critical of the national government, with more than four out of five respondents in all three groups identifying the national government as the most problematic. Independents likewise were highly critical of the national government, falling just short of the 80 percent level. Nearly half of the Independent Democrats were most critical of the national government, and even the weak Democrats were more troubled by the national government (42 percent) than by either the state or the local levels. Only for the Strong Democrats did frustration with the state government (then under complete GOP control) exceed frustration with the national government. Clearly Virginia Republicans have been far more effective in channeling frustrations with government towards Washington. Virginia Democrats are not nearly as supportive of big government as Republicans are hostile to it.

**Table 3: Cross Tabs: Party Identification and Least Favored Level of Government (in percentages)**

	FEDERAL	STATE	LOCAL
<b>Strong Democratic</b>	32.7	36.8	30.5
<b>Weak Democratic</b>	42	27.3	30.7
<b>Independent Democratic</b>	49.6	25.2	25.2
<b>Independent</b>	79.7	15.3	5.1
<b>Independent Republican</b>	86.4	5.1	8.5
<b>Weak Republican</b>	80.2	12.3	7.4
<b>Strong Republican</b>	86.9	5.7	7.4
<b>Total Percent</b>	61.8	19.9	18.3

N = 880

Chi-square significance = .000

Cramer's V = .339 (significance < .001)

Source: UMW Survey of Virginians, March 2013 (N=1004)

Note: Percentages may not all add up to 100 because of rounding.

**Table 4: Logistic Regression Analyses: Least Faith and Confidence in the Federal Government**

VARIABLE NAME	b	WALD
Age	-0.01	2.34
Education	.21**	9.02
Latino	-0.13	0.09
African American	0.24	2.5
Party ID	.16*	4.69
Ideology	0.1	0.53
Tea Party	-0.19	0.23
US Direction	.76***	20.56
VA Direction	-.34*	4.84
Obama Approval	.84*	5.29
McDonnell Approval	-.92***	10.85
US Trust	.86***	13.64
VA Trust	-0.32	2.27
US Economy	0.02	0.04
Big Interests	-.91**	8.87
No Say	-0.04	0.17
No Care	0.07	0.46
Complex	0.06	0.52
Sex	0.29	1.49
N	556	
-2 Log Likelihood	479.498	
Cox/Snell r-square	0.382	
Nagelkerke	0.517	

**CLASSIFICATION: PREDICTED VS. OBSERVED PREFERENCE**

	Not Least	Least
Predicted	154	42
Observed	67	293
% Correct	69.6	87.6
<b>Total % Correct</b>	<b>80.4</b>	

Notes: \* p < .05 \*\* p < .01 \*\*\* p < .001. Cut value set at .431.

Table 4 contains the first of two logistic regressions testing the extent to which one's relative hostility to either the federal government or one's own state government can be predicted by demographic, partisan, and ideological measures, as well as by political attitudes. OLS regression is an improper statistical technique for dichotomous dependent variables (was the respondent the most hostile to the federal government or not, in this table, or to their own state government, in Table 5). While a straight-fitting OLS regression line does not fit logistic distributions, a related technique known as logistic regression provides regression coefficients like those found in OLS regression and, therefore, relatively easily interpreted results. One key difference between the two techniques is that the effectiveness of the overall model can be measured both by an r-square statistic and by the percentage of the cases predicted correctly. Logistic regression is also preferred to some other statistical methods (like probit) for analyzing relationships with dichotomies or dependent variables with only a few values because of its greater familiarity to many scholars. The remaining tables in the paper contain unstandardized coefficients (b), standardized coefficients (Wald), an r-square measure, and case-classification results.

With respect to the results relating to the federal government, one notices at first the powerful influence played by measures that relate to the federal government (US Trust, US Direction, Big Interests) and an assessment of President Obama. All operate in the expected direction, with more negative assessments of the national government on these measures leading to an increased likelihood of being most critical of Washington. As expected, party identification was also influential, with Republicans most negatively disposed toward the federal government, as hypothesized. There is also an explicit state dimension to this federal assessment. Critics of Gov. McDonnell and those upset about the direction of Virginia politics were less likely to identify the government in Washington as most problematic. Interestingly, several variables were not statistically significant, including variables for Latinos and African-Americans as well as a measure soliciting views on the Tea Party movement.

The federal model, which has a Cox/Snell r-square of .382, correctly predicts 80.4 percent of the cases: 87.6 percent of the cases where the federal government was least liked and 69.6 percent of the cases where Washington was not the least liked. (The cut value for this equation was set to .431, as 43.1 percent of the respondents in these equations listed either the state or local government as their least favorite.)

Table 5 uses the same independent variables to predict whether an individual was most hostile (or not) to his or her own state government. Although the state model has a higher overall prediction rate, 82.3 percent, this is a highly misleading statistic; the high percentage comes from the fact that the model does not effectively distinguish people relatively hostile to state governments from those more hostile to some other level of government. The Cox/Snell r-square reading of .214 demonstrates the limitations of the state model, as does a closer look at the classification pattern. The model classifies all but one of the state least liked cases incorrectly.

Even so, many of the same independent variables are influential in both the federal and state models. Strong Republicans, those who believe the US is headed in the wrong direction, and those who like McDonnell and dislike Obama are least likely to place Richmond at the bottom of the governmental pack. So did people who thought the federal government cared about ordinary citizens and was not too closely aligned with powerful influences.

Interestingly, ideology matters here, with liberals most likely to disapprove most strongly of the state government. (Ideology was not a significant predictor of feelings relating to the national government). Once again, variables for Latino and African American voters were not significant. Support for the Tea Party movement was also not relevant to feelings about state government.

How well do these same variables predict more positive assessments of the federal government? The answer is not

nearly as well. Table 6 provides the same variables as those in the previous tables, but now considering whether those variables predict whether respondents listed the federal government as the source of most faith and confidence (23.4 percent of the sample did so). Many of the same variables that provided evidence of a strong relationship in Table 4 also provided to be highly useful in the equation reported in Table 6, though of course the coefficients that were previously positive are now negative as one would expect. Once again, party ID, education, as assessments of the national economic performance were highly valuable for federal government assessments, and negative assessments of the Virginia's performance were also statistically significant. (Direct assessments of Republican Gov. McDonnell ceased to be statistically significant).

The total number of cases correctly classified for feelings about the federal government fell slightly from the results of Table 4. But the model didn't work nearly as well when positive

*Table 5: Logistic Regression Analyses: Least Faith and Confidence in State Government*

VARIABLE NAME	b	WALD
Age	0.004	0.22
Education	-0.12	2.3
Latino	0.08	0.3
African American	-0.06	0.16
Party ID	-0.02	0.06
Ideology	-.31*	4.3
Tea Party	-0.48	0.97
US Direction	-.52**	7.03
VA Direction	0.24	2.19
Obama Approval	-1.10*	4.93
McDonnell Approval	.96***	10.32
US Trust	-0.24	0.98
VA Trust	0.31	1.87
US Economy	-0.16	0.08
Big Interests	.74*	5.64
No Say	-0.05	0.2
No Care	.23*	3.84
Complex	-0.11	1.12
Sex	-0.13	0.24
<i>N</i>	556	
<i>-2 Log Likelihood</i>	389.084	
<i>Cox/Snell r-square</i>	0.214	
<i>Nagelkerke</i>	0.351	
<b>CLASSIFICATION: PREDICTED VS. OBSERVED PREFERENCE</b>		
	<i>Not Least</i>	<i>Least</i>
<i>Predicted</i>	456	99
<i>Observed</i>	0	1
<i>% Correct</i>	100	1.2
<b>Total % Correct</b>	82.3	

Notes: \* p < .05 \*\* p < .01 \*\*\* p < .001. Cut value set at .822.

*Table 6: Logistic Regression Analyses: Most Faith and Confidence in State Government*

VARIABLE NAME	b	WALD
Age	-0.01	1.71
Education	-.27***	10.52
Latino	0.05	0.01
African American	-0.15	0.93
Party ID	-.24**	7.41
Ideology	-0.21	1.9
Tea Party	0.39	0.48
US Direction	-.78***	14.81
VA Direction	.55***	10.88
Obama Approval	-0.6	1.41
McDonnell Approval	0.1	0.11
US Trust	-.82***	11.03
VA Trust	0.39	2.97
US Economy	-0.22	2.08
Big Interests	0.22	0.5
No Say	0.07	0.4
No Care	0.06	0.24
Complex	0.02	0.35
Sex	-0.36	1.76
<i>N</i>	559	
<i>-2 Log Likelihood</i>	378.945	
<i>Cox/Snell r-square</i>	0.307	
<i>Nagelkerke</i>	0.469	
<b>CLASSIFICATION: PREDICTED VS. OBSERVED PREFERENCE</b>		
	<i>Not Most</i>	<i>Most</i>
<i>Predicted</i>	416	105
<i>Observed</i>	6	17
<i>% Correct</i>	98.6	13.8
<b>Total % Correct</b>	79.6	

Notes: \* p < .05 \*\* p < .01 \*\*\* p < .001. Cut value set at .766.

assessments of Washington were involved: nearly all cases were categorized as not favoring the federal government, regardless of whether or not those respondents did favor the national government.

How well do these same variables predict more positive assessments of the state government in Richmond? Again the results for the positive assessments (Table 7) are weaker than the negative assessments analyzed in the companion Richmond-related results of Table 5. As expected, Republican partisan preferences, negative assessments of President Obama and positive feelings about the general direction of Virginia were key variables in this analysis. The total number of cases correctly classified in Table 7 fell slightly from the results of Table 5. But neither model showed much of an ability to distinguish those picking the state government as the most or least favorite level of government from those who placed another level of government in that category.

*Table 7: Logistic Regression Analyses: Most Faith and Confidence in State Government*

VARIABLE NAME	b	WALD
Age	0.01	2.42
Education	0.09	2
Latino	-0.06	0.16
African American	0.27	2.66
Party ID	.16*	4.68
Ideology	-0.13	0.97
Tea Party	0.23	0.49
US Direction	0.08	0.2
VA Direction	-.44***	10.25
Obama Approval	.82*	4.58
McDonnell Approval	-0.34	1.43
US Trust	0.02	0.01
VA Trust	-0.33	2.84
US Economy	0.002	0
Big Interests	-0.41	1.68
No Say	0.004	0.02
No Care	-0.13	1.65
Complex	-0.04	0.23
Sex	0.35	2.61
<i>N</i>	559	
<i>-2 Log Likelihood</i>	547.531	
<i>Cox/Snell r-square</i>	0.147	
<i>Nagelkerke</i>	0.213	
<b>CLASSIFICATION: PREDICTED VS. OBSERVED PREFERENCE</b>		
	<i>Not Least</i>	<i>Least</i>
<i>Predicted</i>	397	144
<i>Observed</i>	1	3
<i>% Correct</i>	99.8	1.8
<b>Total % Correct</b>	73.4	

Notes: \* p < .05 \*\* p < .01 \*\*\* p < .001. Cut value set at .744.

Comparisons reveal that the “least favorite” results (Tables 4 and 5) were stronger than the “most favorite” results (Tables 6 and 7) for both levels of government. Clearly, when it comes to national and state governments negative assessments are more fully formed – and are more closely tied to the assessments of governments and government officials employed here – than positive assessments are.

## CONCLUSION

Why might the differences between predictions in the federal versus state comparisons be so dramatic? As expected, Republican Virginians seem committed mainly to a negative evaluation of the federal government. After all, Republican ideas of reducing federal power can be, and sometimes are, coupled with proposals to reduce state government authority as well. Along these same lines, Democrats are not all that positively disposed towards Washington either, though they are not nearly as hostile as Republicans are.

The results indicate that citizen evaluations about state government are largely ideological and partisan in orientation, though there is also an element of perceived performance shortcomings on the part of the federal government. The findings here much more strongly supported the link between the attitudinal measures and federal government feelings than any supposed link between those attitudinal measures and feelings about state governments.

The relative weakness of the state government models may be partially due to a media gap: there is far more news coming out of Washington than coming out of state capitals. The financial crises afflicting the mass media have led to significant reductions in the size of statehouse press bureaus over the past two decades (Graber and Dunaway 2015). In other words, citizens know a lot more about the shortcomings of the national government than they do about state government performance. As a result of knowing more about Washington, citizens can find more to feel negatively about (cf., Soroka 2014). Of course, the results here also demonstrate that negative news seems more salient than positive news, regardless of the level of government under consideration.

There are opportunities for further research on how feelings about the different orders of government are derived. Attempts to employ possible predictor measures for public views about state government have been hampered by this survey’s concentration on federal issues. Might more questions relating to state government efficacy predict levels of public feelings about state government? That seems likely, but this study cannot say.

Although reducing the totality of the national government’s functions may be popular rhetoric, one can wonder how desired that approach actually is by voters. Citizens continue to expect the federal government to provide a high level of public services, and elected officials at all levels rely on effective service delivery to help remain in the good graces of their constituents (Pew 2010).

One can also wonder whether citizens who dislike federal government power may also dislike state government power. The state questions used here, though consistent with previous questions asked by the ANES, may force respondents to choose which government they like the most even if they dislike them all intensely. To deal with this potential problem, future surveys might use thermometer measures or at least a five-point like-dislike scale to tap more precisely citizen orientations toward the different levels of governments.

This study, with its generalized comparison of federal versus state government power, might profitably be tested further in surveys of different state electorates. Distinct state political cultures could affect the results in ways not apparent in a study of Virginia residents. Another fruitful analysis could be the impact of public opinion about state governments on state elections.

This study is time-bound. As it happens, this survey was in the field a few weeks before the biggest political scandal in Virginia in decades was broken by the *Washington Post*. Further research into the changing nature of comparative evaluations of government and politics over time also should be an important part of future research. We do not know, for example, whether a revived states' rights doctrine will remain prominent in the minds of voters and candidates, even when a Democratic governor and a Democratic president preside in Richmond and Washington respectively.

## APPENDIX: SURVEY QUESTIONS

**MOST:** We find that people differ in how much faith and confidence they have in various levels of government in this country... Do you have the most faith and confidence in [RANDOMIZE: (the national government), (the government of this state), or in (the local government around here)]?

**LEAST:** In which of those levels of government do you have the LEAST faith and confidence? [IF NECESSARY, READ AND RANDOMIZE IN SAME ORDER AS Q9: (the national government), (the government of this state), or in (the local government around here)?]

**AGE:** Recorded in years.

**LATINO:** (1) Yes; (0) No.

**AFRICAN-AMERICAN:** (1) Yes; (0) No.

**EDUCATION:** What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received? [DO NOT READ] [INTERVIEWER NOTE: Enter code 3-HS grad if R completed training that did NOT count toward a degree] (1) Less than high school (Grades 1-8 or no formal schooling); (2) High school incomplete (Grades 9-11 or Grade 12 with NO diploma); (3) High school graduate (Grade 12 with diploma or GED certificate); (4) Some college, no degree (includes some community college); (5) Two year associate degree from a college or university; (6) Four year college or university degree/

Bachelor's degree (e.g., BS, BA, AB); (7) Some postgraduate or professional schooling, no postgraduate degree; (8) Postgraduate or professional degree, including master's, doctorate, medical or law degree (e.g., MA, MS, PhD, MD, JD).

**PARTY ID:** Traditional seven point party ID scale, ranging from Strong Democrats (1) to Strong Republicans (7)

**IDEOLOGY:** In general, would you describe your political views as (1) very liberal; (2) liberal; (3) moderate; (4) conservative; or (5) very conservative?

**TEA PARTY:** Do you consider yourself a part of the Tea Party movement? (1) Yes; (2) No.

**US DIRECTION:** Overall, would you say that things in the U.S. are headed more in the right direction or the wrong direction? (1) Right; (2) (volunteered) Mixed; (3) Wrong.

**VA DIRECTION:** Overall, would you say that things in the Commonwealth of Virginia are headed more in the right direction or the wrong direction? (1) Right; (2) (volunteered) Mixed; (3) Wrong.

**OBAMA APPROVAL:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president? [IF DEPENDS OR IF RESPONDENT IS UNSURE, PROBE ONCE WITH: Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president? IF STILL DEPENDS OR UNSURE ENTER AS UNSURE/DK] (1) Approve; (2) Disapprove

**MCDONNELL APPROVAL:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bob McDonnell is handling his job as governor? [IF DEPENDS OR IF RESPONDENT IS UNSURE, PROBE ONCE WITH: Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Bob McDonnell is handling his job as governor? IF STILL DEPENDS OR UNSURE ENTER AS UNSURE/DK] (1) Approve; (2) Disapprove

**US TRUST:** How much of the time do you think you can trust the FEDERAL government to do what is right – (1) just about always, (2) most of the time, or (3) only some of the time? [4, volunteered response: “never.”]

**VA TRUST:** How much of the time do you think you can trust the STATE government to do what is right – (1) just about always, (2) most of the time, or (3) only some of the time? [4, volunteered response: “never.”]

**US ECONOMY:** Would you say that, over the past 12 months, the U.S. economy has [RANDOMIZE BLOCKS: (gotten worse, stayed the same or gotten better) / (gotten better, stayed the same or gotten worse)]? [IF BETTER/WORSE, PROBE: Would you say MUCH or SOMEWHAT (worse / better)?] (1) Much worse; (2) Somewhat worse; (3) Stayed the same; (4) Somewhat better; (5) Much better.

**BIG INTERESTS:** Would you say that government is pretty much run by (1) a few big interests looking out for themselves or (2) is it run for the benefit of all the people? [IF R ASKS WHAT

IS MEANT BY “GOVERNMENT,” READ: Please think about the national government.]

**NO SAY:** Now I’m going to read you a few statements about public life in this nation. Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with them: “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.” (1) Strongly agree; (2) Somewhat agree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Somewhat disagree; (5) Strongly disagree.

**NO CARE:** “Public officials don’t care much about what people like me think.” (1) Strongly agree; (2) Somewhat agree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Somewhat disagree; (5) Strongly disagree.

**COMPLEX:** “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on.” (1) Strongly agree; (2) Somewhat agree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Somewhat disagree; (5) Strongly disagree.

**SEX:** (1) Male; (2) Female

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# Finding One's Way as a Geographer

## Remarks upon Receiving the Virginia Social Science Association 2014 Scholar Award in Geography

DONALD DAHMANN

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**RECIPIENT** DONALD C. DAHMANN is retired from U.S. Census Bureau and now in independent practice at Alexandria, Virginia

I accept this honor with sincere humility, and am particularly pleased to be recognized as a social scientist and as a Virginian. Let me explain.

None of us were born social scientists – I only came upon the term “social science” when applying for graduate studies in the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago. Nonetheless, from that time on, my professional life has been spent virtually entirely as a social scientist, typically in the context of national policy decision-making.

With respect to being a Virginian – I was not born here, but rather in Cincinnati, which was and remains, a remarkably nurturing place to spend one's formative years. But Cincinnati definitely is not Virginia. My initial understanding of Virginia derives from visiting here as an eight-year old – I understood it to consist of three-lane highways with “suicide” center turning lanes; Mr. Jefferson and his remarkable academical village and Monticello; and Williamsburg and Jamestown. I responded to this Virginia much as my son did many years later, when he was about the same age. While our family was visiting Williamsburg, he asked, “How old are these people, anyway? They don't look two centuries old.” For some thirty years now, I have worked at “being a Virginian” while residing in Northern Virginia, a region I realize that some regard as not “true Virginia” – but that might be said of a few other corners of the state as well. As my own research into the history of Alexandria has revealed that this perspective has existed since at least the eighteenth century, I no longer feel uncomfortable when other Virginians consider me an outsider because of where I live.

And, I do not believe that I was born a geographer – although I enjoyed venturing out to discover new corners of Cincinnati very early, my introduction to formal instruction in geography during primary and secondary schooling was minimal. I do recall that I enjoyed making maps. Following my freshman year of college at the University of Cincinnati, however, I took a summer-term, three-hour-a-day, five-day-a-week course in human geography, which was offered primarily for middle-school geography teachers – by the end of that course, geography had captured my imagination. Suddenly, I was majoring in geography, and for the next three years sought as much course-work as possible in it and in the university's urban-focused offerings in economics, sociology, and history. By graduation, I had hand-drafted – the mapping capacities of

today's geographic information systems did not exist during the 1960s – several maps to accompany professor's publications in scholarly journals, and knew that I wished to pursue graduate study in either urban geography or urban planning.

Before that could happen, however, I had a military-service commitment with the United States Army, which turned into three years as an officer in the Corps of Engineers. Fortunately, as a bachelor-degreed geographer, I was able to attend the Defense Mapping School and become a topographic engineer, after which I spent two years in West Africa with the Liberia-United States Mapping Mission, a U.S. Agency for International Development project established to produce a large-scale topographic map of Liberia. The maps, an important economic development project, were produced, plus I received a non-degree, but world-class, program of comparative instruction in how another region of the world operates.

I returned to the United States and three years of blissful inquiry as a graduate student at the University of Chicago, nominally in geography, but with considerable course work in the faculties of statistics, economics, social thought, sociology, and history. While at Chicago, I participated in a research project that was sponsored by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for which I prepared several chapters of a monograph on the impacts of the geographic structure of America's settlement system on various forms of environmental pollution (*Land Use, Urban Form and Environmental Quality*, Chicago 1974), and then prepared a dissertation, which demonstrated that the spatial structure of a large urban school system can have more impact on students' life opportunities than their scholastic ability or their family's socio-economic status (*Locals and Cosmopolitans: Patterns of Spatial Mobility during the Transition from Youth to Adulthood*, Chicago 1982).

Following graduation from Chicago, I took a position at the National Research Council-National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C., to prepare a background paper for a conference of social scientists inquiring into the consequences of the unexpected increase in population growth in the nation's nonmetropolitan areas during the early 1970s (*Population Redistribution in the United States in the 1970s*, National Academy of Sciences and *Population Redistribution and Public Policy*, National Academy of Sciences 1977 and 1980). It served as a marvelous up-close-and-personal introduction to the

hard-nosed competition that can take place among social scientists outside the academic arena.

After the Academy, I took a position at the U.S. Census Bureau, where I spent nearly three decades as a social scientist cum geographer cum statistician producing statistics on population distribution, human settlement, geographical mobility, migration, and housing; and conducting research into current changes in these topics, their causes and consequences, and possible impacts on federal policies and programs.

This work included the publication of reports in annual statistical series that always drew media attention. While I was in the classroom during this period teaching an urban geography course every other year at George Washington University, newspaper reporters and columnists were also my students, and perceptive and competent students they proved to be. Standard census statistical reports, though loaded with interesting details, are highly structured, and some would say, a tedious medium for producing public statements on social science topics. The expectation that such reports would be written in highly structured manners is demonstrated by my once being interviewed by a seasoned “Wall Street Journal” reporter simply because a report I had authored contained a word he had never seen in a federal-government publication (sadly, I cannot recall the word). I am pleased to be able to say that all of the reports that I produced resulted in articles in the “New York Times,” the “Wall Street Journal,” and the “Washington Post,” and in numerous popular media spots as well.

My position at the Census Bureau also enabled me to conduct independent research with its large-scale, national-level, data sets, and to publish findings in academic journals. Most of this research focused on the geographic contexts in which standard social-science research topics occur. With housing, I sought to discover the consequences of residents’ geographic setting – in inner-city locales; in older or in newly built suburban areas; in small, medium, or large metropolitan areas; in low, middle, or high-income neighborhoods; and a host of other geographic-setting variables; and always region of the country. I am certain that it is easy for you to understand that one’s residential setting remains an important social-science variable. Unfortunately, that is not always the case within the Washington Beltway, probably because economists, who dominate social science circles there, take the location of one’s housing as being embedded in house value, so geographic setting per se is not viewed as relevant. One of the topics I extensively examined was the responses of residents to conditions in their local neighborhoods – results of these studies were regularly incorporated into the President’s Nation Urban Policy Reports and the several federal-government social indicator reports issued during the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, however, the federal government stopped collecting these data altogether, in part because people were not reporting that their neighborhood conditions were improving, and in part because federal housing policy turned to promoting home ownership as the principle means of improving the housing and neighborhood conditions of Americans.

Since I left the Census Bureau, I am now fortunate to be able to address other topics. I have turned to research in two areas that have long interested me – the history of Alexandria and the history of the discipline of geography in the United States. My first real discovery about Alexandria’s history was brought to light in a book that features the personal diary of a Presbyterian minister from 1805 – revealing a voice from two centuries ago (*Diligent and Unwearied in the Discharge of His Pastoral Duties: The 1805 Diary of the Rev. Dr. James Muir, Minister of the Old Presbyterian Meeting House in Alexandria, Virginia*, Heritage 2011). I located the diary in the state archive, where it was catalogued as an almanac. About researching local history otherwise, I will only say that I have learned that examining Alexandria’s history as a social scientist, rather than telling stories that reproduce existing myths, is considered fairly unique and definitely an outsider’s approach to the subject.

My work on the history of geography in the United States has led to the creation of a website that documents 500 years of geography in America in a timeline format (*Geography in America Timeline*); providing material that accompanies the online digital versions of nineteenth and twentieth-century U.S. national atlases that are part of the American Memory project at the Library of Congress (*Presenting the Nation’s Cultural Geography*); providing several essays for the University of Chicago’s eight-volume History of Cartography project; and preparing an examination of geography works published in the United States during the nineteenth century (*Geography in America’s Schools, Libraries, and Homes*, National Council for Geographic Education 2011). The latter piece demonstrated that Americans were once extremely curious about Earth’s human and physical geographies, with the connections between them, and with their consequences for Earth’s residents – more than 1,600 works were produced in the United States during the nineteenth century in response to this demand. These works were created not only for consumption in school classrooms, but were prepared for adults and for markets abroad as well. Currently, I am preparing a biography of Henry Gannett (1846-1914), whose influential career involved him in numerous activities of national consequence during the late nineteenth century, including establishing federal government programs in topographic mapping and geographic operations for decennial censuses; founding and managing the National Geographic Society; and nurturing various aspects of the nation’s initial environmental conservation efforts (*Henry Gannett and the Transition of American Geography from the Exploration of a Continent to Geographic Information Systems and Scientific Explanation*, tentative title).

Not born a geographer, or a social scientist, or in Virginia, I am happy to now say that I have found my way to immense satisfaction being a geographer and social scientist and to residing in Virginia. Again, my thanks to the Virginia Social Science Association for this honor, and for your support of social-science research in the Commonwealth of Virginia.